Sign

Sign "Drummer 11 five-year plan" Established by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League dated March 26, 1981 N304 "On the All-Union Socialist Competition for the successful fulfillment and overfulfillment of the tasks of the eleventh five-year plan."

Regulations on Badge "Drummer 11 Five-Year Plan" approved By the Decree of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions N P-8, the USSR State Committee for Labor N 289 dated 09/25/1981 "On approval of the Regulations on the unified all-Union sign "Drummer of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan"

Sign "Drummer 11 five-year plan" was awarded on the basis of the results of the 11th five-year plan (1981-1985). It is identical to the badge of the drummer of the 10th five-year plan.

The badge was made of aluminium, has an oval shape and is edged with laurel and oak leaves. Below on the sides are ears of wheat. In the center is an unfolded red banner with the inscription "drummer of the 11th five-year plan", at the bottom of the sign there is a red ribbon with the inscription "USSR" between the banner and the hammer and sickle ribbon, at the top is a red star.

The sign is attached with a pin. Along with the badge, an appropriate certificate was presented, which indicated the full name of the recipient and the name of the organization by whose decision the drummer was awarded.

Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League of March 26, 1981 N304 "On the All-Union Socialist Competition for the Successful Fulfillment and Overfulfillment of the Tasks of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan"

Extract:

"..8. Establish a memorial sign of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League "For the high efficiency and quality of work in the eleventh five-year plan" to reward teams of enterprises, associations, construction projects, collective farms, state farms, research and other organizations and institutions, higher educational institutions. A commemorative badge to award teams that have achieved high quality work and the best performance in fulfilling the tasks of the eleventh five-year plan, repeatedly awarded the annual results of the All-Union Socialist Competition of the Red Banners of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League.

To award the winners in the All-Union Socialist Competition, establish the number of passing Red Banners of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Central Committee of the Komsomol and Commemorative Signs according to the appendix (not given).

To reward workers, collective farmers, engineers and technicians, specialists and employees, to establish unified all-union badge "Drummer of the eleventh five-year plan" with the presentation of a memorable gift for achieving high rates in improving the efficiency and quality of work, ahead of schedule fulfillment of tasks and socialist obligations ... "

For the 11th five-year plan, the national task was to give the country's development even greater dynamism through more efficient use of production assets, their further development and renewal, the introduction of advanced technologies and the achievements of scientific and technological progress, especially in heavy industry. In the light Food Industry Along with the creation of new capacities, the expansion and technical re-equipment of existing enterprises was actively carried out. Total length of main oil and gas pipelines and branches from them reached 54 thousand and 112 thousand kilometers, respectively. On the whole, during the five-year period, the national income and the gross social product increased by another 19 percent. Real incomes per capita, payments and benefits to the population from public consumption funds increased by 11 and 25 percent, respectively.

Badge "Drummer 11th Five-Year Plan" of the USSR is included in the list of departmental insignia in labor, giving the right to confer the title of "Veteran of Labor".

The tasks that were set in the first five-year plan were to increase the growth of industrial output by 136%, labor productivity by 110%, and reduce production costs by 35%. Also, at the end of such buildings as the Dneproges and Turksib by 1930, it was decided to build over 1200 factories (according to one of the delegates to the 5th Congress of Soviets, when these plans were approved, it seemed that Rykov was sitting on a huge chest with money and distributing factories to everyone who wishes). The advantage was given to heavy industry, 78% of the budget was invested in it. Despite the excessive increase in the productivity of products, at the Sixteenth Party Congress it was decided to fulfill the plan in four, not five years. It was to be expected that not all plans came to fruition. By 1930, the construction of hundreds of objects was frozen. There was a shortage of raw materials, technical equipment and labor. Due to the lack of resources, it was decided to transfer their distribution into the hands of administrative structures. It was they who decided which enterprise and in what order would receive the materials they needed. Of course, this led to the decline of many enterprises that were at the bottom of the list, as they were not involved mainly in the five-year plan. The enterprises that were the first to receive everything they needed, such as the metallurgical plant in Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk, tractor plants in Kharkov and Chelyabinsk, etc., were an example for the whole country in production.

The system of priorities worked, but it was not a way out in the current situation, rather it was a half-measure that did not allow the economy of the USSR to collapse in the early 30s of the twentieth century. Another problem was the shortage of qualified personnel. This problem was created by the party itself. From 1928 to 1931 A campaign was launched against the "bourgeois specialists". This decision was made in order to strengthen the power of his party in the country, since almost 80% of the top leadership held their posts under the old government. In total, about 300,000 workers were "cleansed" during this time. And this is 300 thousand skilled workers. The power in the enterprises began to belong to the chief director (necessarily a member of the party), and the education of "such" directors usually did not exceed even the initial one. Communist workers were promoted to responsible posts.

Add to all this mass arrests arranged because of "sabotage in the workplace." If the enterprise did not fulfill the plan, then the responsibility fell not only on the head of the enterprise, but also on all its employees. From this I conclude that an atmosphere of fear and oppression was created at the enterprises.

What can be learned positively from the first five-year plan? And the fact that despite the loss of qualified personnel, the party government has created institutions for advanced training of workers. So from 1928 to 1932. the number of students in workers' faculties increased from 50,000 to 285,000. Approximately 660,000 communist workers "departed from the machine" and took up higher positions or went to refresher courses. The CPSU promised promotion to those communist workers who received the appropriate education, thereby recruiting more skilled workers. Thus, the campaign to promote new workers to positions of responsibility, who are members of the Communist Party, was successful. In view of this, the face of the working class has changed. Unemployment among the working class also disappeared. In industrial and construction enterprises, the number of workers increased from 3.7 million to 8.5 million.

In 1930, a mass migration of peasants to the cities for enterprises began, which entailed new problems. In general terms, this is a decrease in labor productivity, due to new unskilled workers.

An increase in staff turnover, riots, industrial injuries - all this led to defective products, as a result of which the five-year plan was not fulfilled.

But timely measures were able to resolve the problem. The specialists of the old school were called up again. Internal passports were introduced at enterprises to reduce staff turnover and absenteeism at the workplace and piecework wages. Tougher penalties for absenteeism. This is not the whole list of measures that led to a new social system to raise the economy of the state. As planned, the five-year plan was completed in 4 years and 3 months.

The first five-year plan was able to achieve some successes, although not those that were set. The table shows the planned indicators before the amendment, which increased them significantly. (See Table No. 1.)

Table number 1.

Planned average annual growth rate for 1928 - 1932. the actual amounted to 11.9, which in the end is 41% of the implementation of planned targets.

Three other factors are worth noting:

The production of light industry goods was not given so much attention and the plan was only 70% fulfilled.

The volume of capital investment in industry in relation to the gross national product has increased 3.5 times in five years. True, to the detriment of the standard of living of the people.

The goal was also to increase labor productivity by 110%, but this indicator did not move (according to some reports, it even fell by 8%)

At the end of the first five-year plan, the new five-year plan was already adjusted. Having learned from the bitter experience of the previous five-year plan, the new project did not overestimate the bar for the industrialization of the country. True, the new indicators were higher than the previous ones, but it was believed that after a relatively successful first five-year plan, this plan could be implemented, since it turned out to be more balanced. Another difference from the first five-year plan was the increase in the budget for light industry, which amounted to 18.5% and 14.5% growth per year. The main emphasis was placed on improving the standard of living by increasing wages and reducing the retail price by 35%. It was supposed to raise the level of consumption among the population two, three times.

New methods were developed for industrialization in the country. Heavy industry switched to work without subsidies, based on the example of the Makeevka Metallurgical Plant. In 1936, the experience of economic settlement was expanded. People's Commissars were allowed to manage the funds of an industrial enterprise, also have an account with the State Bank, and sell products. But the new policy did not mean the legalization of private capital.

In industrial production, a separate wage is introduced, where wages depend on productivity. This is a new system to stimulate the working class, forced to improve their skills of people employed in the enterprise. It becomes prestigious to be a specialist in your field. The main motive is to "catch up and overtake the developed countries in order to prove that the Soviet worker is in no way inferior to the workers of other countries." Already in 1935, the result of such a policy was noticeable, expressed in the growth of labor productivity.

The ruble was not left without attention, a policy was carried out to strengthen it. On January 1, 1935, ration cards for bread went out of use, followed by ration cards for meat, fats, granulated sugar and potatoes on October 1 of the same year. In January 1936 the rationing system was abolished.

At the same time, the Stakhanovite movement was born, consisting in a narrow distribution of labor, when each worker specialized only in his own work. Such a distribution at times increased the quality and speed of the plan. The stimulation of the Stakhanovites was not only moral, but also monetary, thanks to which their number grew relentlessly. "Stakhanovite schools" appear, in which more experienced workers pass on their knowledge to less experienced ones. This is another factor in increasing labor productivity.

Unfortunately, the second five-year plan was not without its drawbacks. Forced labor was still used. After the first five-year plan, the number of prisoners only increased, and at the end of the second five-year plan their number was 1,668,200. The labor of special settlers was also used. Such work could be called almost free. The incentive for such "workers" was early release, material rewards, medals and orders. In my opinion, it was precisely such work that played an important role in the development of industrialization. Over two million workers who work, one might say, on incentive alone. It was with their help that the Moscow-Volga Canal, Magnitogorsk and the White Sea-Baltic Canal were built. Of course, the result of such work was a high mortality rate.

Table #3

Production of certain types of machinery and equipment

From Table. 4 shows what a leap was made during the years of the second five-year plan in comparison with the end of the first.

Table number 4.

The percentage of fulfillment of planned targets increased by 29% compared to the previous five-year period. Both in the first and in the second five-year plans, it was not possible to achieve the planned average annual growth rate, but nevertheless it was possible to increase it noticeably.

Table number 5

Observing the growth of indicators, we can say with accuracy that the economic policy of the USSR was on the right track. The second five-year plan did not repeat the mistakes of the first, but created other problems for itself. Such as a decline in the standard of living on collective farms, a slowdown in the growth of agriculture, long queues for food and "blat". But if you close your eyes to all these disadvantages, the USSR created a powerful military-industrial complex. Ranked first in Europe in terms of production volume.

This is the last five-year plan, which I will talk about in more detail, in the future I will give dry statistics and, based on it, I will draw a conclusion for the period from 1946 to 1991.

Let's start with the fact that the beginning of the five-year plan fell on the beginning of the Second World War. The defense had to allocate a quarter of the state. budget. In 1940 appropriations were increased to 1/3, and in 1941 almost to half of the country's budget. According to official data, the average annual growth rate of military production was 39%. The production of tanks was doubled. Even non-military enterprises received orders for military equipment. Main geographic location new factories became the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia.

The objective of the Third Five-Year Plan was to catch up with the developed countries in terms of industrial output per capita. The main indicator was quality, not quantity. The chemical industry developed and the first steps were taken in the automation of production. In just 3 years, production increased by 34%, a figure close to fulfilling the five-year plan, but not enough.

A new problem, which took us by surprise, is the shortage of qualified personnel, the need for which has grown in comparison with the second five-year plan. So on October 2, 1940, a system was created for the preparation of state labor reserves. Workers of the highest and middle qualifications were still taught by institutes and technical schools.

Education has become more accessible. By 1940, the number of educational institutions was 4600. The number of other cultural institutions also increased. The level of healthcare has risen. In my opinion, all these achievements were canceled out by hunger, a housing crisis and a decrease in purchasing power. Wages rose, but rose along with prices. Despite the industrial leap, society was fed worse than in 1913.

In 1940, the number of workers grew to 23-24 million people.

At the beginning of the winter of 1941, gross industrial output dropped 2.1 times. Such a sharp jump is associated with the occupation of the USSR by German troops.

The third five-year plan was destined to be interrupted because of the war. Having considered the third five-year plan, I conclude that the government of the USSR, although it made plans for 5 years ahead, did not look into the future. In the third five-year plan, the same problem with the shortage of qualified personnel as in the first one arose. But it is also worth noting that the placement of new industrial plants as far as possible from the front line played an important role in the Second World War. Even after the war, these factories continued to function and develop. And it was on them that the production of a new military equipment.

By 1948, the level of industrial production was brought closer to the pre-war level. More than 6,200 large industrial enterprises have been rebuilt and restored. 1946 On December 25, the first nuclear reactor in the USSR was built.

In 1948, the building of the first atomic industrial reactor "A" of plant No. 817 was built and on June 18 of the same year the reactor "A" was launched. Successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb was carried out on August 29, 1949 at the constructed training ground in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan. Thus, depriving the United States of a monopoly on atomic weapons.

By 1950, the pre-war level of production was restored: in industry, the figure increased by 41%, in construction by 141%, in transport and communications - by 20%. The pre-war level of gross output was increased by 73%. Power stations have been launched: DneproGES, Dnieper region, Donbass, Chernozem region, North Caucasus. The production process has been set up at the metallurgical and machine-building plants of the South. Reduction in the retail price of food and consumer goods from 1947 to 1953

The main policy was directed towards the development of nuclear weapons and the use of atomic energy. What later made the USSR a world power.

Table number 7

The volume of capital investments in the national economy of the USSR in 1946-1958

Table No. 8

Commissioning of fixed assets of the national economy in the USSR, production capacities and facilities in 1946-1958.

The task is to restore the national economy. More than 3,000 large industrial enterprises have been built in the USSR. The national income grew by 71%, the volume of production by 85%, the volume of agricultural production by 21%, capital investments by 1.9 times.

Increased growth in coal production. An oil refinery was built in Omsk. In 1952, the Volga-Don shipping canal was opened. The world's largest gas pipeline Stavropol - Moscow was built. About 13 million hectares of new land have been put into circulation.

Table No. 7, No. 8

The main task of the sixth five-year plan, like the fifth, was to raise the national economy. 2400 more large enterprises have earned. The growth of national income increased by 0.5 times, gross industrial output increased by 64%, gross agricultural output by 32%. The world's first artificial satellite was launched into space on October 4, 1957. Europe's largest plant in Ivanovo began its work. Gorky, Irkutsk, Volga, Kuibyshev hydroelectric power stations were built. Obtaining a nuclear missile shield.

Table No. 7, No. 8

A comparison of the indicators of the three plans is shown in Table No. 9.

Table No. 9

Comparison of indicators of the development of the national economy in the 9th Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) with indicators of the 7th and 8th Five-Year Plans

National income grew by 24%, gross industrial output by 43%, gross agricultural output by 10%. In another source, these figures are underestimated - the national income increased by 21%, the volume of gross industrial output by 24%, the volume of gross agricultural output by 9%. Such dispersion in the data is due to the fact that after the failure to fulfill the plan of the first five-year plans, data on them were not published.

National income grew by 16.5%, gross industrial output by 20%, gross agricultural output by 11%. Almost 50 million people have been provided with housing.

Although at the beginning of the five-year plan more than 400 large enterprises had been built and the construction of 36,000 new ones had begun, a decline in construction production in the country is nevertheless outlined. The volume of housing construction decreased, unit costs increased, efficiency decreased, the industry plunged into a systemic crisis.

The Stalinist industrialization of the late 1920s and 1930s was traditionally viewed by Soviet historiography (as well as Soviet propaganda) as a way to raise the economy of the USSR to the global level. This was a deliberate lie.

Under normal conditions, the growth of the economy is accompanied by the development of trade, entertainment infrastructure, the growth of public consumption and rising living standards. And the industrialization of the national economy means, first of all, the industrialization of the production of consumer goods.

In the USSR, everything was the other way around. The sharp growth of productive forces was accompanied by the elimination of trade, a sharp decline in the production of consumer goods, the reduction of consumption itself to a minimum level and, accordingly, a catastrophic drop in the standard of living of the population.

The first versions of the plans for the first five-year plan were developed in parallel in the Supreme Economic Council (for state industry) and in the State Planning Committee of the USSR (for the entire national economy) since 1926. The first five-year plan was approved in May 1929 at the Fifth Congress of Soviets. There are six or seven options in total.

During these four years in the USSR there was a change in the state regime and a change in state economic principles.

The dictatorship of the Politburo, established after Lenin's death, whose members were not united in their views on the future of the government's economic policy, was replaced by the sole dictatorship of Stalin.

The setting for the continuation and development of Lenin's "new economic policy", which was defended by the "right-wing communists" who were in the Politburo until 1928, was replaced by the Stalinist setting for the elimination of the NEP, the introduction of general forced labor and the concentration of all resources on the construction of heavy industry, which was by no means calculated to provide the population with the benefits of life.

The first five-year plans developed by NEP supporters proceeded from the uniform and interconnected growth of agriculture and industry, mutually providing each other with the necessary funds. And, as a result, from a gradual increase in the standard of living of the population.

The five-year plan approved in 1929 has already lost all connection with any meaningful economic calculations. It combined unnaturally high directive targets for the growth of industry, which had to be met at any cost, and obviously not designed to be met, purely fictitious fantastic rates of growth in labor productivity, national consumption, housing construction, etc. The first completely excluded the second. The implementation of Stalin's plans for industrial production could only be carried out at the expense of the population. This was clear to all the developers of the five-year plans.

The first authors of the five-year plans were convicted at the "trial of the Mensheviks" in 1931. The survivors lived in accordance with the aphorism attributed to Stanislav Strumilin, who at the initial stage led the development of five-year plans in the State Planning Committee of the USSR: “It is better to stand for high rates than sit for low ones.”

1. General results of the implementation of the first five-year plan

The extent to which the results of the first five-year plan did not correspond not only to the first versions of the five-year plan of 1927–28, but also to the officially approved project of 1929 can be judged from the volume “Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy” issued in 1933. USSR».

Of course, the statistics of this time should be treated with extreme caution: there is no doubt that they were generally falsified. At the same time, even based on unreliable data, guessing what exactly was falsified and for what purpose, one can understand the meaning of the economic and social processes taking place in the USSR.

Officially, the first five-year plan was completed in four and a quarter years. The optimal variant, approved in 1929, assumed especially favorable conditions for economic development and “… proceeded from the smaller share of defense spending in the national economy compared to the starting variant. However, in the course of the implementation of the five-year plan, in view of the increased military danger, the USSR was forced to increase its defense capability in the last year of the five-year plan to increase the defense program.<…>... especially favorable conditions, which, according to the five-year plan, should have ensured the implementation of the optimal variant in five years, were not only absent, but more than that, instead of them we had additional difficulties. And yet the plan was carried out and, moreover, on time, which was a stunning surprise for the enemies of the USSR.

The military danger did not intensify at all in 1932. In any case, not from the side of the Western neighbors in relation to the USSR, except perhaps vice versa.

It is safe to say that, increasing the pace of industrialization, Stalin built a mobilization-type economy, the meaning of which was the creation of a military industry and, as a result, the largest and most efficient army. All other sectors of the economy played a subordinate role and served the heavy and military industries.

As the American researcher Alec Nove wrote in 1989, “there are suggestions that the war psychosis was deliberately fomented as a weapon of internal party struggle, since, of course, the Soviet Union felt threatened by the capitalist encirclement. But there is another explanation as well. Years ago, the Polish economist Oskar Lange described the Soviet centralized system as a "special type of war economy." There is the logic and psychology of wartime, and as such they are not connected with ideology. For example, in Great Britain in 1943, the market equilibrium was disturbed, prices did not express consumer value, the currency was inconvertible, and bureaucrats distributed raw materials. All this was, as were bureaucratic perversions of all kinds. However, it was believed that these were the inevitable and necessary costs of wartime. Of course, at the end of the 20s there was no war as such, but the “military” psychology was and was deliberately implanted: the toughening of the class struggle, “fronts”, “bridgeheads”, “assaults” everywhere ... ".

But in the plans for the first five-year plan, as well as in its official results, there are no data on defense spending. There is only the column "administration and defense", in which the expenditures on the state apparatus are combined with defense and are not differentiated in any way.

In figures, the increase in spending for these purposes is as follows. In 1927/28, 1.2 billion rubles were spent on administration and defense, which accounted for 23.7% of all budget expenditures (5.06 billion rubles).

In 1932, 1.84 billion rubles were already going through this column. making up 6.1% of all expenses (30.16 billion rubles). In total, over 4.25 years, 6.95 billion rubles were spent for these purposes, 9.7% of all budget expenditures for the five-year period, which amounted to 71.96 billion rubles. Thus, officially expenditures on apparatus and defense increased by 1932 by only one and a half times, while decreasing by a percentage of 3.9 times.

The population of the USSR in 1932 amounted to 165.7 million people, having increased by 11.5 million people since 1928. The urban population amounted to 38.7 million, the rural population - 127 million. The urban population has increased since 1928 by 11.1 million people, the rural population - by 0.4 million people. .

The number of people employed in agriculture decreased in general from 119.9 million people. up to 117.2 million people

These data reflect the intensive forcible transfer of the rural population to the cities, more precisely, to the construction sites of the five-year plan. According to Ginzburg's plan, based on natural migration to the cities from the countryside, the urban population was to grow only to 30.1 million people, that is, to be 8.6 million fewer people.

The rural population almost did not increase numerically during the five-year period, while the number of people engaged in agriculture decreased by 2.7 million. This speaks of the colossal withdrawals of the population from the collective farms.

The collective-farm population, which in 1928 amounted to two million people, grew to 66.7 million people. (growth - 3300%).

The share of collective farmers in the agricultural population increased from 1.7% to 61.6%.

The number of state farms increased by 1932 from 3125 to 10203. The number of employees in them increased from 345.5 thousand to 1046.6 thousand people.

The number of collective farms increased from 33.3 thousand in 1928 to 209.6 thousand in 1932 (620.4% growth). The number of collective farms increased from 416.7 thousand to 14,707.7 thousand (3,529.4% growth) .

The growth in the number of collective farms by 38 times and state farms by three times meant the actual expropriation of personal property from the absolute majority of the rural population and the subordination of its former owners directly to the Politburo as forced laborers. The productivity of collective farms was much lower than that of private farms, but much more important was the possibility, without much hassle and without the need to negotiate with each individual farmer, to seize the entire product produced into the ownership of the state and freely manipulate the labor force, moving it in the right quantities to where it was required. Currently.

Capital investments in Nar. economy for the five-year period amounted to 60 billion rubles. (in prices corresponding years), while in the socialized sector - 52.5 billion and in the private sector - 7.5 billion.

Including investments in the socialized sector of industry amounted to 24.8 billion rubles, agriculture - 10.8 billion rubles. .

The gross output of the entire census industry in 1932 amounted to 34.3 billion rubles. with a plan of 36.6 billion (93.7% completion).

For comparison, according to the Strumilin Plan, investments in the national economy were planned for the five-year period at 17.6 billion rubles, in state industry - 4.95 billion rubles, in agriculture - 1.2-1.3 billion rubles. . Gross industrial output was planned according to the Ginzburg plan in 1932 in the amount of 20.4 billion rubles.

The total number of workers and employees increased from 1928 to 1932 from 11.599 million people to 22.804 million people. (the planned figure for the five-year plan is 15.763 million people, according to the Ginzburg plan - 12.86 million). Growth - 196.6%.

Including in industry - from 4.534 million to 6.781 million (according to the plan - 4.602 million people). Growth - 191.9%.

In the licensed industry - from 3.126 million to 6.311 million people. (plan - 4.08 million people). Growth 201.9%.

In construction, the number of workers and employees increased from 723 thousand people (1928) to 3125.6 thousand people. (according to the five-year plan - 1882.5 thousand people). According to the five-year plan, the number of workers in construction in 1932 was to be 166% by 1928, and amounted to 432.3%.

These figures give an idea of ​​the extent of the forcible transfer of labor from the countryside and how it was used. The total number of wage laborers increased by 11 million people. over five years, 10 million more than was supposed under the Ginzburg plan, and 7 million more than according to the approved plan of 1929.

The average monthly wage in industry increased from 70.24 rubles. in 1928 to 116.62 rubles. in 1932 (66% increase).

The annual wages of the proletariat increased from 703.4 rubles. up to 1432 rubles. (growth 103%). The entire average wage during the years of the five-year plan has almost doubled, exceeding the outlines of the five-year plan (for 1932-33) by 44%.

At the same time, the growth in nominal wages outpaced the growth in labor productivity and lagged far behind the growth in prices, which will be discussed below.

The financial plan of the five-year plan was fulfilled by 131.1%. According to the plan, revenues and expenses for five years were to amount to 91.6 billion rubles, and for four and a quarter years they amounted to 120 billion. Of these, the income of the socialized sector amounted to 89.9 billion rubles. (74.9% of the total). According to the five-year plan, they were to amount to 70.9 billion rubles. (77.4% of the total). The five-year plan was exceeded by 126.8%.

According to Strumilin's plan, proceeding from the continuation of the NEP, the five-year financial plan was to amount to 39.68 billion rubles, but in reality amounted to three times more. It is clear that the remaining 80 billion rubles (in fact, even more, since the NEP mechanisms ceased to operate) were squeezed out of the population by various non-economic methods.

The results of housing construction are very sparingly covered in the Results of the Fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan. In total, 22,264 thousand square meters were put into operation during the first five-year plan. m of living space. Another 5 million should be handed over at the beginning of 1933.

The total housing stock in cities amounted to 162.46 million square meters in 1928. m, grew by 1932 to 185.6 million square meters. m.

Investments of the socialized sector in housing construction amounted to 4 billion rubles. .

No data on what the built living space was like - what part of it was temporary housing, and what part was normal, in accordance with sanitary standards, what part was apartments, and what part was dormitories - is not presented in the "Itogi ...". As well as there are no data on the per capita norm of living space.

Based on the above data, then 38.7 million urban population in 1932 accounted for 185.6 million square meters. m. That is, the per capita rate fell from 5.6 square meters. m in 1928 to 4.8 sq. m in 1932 instead of growing to 6.9 sq. m. m at the starting point and up to 7.3 sq. m according to the optimal (approved) five-year plan.

According to the statistical yearbook of 1934, as of January 1, 1933, the urban population of the USSR was 38,739 thousand people. , and the housing stock in the cities of the USSR in 1933 - 191.5 million square meters. m. Hence the per capita norm is 4.94 sq. m.

Most likely, the data on the urban population is more or less correct, and the data on the built housing is overestimated. As well as the data on housing finance are overestimated. Anyway, real situation with housing in the cities of the USSR, especially in new industrial cities, it was much worse.

It turns out that the urban population, according to official data, has grown by 12.423 million people over the five-year period. (27.316 million at the beginning of 1929 and 39.739 million at the beginning of 1933). The living area has grown during this time by 23 million square meters. m. Consequently, an average of 1.85 sq. m. was built per new city dweller during the five-year period. m of living space. In 1931-32, this was approximately the same number per inhabitant of the new industrial cities that did not have the old housing stock and, therefore, were deprived of the possibility of compaction.

For example, in Chelyabinsk, where a giant tractor plant was being built, the average per capita norm in 1933 was 2.2 square meters. m, in Perm - 2.8 sq. m. In Magnitogorsk, built in an open field - 1.6 square meters. m, and in Sverdlovsk, which had an old fund, - 4.2 square meters. m (in 1928 - 5.3 sq. m).

It is striking how much the volume of the “Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR” of 1933 differs from the editions of the plans for the first five-year plans, especially the first, 1927.

The statistics in it are extremely stingy, rough and unverifiable. Data on the implementation of production plans are given in monetary terms. What was produced and in what quantity is unclear in most cases.

As economic achievements, the volume of capital investments, the growth in the share of the socialized sector in industry and agriculture, the growth of the urban population and the relative decrease in the rural population, and the growth in the share of production of means of production are considered. That is, circumstances that do not characterize the state of the economy and the level of well-being of the population. Or characterize in a negative sense.

The growth in the volume of capital investments, carried out by reducing the level of consumption of the population, clearly indicates a decrease in the standard of living and increased exploitation of the population.

Behind the growth in the share of the socialized sector in industry and agriculture is the fall in labor productivity, the degradation of small-scale industry, handicrafts, trade, and the decline in the production of consumer goods.

unnatural fast growth the urban population, while the rural population is decreasing, indicates the forced nature of this process, which became possible only thanks to terror in the countryside - “dispossession”, deportations and artificially organized famine as a result of the total withdrawal of food from the village.

An increase in the share of production of means of production could indicate the growth of the economy as a whole and the growth of well-being only if we were talking about the production of means of production of consumer goods. Or any products that generate income for the manufacturer. But at the same time, it would inevitably have to develop and commercial network. In the USSR, the opposite happened: private trade was completely destroyed, and the market was replaced by a system of state distribution.

In Itogi... there is no data on what kind of goods and in what quantity were produced (or should have been produced) as a result of a gigantic increase in the production of capital goods, mechanical engineering, electricity production, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, oil and coal production.

As agricultural achievements, the growth in the size of the crops of state farms and collective farms, the number of various machines received by the countryside, the general growth in crops are indicated ... However, there are no data on agricultural production and consumption of agricultural products, including food.

There is data on trade, but very scarce. And there is no data on foreign trade, except for general information about the shortfall in the export-import plan, in connection with political complications with England and the USA and the "slanderous campaign about" forced labor "in the USSR" .

For example, in the chapter "Commodity turnover" there is data that "the state procurement of grain grains increased from 12.1 million tons in 1928/29 to 23 million tons in 1931/32, that is, almost 2 times". But the chapter on agriculture lacks data on total grain production and yield dynamics. Instead, there are abundant data on the growth of the socialization of agriculture in percentage terms by 1928.

There are no data on small and handicraft industries.

The chapter "Consumption" is missing altogether.

There is no data on the situation with housing and changes in the per capita norm.

This work was published by the State Planning Committee of the USSR, but the State Planning Committee of 1933 is something completely different from five years ago. Both the aims and methods of work of Soviet economists have changed.

Accordingly, the results have changed.

It is interesting to compare the official results of the first five-year plan with the options for its planning at the beginning of the Stalin era, in 1927, which proceeded from the continuation of the NEP, the balanced growth of industry, agriculture and the welfare of the population.

A comparison of the data shows that the budget of the national economy has officially increased from 13 million rubles. in 1928/29 to 44.6 billion in 1932. In total, 120 billion rubles were invested in the economy in an incomplete five-year period. While according to the calculations of Strumilin's five-year plan, all savings for five years should have amounted to 12.8 billion rubles, and with loans, withdrawals from the budget and emission - 18.250 billion rubles.

It is impossible to explain the origin of these funds otherwise than by forcibly pumping them out of the population. The state did not have its own funds for the purpose of accelerated industrialization. As it did not have the necessary number of workers.

During the first five-year plan, there is a pathologically sharp increase in the so-called. "urban population", the number of employees, workers in state industry and construction, far exceeding the planned natural migration of the rural population to the city. At the same time, the same pathologically sharp relative reduction of the rural population in general and the population employed in agriculture takes place.

The social reforms carried out at that time with exceptional cruelty - the collectivization of agriculture and the complete destruction of private ownership of the means of production, that is, the destruction of small industry, crafts, trade, etc.

From the point of view of normal balanced economic development, these reforms were deadly. Enslaving the population and lowering the standard of living cannot be the goal of economic reforms - under normal conditions. Forced labor under normal conditions is also inefficient. The Stalinist reforms of the era of the first five-year plan led to a decrease in labor productivity, a decline in the well-being of the population, and in themselves were crimes. But without them, in principle, the goals set by the government could not be achieved.

It is quite obvious that the planned indicators for the growth of labor productivity, the growth of real wages, the growth of consumption and the per capita norm, contained in the approved five-year plan, were by no means designed to be fulfilled. They completely contradicted those indicators, the maximum possible fulfillment of which the government really demanded - the volume of capital investments, the growth of wage laborers, the socialization of the national economy, and so on.

2. Industry

According to Strumilin's plan, the growth of industrial production was to be 79%. According to the Ginzburg plan, the growth of industrial production in industry, planned by the Supreme Economic Council, was to be 82.1%.

According to the five-year plan of 1929, “... the physical volume of output of the entire licensed industry grows by 2.3 times according to the calculations of the starting variant and by 2.6 times according to the calculations of the optimal variant, while the output of the planned industry grows, respectively, according to the variants by 135% and 180 %".

According to Naum Yasny, “in the period of less than two years between the drawing up of the first and final versions of the plan, the planned figures for the growth of industrial production more than doubled. Shortly after the adoption of the five-year plan, the resolution of the 16th Party Congress (June-July 1930) provided for a further increase in industrial production for some of the most important branches of industry. A worthy conclusion to this unrestrained orgy of planning was the decision of the VI Congress of Soviets (March 8–18, 1931): the approved plan targets of the five-year plan were to be completed in four years, and a period of three years was allotted for especially important industries. Thus, the figures in the assignments of the two five-year plans drawn up in the first half of 1927 were more than doubled, and in some cases almost tripled.

As a characteristic moment in the evolution of planning, Yasny notes the disappearance of data on the planning and production of small-scale industry.

“In 1927, the statistical reports still corresponded to reality, therefore both five-year plans drawn up by the State Planning Commission and the Supreme Economic Council and approved in 1927 contained some data on small industry. However, in the first five-year plan, data on the output of small industry are absent, although on the whole the plan itself was much more detailed than its draft, developed by the State Planning Commission in 1927. Starting from 1929, information on the output of small industry is not available in most statistical collections. .

According to Yasny's calculations, the planning of small-scale industry looked like this:

The fulfillment of the industrial production plan looked like this: “According to official statistical sources, in four years, from 1928 to 1932, industrial output increased by 101% (in industry as a whole) and by 132% (in large industry). At the same time, the output of small industry decreased by 2%. For comparison: it was planned to increase production growth by 136% for industry as a whole, by 164% for large and 50% for small industry.

The official figures given by N. Yasny for the increase in production in the first five-year plan give a good idea of ​​the priorities of the Soviet government during the implementation of the first five-year plan.

Official growth figures in the first five-year plan

First of all, the indicators of growth in the production of means of production, the most intense ones, were carried out (as far as possible). In the second - the entire industry. At the same time, the increase in the production of consumer goods, projected to be extremely insignificant, turned out to be completely negative. That is, the production of consumer goods has sharply decreased.

Despite the gigantic construction program of the five-year plan, "the production of building timber increased by 1.5% in three years (1930–1933), while the output of bricks and cement fell by 20% and 9.9%, respectively."

This indicates a catastrophic reduction in civil engineering in the USSR and an equally catastrophic drop in its quality.

It is quite obvious that the gigantic volumes of industrial construction absorbed almost all the scarce building materials - cement, metal, brick ... The share of residential and municipal construction accounted for miserable remnants. The government constantly issued decrees to limit or completely ban the use of metal, cement, high-quality wood in civil construction, to replace scarce building materials with surrogates, and to reduce the cost of construction by thinning walls and using off-grade wood.

3. Agriculture

According to Naum Yasny, “instead of an increase of 55% over the five-year period from 1927/28 to 1932/33, which was provided for by the approved version of the five-year plan, the total agricultural output decreased by 14% between 1928 and 1933 G. . The output of livestock products decreased by 48% instead of the planned growth of 50-54%. This means that the five-year plan for these indicators was fulfilled by a little more than a third<…>In 1928, a slight increase (3%) was observed in agricultural production. After the approval of the first five-year plan in 1928, there was an annual decline in both total agricultural output and livestock output, and even to a greater extent.<…>in the last years of the first five-year plan, millions of people died of starvation. The famine continued during the period of the second five-year plan.

The mass famine in the USSR was caused not only by the fall in production and the total withdrawal of food from the collectivized village, but also by the export of food abroad. By itself, the fall in food production could not have caused such a catastrophe if it were not for exports. Export earnings were the main source of foreign exchange needed to purchase industrial modern technology, equipment for factories under construction and payment for specialists who installed Western equipment. And the main export, along with timber, was food, primarily grain.

4 . International trade

The approved five-year plan stated:

“A feature of the export plan is the restoration of grain exports. Due to the fact that material growth production is projected at an even higher pace than exports, our trade relations will not grow relatively. In relation to the gross output of 1932/33, exports will amount to approximately 3%, which is close to modern ratios.<…>As for imports, in addition to its large growth, due to the strengthening of the role of agriculture as a raw material base for industry, its structure will change towards an increase in the importance of importing equipment at the expense of raw materials. This will make the Soviet market especially attractive to the world industry, which suffers from chronic overproduction.

The relationship between food exports, equipment imports and hunger in the USSR is well illustrated by data from Konstantin Trommel's dissertation work on the development of Soviet-German trade relations from 1928 to 1936 and defended in Leipzig in 1939.

Since 1928, Germany has been the most important trading partner for the USSR (ahead of England and the USA). Only in 1935, in terms of the volume of Soviet imports, Germany moved to third place (after the USA and England), but in 1936 it was again in first place.

In terms of the volume of Soviet exports, Germany was in first place only in 1928, 1929 and 1934, in other years England occupied the first place.

The maximum volume (in rubles) of German imports to the USSR reached in 1931 - 410 million rubles. This amounted to 37.2% of all Soviet imports in 1931 (1.105 billion rubles). The following year, the volume of imports decreased in absolute terms to 327.7 million rubles, but rose in relative terms to 46.5% (total 704 million rubles).

In total, during the years of the five-year plan (1928-1932), the USSR imported goods from abroad worth 4.7 billion rubles. , and took out 4.140 billion rubles. .

In general, the foreign trade of the USSR for 1928-1933. looked like this.

Trade between Germany and the USSR for the five-year plan looked like this: the bulk of Soviet imports were machine tools and apparatus, electrical equipment, metal products, cars and parts for them, tractors and agricultural machines.

From the above tables it can be seen that the maximum export from the USSR falls in 1929–1930, and the maximum import in the USSR falls in 1930–31. Almost exclusively industrial equipment was also imported from Germany to the USSR. different types and raw materials (eg wool, rubber). Consumer goods accounted for a few percent.

In 1930, goods worth 1.058 billion rubles were imported into the USSR, and 1.030 billion rubles were exported.

For comparison, in the relatively prosperous and well-fed year 1925, imports amounted to 724 million rubles, and exports - 559 million rubles. (for Germany, respectively - 102.7 and 87.4 million rubles).

The absolute maximum of imports from Germany falls in 1931 - 410 million rubles. Export from the USSR to Germany this year amounted to 129 million rubles.

The absolute maximum export to Germany - 1929 (251 million rubles).

Imports to the USSR from Germany in 1931 (762 million Reichsmarks) consisted of 89% of finished products, 9.3% of raw materials and semi-finished products, 0.9% of food and beverages.

Soviet exports to Germany in 1931 (303.45 million Reichsmarks) consisted of 27.4% food, 63.3% raw materials and semi-finished products, and 9.3% finished products.

In total, in 1931, the USSR exported abroad from a total amount of 811 million rubles. food for 302 million rubles, raw materials and semi-finished products for 418.9 million rubles, finished products for 89.6 million rubles.

In general, food exports from the USSR for the five-year period looked as follows:

The import of industrial equipment into the USSR developed as follows:

In total, during the five-year plan, only industrial equipment worth 2,236.5 million rubles was imported into the USSR, 47.5% of total imports.

It does not take into account other goods of a purely industrial nature - products from non-ferrous metals, chemical products, cotton, wool, rubber, etc.

Food exports for individual goods looked like this (million rubles; % of total exports):

For five years, from 1928 to 1932, the SSSO exported grain for 458.4 million rubles;

Oils for 120.6 million rubles;

Eggs for 76.2 million rubles;

Fish for 66.6 million rubles;

Sugar by 141.2 million rubles;

Cake for 82 million rubles.

The dynamics of Soviet food exports to Germany can be seen from the following table (in tons and millions of Reichsmarks).

Import of Soviet food products to Germany

From the above tables it can be seen that the peak of food exports from the USSR as a whole falls on 1930–31–32. It coincides with the peak of imports to the USSR of machinery and machine tools, and also coincides (partially preceding it) with the mass famine of 1932–33. with millions of victims. The maximum import of industrial equipment to the USSR falls in 1931, the maximum export of food in 1930 - the year of collectivization.

At the same time, the maximum export of grain (805,709 tons) and oil (13,438 tons) to Germany falls on 1932 - the peak of famine in the Soviet countryside.

At the same time, by simple calculations, one can find out that grain prices fell from 308 Reichsmarks per ton in 1928 to 90.8 in 1932 (by 3.4 times). Accordingly, oil prices fell during this time from 3010 to 1174 Reichsmarks per ton (2.6 times). That is, by the end of the five-year plan, the USSR exported food at dumping prices.

In 1929, grain was exported abroad for 23.9 million rubles, and in 1930 (at the height of collectivization) - for 207.1 million rubles, that is, almost 9 times more (in monetary terms). Given the dumping prices at which the USSR sold its goods, the difference in quantity should have been even greater. Even in the terrible year of 1933, grain was exported for 46.5 million rubles, almost the same as in the relatively well-fed 1925 (51.4 million rubles) and four times more than in 1928 (11, 8 million rubles).

The five-year plan of 1929 proceeded from “... the task of doubling the starting point and increasing more than two and a half times for the optimal variant of our exports<…>by the end of the five-year period, grain exports should grow to 50 or 80 million centners<…>Expansion of export of page - x. products (butter, eggs, etc.) is planned with full consideration of the needs of the domestic market and the tasks of the so-called improvement of the structure of consumption (growth in the consumption of eggs, butter, etc.), which should naturally accompany the industrial and cultural growth of the country.

The following table gives an idea of ​​the ratio of the dynamics of Soviet exports for the five-year period as a whole, food exports and exports of grain and legumes in monetary terms according to Tremel's data.

The table shows that the entire export of 1929 exceeded the export of 1928 by 15%, the export of 1930 - by almost 30%, the export of 1931 was practically equal to the export of 1028, and the export of 1932 fell by 28%.

That is, in the first three years of the five-year plan, Soviet exports grow, reaching a maximum in 1930, and then fall sharply, falling below the 1928 level in 1932.

At the same time, food exports as a whole in the second year of the five-year plan almost did not increase compared to 1928, in 1930 it increased by 60%, in 1931 it exceeded the export of 1928 by 40%, and in 1932 it amounted to only 66 % of the first year of the five-year plan.

This means that the share of food in total exports increased until 1931 and fell sharply only in 1932, lower than in 1928.

A completely different picture is given by the dynamics of the export of grain crops.

In 1929, grain export revenues more than doubled compared to 1928 (202%). In 1930, an increase of 17.5 times (1755%), in 1931 - 13 times (1336%), in 1932 - almost five times (494%) compared with the first year of the five-year plan.

Grain exports rose sharply by 1930, but even after falling in 1931 and 1932, they were many times higher than at the beginning of the five-year plan.

The export of bread gives the maximum revenue in 1930 and 1931. But even in 1932, when a massive famine set in, the proceeds from grain exports were 5 times greater than in the relatively prosperous 1928.

The data on the export of grain in tons is even more expressive and shows how much importance the Politburo attached to the export of grain as a source of financing for industrialization.

Export of grain crops from the USSR (in tons)

The maximum export of grain crops falls in 1931 - 5,182,835 tons (51.8 million centners) and exceeds the export of 1927/28 by 15 times. This is almost the level of the planned assumptions of 1929 at the end of the five-year plan - "50 or 80 million centners", except for the fact that these achievements led to mass famine in the country.

For comparison, grain exports in the relatively prosperous years of the NEP amounted to 2,068,777 tons in 1925/26; in 1926/27 - 2,177,714 tons.

In 1928, grain exports accounted for only 1.5% of total exports. Butter and eggs gave 4.9% and 5.2%, respectively. In subsequent years, the export of these products fell sharply (in 1930, respectively, 1.1 and 0.4%), but the share of grain rose in 1930 to 25.5% of total exports.

These regularities can be easily explained by collectivization, the height of which falls exactly in 1930. The production of butter and eggs sharply decreased after the destruction of individual peasant farms and small private industry. The task of the collective farms was to produce as much grain as possible, which was almost completely removed from the village.

This situation is very clearly illustrated and explained by Stalin's letter to Molotov in August 1930: “Mikoyan reports that procurements are growing and every day we export 1-1.5 million poods of grain. I think this is not enough. We must now raise (the norm) of daily exports to at least 3-4 million poods. Otherwise, we run the risk of being left without our new metallurgical and machine-building (Avtozavod, Chelyabzavod, etc.) plants ... In a word, we need to madly speed up the export of grain.

The supply of equipment for factories directly depended on the export of food from the USSR.

Curious data on the supply of Soviet timber to Germany.

The table shows a sharp increase in supplies, peaking in 1930 - 1.309 million tons, four times more than in 1925 (at the height of the NEP). At the same time, prices are falling sharply, in 1932 - almost twice as compared with 1928.

Here it must be borne in mind that almost the entire plan for logging was carried out with the help of forced labor.

According to the reference book "Control figures for labor for 1929-30" lumber harvesting in 1927/28 involved 1.0 million foot and horse workers, in 1928/29 - 1.198 million. In 1929/30, it was planned to use 2.307 million foot and horse workers. Another 793 thousand workers were planned to be used for alloying.

Reality looked like this:

"At the spring plenum of the Central Committee<1928 г.>it turned out that it was impossible to carry out the logging program of 1929 using the old means and methods. By this time, collectivization had just begun. The commissar for agriculture in charge pointed out that collectivization would be impossible if, as before, logging during the winter season was carried out by forcibly recruited masses of peasants with their horses, who, upon returning home, were not only monstrously reduced in number, but also so exhausted that they are not able to participate in spring work ... According to the accepted methods and organization of work, already in 1928, for logging and transporting timber for four months from November 15 to March 15, a total of about five million people and two million horses were required.

These unimaginable masses of people were forcibly sent to an area without roads, and not the slightest concern was shown about their accommodation and provision.

5 . Consumption

The first five-year plan, approved in 1929, included indicators of growth in food consumption.

Growth in food consumption according to the five-year plan of 1929

As can be seen from the table, in 1932/33 the urban population had to eat as much bread as in 1928, eat 12% more meat than in 1928, eggs - 71% more, dairy products - by 55% more. The consumption of the rural population also had to grow, although not so significantly.

It can be said with full confidence that the planned figures for the growth of consumption by the population were a deliberate bluff already at the time the five-year plan was approved. Nobody was going to fulfill them, and it was impossible. The government pursued tasks of the opposite kind - reducing consumption to the minimum possible. At the same time, the rural population found itself in a much worse situation than the urban population, which also starved.

As Elena Osokina writes, “… state system supply was built on the assumption of self-sufficiency of the rural population. However, the possibility of self-sufficiency was undermined by the ever-increasing state procurement, which seized not only the commodity, but also the product necessary for the consumption of the villagers themselves. As a result, the collective farms were left with a small amount of money - the procurement prices for the collective farms were unprofitable - and with a small stock of products grown by them, from which seed and reserve funds had yet to be allocated. As a result, as the Russian proverb says, “the shoemaker sat without boots”: the grain growers did not have enough bread, those who raised livestock did not eat meat, did not drink milk.

Cleaning out the collective farm bins, the state supplied the rural population poorly and irregularly. Although the rural population was more than three times larger than the urban population, during the period of the rationing system, rural supplies accounted for only about a third of the country's trade turnover. The commodity was imported mainly in the third and fourth quarters to stimulate the harvest. In 1931-33, the People's Commissariat of Supply provided only 30-40% of garments, shoes, soap, and knitwear for the supply of the rural population. Even worse, the rural population was provided with food. During this period, Narkomsnab sent more than half of the market fund to the cities of the USSR vegetable oil, about 80% of the funds of flour, cereals, animal oil, fish products, sugar, almost the entire fund of meat products (94%), all margarine, a third of all state funds of tea and salt.

Considering that the cities, receiving the lion's share of state funds, were provided extremely insufficiently, it is clear that the crumbs remaining for the rural population could not improve their situation.

Even these data, being averaged, only weakly characterize the paucity of state supplies for the rural population. The funds sent to the countryside were earmarked. This means that the goods were not distributed equally among the inhabitants, but were used to provide for certain groups of the population, primarily employees of political departments, MTS and state farms. By the time the goods arrived at the general store, most of them were assigned to certain groups of consumers.

6. Prices

One of the most obvious symptoms of the catastrophe that ended the first five-year plan is the rise in consumer prices and the decline in trade in consumer goods.

“... During the entire period of the first five-year plan, and especially in the last two years of the five-year plan, there was a huge increase in prices for consumer goods and a sharp drop in the supply of these goods to the retail network. These figures are especially impressive when viewed on a per capita basis. According to Malafeev, sales of food products through state-owned retail trade decreased from 7367 million rubles. in 1930 to 5538 million rubles. in 1932 . Throughout the five-year period, sales of retail products, excluding foodstuffs, grew, but their growth was only 1.5% But at the same time, prices for both categories of goods increased by 62.4% between 1930 and the first half of 1932. This meant that in two years, from 1930 to 1932, the actual volume of state trade was reduced by more than half.

In the same short period, private market prices rose by 233%. Already in 1931, in private trade, the rise in prices for retail products was quite high. Between 1927/28 and 1930 the price increase was 131%, and between 1927/28 and the first half of 1932 there was an almost eightfold increase in prices. The next significant jump in prices for retail goods occurred in the second half of 1932.

Official data on the results of the first five-year plan (as well as materials for the preparation of the approved five-year plan with all the changes) do not answer the main question - what was its goal?

It is clear that the USSR produced a huge amount of coal, oil, electricity, metals, machine tools and other intermediate products intended for the production of something final. But this final product was never mentioned.

Practically none of the goods produced at the enterprises built during the years of the first five-year plan were exported. They also did not enter the domestic market. Moreover, by 1930, private trade had already been destroyed, and the supply of the population with essential goods took the form of rationing.

In the same way, the initial data that served as the basis for calculating Soviet industrialization was never mentioned. Planning for the construction of about one and a half thousand new enterprises had to proceed from the planning of the production of their final products, which definitely could not be just iron, steel, electricity, or even tractors with cars.

Tractors and automobiles, data on the planned production of which are given in the documents of the five-year plan, are also not final goods. They are also a means of production, especially since cars for private individuals were not produced at all.

The data on the growth in the production of consumer goods (obviously bullshit) given in the "Results ..." do not explain in any way all the superhuman efforts to build the production of means of production. Moreover, these conditional data refer only to state production, the growth of which took place against the background of the destruction of private small-scale industry, which, in fact, provided the household needs of the population under the NEP.

During the first five-year plan, an industry was built whose production goals were never elucidated. Social reforms were carried out, which were reduced to the introduction of general forced labor. Forced labor is the least productive form of labor. But it is extremely effective when the task is to build something that does not ultimately have a direct economic effect for society and disadvantageous to the population. And when the organizer of this construction does not have the means and opportunities to provide the construction with funds and a free labor force.

7. The problem of foreign investment

A characteristic (and surprising, at first glance) feature of the Soviet industrialization plans is the absence of any mention of the possibility of attracting foreign investors. They are not even in the very first plans of the first five-year plan. Although it would seem that foreign investment could play a key role in the rise of the national economy. The fact that this topic was discussed in government circles is confirmed by the publication in 1929 in foreign languages ​​of several books in the series "Concession objects of the Soviet Union." Among them, there are definitely the Magnitogorsk plant, the Nadezhda and Taganrog iron foundries, the Svir power plant and the Volga-Don Canal.

In the book of prof. M.I. Bogolepov "Financial plan for the five-year plan", which is a detailed version of the corresponding section of the five-year plan approved in 1929, indicates the sources of financing for the five-year plan, which are determined in the amount of 76,800 million rubles. There are no foreign investments among them.

Stalin's negative attitude towards concessions is well known.

Some light on the explanation of this fact is shed by the memoirs of Grigory Besedovsky, a Soviet diplomat who fled to the West (that is, literally through the wall of the Soviet embassy in Paris) in 1929. The memoirs were first published in Paris in 1930. The former Socialist-Revolutionary Besedovsky became the highest-ranking diplomat - a defector of the Stalin era, at the time of his flight he acted as the Soviet plenipotentiary in Paris. Besedovsky was well aware of the internal discussions and contradictions of the Soviet political elite. Here is how he describes the situation in the summer of 1928:

“... Inside the country, there was almost no hope left that it would be possible to avoid a new outbreak of war communism, even more acute in its appearance and even more unbearable psychologically, since this time there was a war on the borders of the country, and no enemy inside the country threatened the peasant.

However, I still cherished faint hopes that if I could bind Stalin with a series of concessions in foreign policy and thus enable the country to receive financial assistance from outside, it would be possible to soften Stalin's policy without bringing matters to an open break with the peasantry.

It seemed clear to me that the pressure on the peasantry was growing as a result of that absurd line towards the rapid industrialization of Russia, which was taken by the Stalin government. This super-industrialization required colossal funds for its implementation and had to force Stalin, in the final analysis, to increase his pressure on the peasantry to the point beyond which starvation and death of millions of people begin.

I understood perfectly well that Stalin's foreign policy for this period of time would be a derivative of his so-called "general line". But at the same time, in the area foreign policy it was possible to put pressure on Stalin much more successfully than in the internal sphere. The prospect of obtaining a large foreign loan could have caused some change in mood among influential members of the Politburo and Stalin's immediate circle. The party apparatus, led by Molotov, unquestioningly followed the latter, pulling him towards the implementation of Stalin's directives in the localities. But the party apparatus moved reluctantly, reluctantly, because the difficulties and dangers that arose on this new path of sharp struggle against the peasantry were clear to all party workers in the localities. That is why the prospect of revitalizing financial and economic relations with foreign countries could even change the mood of the party apparatus and make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Stalinist policy of turning against the peasant.

Besedovsky tried to convince the members of the Politburo to agree to the payment of the Russian debt to France, which could be beneficial for the USSR, as it greatly improved the conditions for obtaining loans and freed up funds for industrialization and opened up wide opportunities for the USSR in the French market. Stalin vetoed Besedovsky's report.

According to Besedovsky, in October 1928 he was summoned to see Stalin, who, among other things, said:

“We cannot pay our debts without changing the class essence of our power<…>You think that it is possible to establish a long financial cooperation with the capitalist world. But by surrendering to Poincaré, we will lose all possibility of revolutionary maneuvering, we will lose one of the most important positions - the refusal to recognize old debts. We overpay on abnormal loans. You're right. But on the other hand, we preserve the complete independence of our economic system in its struggle against the capitalist encirclement. You have to be naive to think that in France we can get long-term loans without any conditions. Conditions will be imposed on us, as a result of which we will not be able to run our economy the way we want. We will not lead, but we will be led. Understand that short-term commodity credits, for all their high cost, save us from political bondage. We do not need large external loans. Or rather, we still won't get them on the terms we can offer. To think otherwise is to fall into disgusting opportunism, to make possible a long cooperation between two irreconcilable economic systems» .

The most important thing in this speech is the fundamental rejection of the prospects for foreign loans, since they will inevitably entail external control over the economic use of investments: "we will not be able to manage our economy the way we want." Short-term credits are unprofitable, expensive and forced to deplete the national economy, but at the same time the Soviet government is spared from any external control.

This way of developing the economy is beneficial only if the results of industrialization must be kept secret from outside world, and a military clash with it is considered inevitable.

Besedovsky, at his own peril and risk, tried to negotiate with a consortium of British banks on the financing of Soviet industrialization on a fairly large scale. Based on the data received from the State Planning Commission, Besedovsky drew up a general plan for possible British investments and handed it over to the British side. This plan in itself is of undoubted interest as a list of objects that Gosplan could theoretically imagine in the form of investment, that is, capable of generating income in the future.

Besedovsky comments: “This plan, of course, sinned by being schematic and insufficiently substantiating the figures given in it, but basically it exhausted the content of the work plan of the State Planning Commission. It is clear that if both sides accepted such a broad plan, which amounted to an impressive figure of five billion gold rubles (that is, already at that time, about ten billion chervonets rubles, since the fall of the chervonets was already proceeding at a rapid pace), a complete political agreement was necessary and a far-reaching agreement between both parties. This plan, if successful, provided a fairly solid basis for the five-year plan without the abolition of the NEP creating a serious political conflict in the country and jeopardizing the existence of Russian agriculture, and, consequently, the country's economy as a whole. I hoped that this plan might also serve as a sufficiently reliable platform for the right side of the Politburo in their efforts to repel Stalin's ever more advanced offensive against the economic and political system NEP".

Besedovsky's description of his activities to attract British investment in the USSR is rather confusing, but it is clear that it could lead to success, since the British side expressed a clear interest. In the autumn of 1928, Besedovsky began to carefully inform the Moscow authorities about its results. The reaction was more than cold. Besedovsky was ordered to stop negotiations, which were completely cut off in March 1929. In September 1929, Besedovsky was summoned to Moscow, but, knowing the morals of his superiors, he preferred to flee.

All this Detective story testifies, first of all, to Stalin's fundamental unwillingness to attract foreign investment to the USSR and not only to put Soviet economy under the control of potential investors, but also in principle to expand Soviet economic ties that go beyond trade in Soviet raw materials and the purchase of Western technology.

It seems to us that there can only be one explanation. The industrialization of industrial production, which was carried out by Stalin, did not aim to receive income from the sale of manufactured products. Moreover, the very nature of these products, as well as the purpose of their production, were a state secret.

Hence the conclusion. The specifics of the ways and methods by which Stalin industrialized in the USSR can only be explained by the construction of a military industry and, as a consequence, a huge mechanized army. With any other setting of goals and objectives of industrialization, other methods could and should have been used that would lead to different results.

Notes

1. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 12.

2. Nove Alek. About the fate of the NEP. Letter to the editors of the journal Questions of History. "Questions of History". No. 8, 1989. - S. 172-176

3. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 272.

4. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 252.

5. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 252.

6. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 264.

7. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 265.

8. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 253.

9. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 253.

10. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 254.

11. Prospects for the expansion of the national economy of the USSR for 1926/27 - 1030/31. S. 47.

12. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 179.

13. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 178.

14. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 271.

15. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.635

16. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 186..

17. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 186..

18. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 186.

19. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical Yearbook. M., 1934, p. 353

20. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical Yearbook. M., 1934, p. 436

21. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical Yearbook. M., 1934, p. 353

22. A.V. Bakunin, V.A. Tsybultnikov. Urban planning in the Urals during the period of industrialization. Sverdlovsk, 1989, Tab. one.

23. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. eleven.

24. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 191.

25. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 271.

26. Prospects for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1926/27 - 1030/31. S. 29

27. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 271.

28. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 271.

29. Prospects for the expansion of the national economy of the USSR for 1926/27 - 1030/31. pp. 32-33

30. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry in the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.551.

31. “Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry in the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32”, M., p.17

32. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 253

33. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry in the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.87.

34. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 129

35. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry in the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.89.

36. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR, M., 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 129.

37. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 58

38. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 70

39. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 2, Part 2, p. 288

40. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., pp. 107-108

41. Prospects for the expansion of the national economy of the USSR for 1926/27 - 1030/31. App., p. 163.

42. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 70

43. Prospects for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1926/27 - 1030/31. Tab. P. 3 (Quoted by Yasny, p. 96)

44. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.403

45. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, 83.

46. ​​Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 95-96

47. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 96-97.

48. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 99

49. Industry of the USSR. Statistical collection. M .: Statistics, 1957. S. 31. The same indicators are repeated in the book "The National Economy of the USSR in 1958" (p. 135). Indicators for small industry are determined on the basis of general values ​​for industry and data for large industry. - Note. N. Yasnoy

50. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 100.

51. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 108.

52. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, Volume 1, 131. - approx. N. Yasnoy

53. National economy of the USSR in 1958 Stat. Yearbook. M. Statistics, 1959, p. 136.

54. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 109

55. The national economy of the USSR in 1958 Stat. Yearbook. M. Statistics, 1959, S. 350.

56. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 95-96

57. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 2, Part 2, p. 418.

58. Trömel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der deutsch-sowjetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen seit 1928 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3a.

59. Tromel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der deutsch-sowjetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen seit 1928 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3b.

60. Trömel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der deutsch-sowjetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen seit 1928 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3a.

61. Trömel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der deutsch-sowjetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen seit 1928 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3b.

62. Trömel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der deutsch-sowjetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen seit 1928 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 8.

63. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 101.

64. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical Yearbook. M., 1934, p. 382-383

65. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 101.

66. Letters to I.V. Stalin V.M. Molotov. 1925-1936. M., 1995, p. 198, 203-205.

67. “Control figures for labor for 1929-30”, M. 1930, p. 89-90.

68. Karl I. Albrecht. "Ber Verratene Sozialismus", Berlin, 1942, p. 67-68

69. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 106

70. If in 1927/28 11.5 million tons of grain were harvested, then by the end of the rationing system in 1934/35 - more than 26 million tons. (The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union. P. 290) - Footnote by E. Osokina.

71. In 1931, the directive grain procurement prices were about 5-12 kopecks. per kg. At the same time, the cost of one kilogram of wheat flour, even at low card prices, was 25-28 kopecks, and on the market - 4-5 rubles. In the same year, state procurement prices for beef and mutton ranged from 17 to 36 kopecks. per kilogram, for milk - 17 kopecks. per litre. At the same time, the lowest price for meat in trade (card supply in the city) was 1 ruble in 1931. 50 kopecks, in 1932 - more than 2 rubles. Commercial and market prices were significantly higher. So, in 1932, the average market price for meat in Moscow was 11 rubles, for milk - 2 rubles. (Osokina E.A. Hierarchy of consumption. P. 46). - Footnote by E. Osokina

72. Elena Osokina. BEHIND THE FACADE OF "STALIN'S ABUNDANCE". Distribution and the market in the supply of the population during the years of industrialization 1927-1941. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1999, p. 115-116.

73. Malafeev A.N. The history of pricing…. S. 172. - Note. N. Yasnoy

74. Malafeev A.N. The history of pricing…. S. 402. - Note. N. Yasnoy

75. “This is clearly demonstrated by the data given by Malafeev (p. 402). If we take the prices of 1927/28 as 100, then the retail price indices in the first half of 1932 were: public sector - . 176.6; private sector - 760.3; the general index is 251.8 If we take the prices of 1928 as 100, then the index of retail prices in state and cooperative trade in 1932 was 255 (Ibid., p. 407). Thus, the increase in retail prices in the public sector in the second half of 1932 was so great that if the analysis takes into account the data for the second half of 1932, then the price increase index in the public and the private sector applicable to characterize a single public sector" - approx. N. Yasnoy.

76. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 110.111.

77. P.S. Yegorov. THE MAGNITQGORSKY (MAGNET MOUNTAIN) METALLURGICAL WORKS MOSCOW, 1929; Prof. A.S. Axamitny. Die Volga-Don Grosswasserstrasse. Moscow 1929; Sergej Andreevič Kukel'-Kraevskij. Die Swir-Wasserkraftanlage für die Elektrizitätsversorgung[!] des Leningrader Gebiets. Moskau: (Upravl. Del. SNK SSSR i STO), 1929; Kostrow, I. N. Eisenhüttenwerke in Nadeschdinsk und Taganrog/.. - Moskau: , 1929

A brief analysis of the results achieved during the years of the first Soviet five-year plan (1928-1933).

The turn towards accelerated economic development of the USSR began in 1929, when the first five-year plan was adopted at the XVI Party Conference, covering the period from October 1928 to September 1933. After the approval of the V Congress of Soviets of the USSR in May 1929, the plan became law, binding.

What didn't work

Planned tasks, however, were soon changed. In December 1929, at the congress of shock workers, the slogan "Five-Year Plan in Four Years!" was put forward. In the summer of 1930, at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, called the “congress of the full-scale offensive of socialism along the entire front,” the accelerated version of industrialization was finally adopted. The already tense tasks of the five-year plan were raised on average twice.

Inconsistency in matters of economic construction led to an overstrain of the country's forces and gave rise to negative phenomena. The cost of industrial products and their energy intensity increased, while the quality, on the contrary, decreased. As a result of errors in planning and miscalculations in the economy, the country's financial system began to falter.

I had to stop funding 613 out of 1659 major facilities under construction. Due to the lack of appropriations, plans had to be curtailed in such a key industry as metallurgy. Of the new transport routes envisaged by the construction plan, only a third were put into operation, and a radical reconstruction of transport did not begin. All this had a negative impact on the defense industry.

On the whole, the first five-year plan turned out to be unfulfilled in the smelting of iron and steel, the production of rolled products, mineral fertilizers, the extraction of iron ore, the production of electricity, the production of automobiles, and other important indicators.

Main results

During the years of the first five-year plan, about 1,500 large industrial facilities were built. Among them are Dneproges, Magnitogorsk, Stalingrad and Kharkov Tractor Plants, Moscow and Gorky Automobile Plants, Saratov Combine Plant, the first stage of the Ural Heavy Machine Building Plant, a milling machine plant in Gorky, a turret machine plant in Moscow, the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant, the Ural Copper Smelter Plant, Nevsky and the Voskresensky Chemical Plants, the Ball Bearing Plant, the development of Khibiny apatites, etc. was launched. A new powerful coal and metallurgical base was created in the east of the country. Along with the Dneproges, hundreds of new power plants were put into operation: Shterovka, Kashira, Ivgres, Nigres, Leningrad Second, Zuevka, Chelyabinsk, Magnitogorsk, Kizel, Stalgres and others.

Many machine tools and equipment for these enterprises were imported from Europe and the USA. At the same time, the problem of launching and operating this equipment by domestic engineers and workers arose. For example, it took about two years to bring the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, built in 1930, to its design capacity (difficulties arose with mastering American technology).

Individual branches of industry fulfilled the five-year plan in three years. Mechanical engineering as a whole was to produce 4,350 million rubles in the fifth year of the five-year plan (1932/33). products, but already in 1931 they produced products worth 4,730 million rubles. The electrical industry already in 1931 produced products worth 925 million rubles. (895 million rubles were planned for the entire five-year period). 21.7 million tons of oil were to be produced, but in fact in 1931 they produced 23.1 million tons. The plan for the production of tractor agricultural implements was exceeded by 32%.

However, there were industries that did not cope with the planned outlines. In general, tasks under the first five-year plan were completed by 93.7%. The plan for ferrous metallurgy was frustrated: the smelting of pig iron in 1932 was envisaged in the amount of 9 million tons, but in reality only 6.2 million tons were smelted. This affected the production of steel and rolled products, the output of which also lagged behind the plan. The lack of iron and steel hit hard on the entire industrial production, including the defense industry. The plan for light industry was also underfulfilled.

The growth of industry in the USSR in the first five years

In 1932, the actual increase in industrial production amounted to only 14.7%, while 36%9 was planned. Nevertheless, the results turned out to be very significant (especially in structural terms), and the country's leadership announced that the first five-year plan was completed ahead of schedule - in 4 years and 3 months. Later, in 1947, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin mentioned that the plan for the first five-year plan had not been fulfilled.

Introduction

Chapter 1.

Chapter 2

Conclusion

Literature

Application

Introduction

My work is devoted to five-year plans for the development of the national economy of the USSR, or, more simply, five-year plans. The beginning is not the most interesting for an abstract, but wait, maybe I can draw your attention to this topic. What do we know about the USSR and its formation? This state began its existence in 1922 and ended it in 1991. The beginning of the formation of the USSR was the revolution of 1917, which entailed a change of power. A radical transition from the Russian absolute monarchy to a provisional government and then to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The relevance of the work lies in the fact that the USSR five-year plan influenced not only the economic, but also the social and public spheres, and I will consider this influence. This period of our country is a huge field for study. It is not for nothing that hundreds of Russian and foreign historians to this day publish books describing that time, bringing their judgments to them. One of these books was V.M. Simcher "Development of the Russian economy for 100 years". It was from it that I took statistical data for the period of the five-year plans. I also contacted for more information. study guide"History of the World Economy". And another indispensable source of information for me was the site # "justify"> five-year plan Soviet Union economic

Chapter 1

First of all, you need to understand what five-year plans are. Five-year plans are a five-year plan for the economic and social development of the USSR - the main form of planning the development of the national economy, improving economic and social relations in the country, the basis for organizing the economic activities of ministries and departments, all levels of government.

It is also worth noting that when developing a five-year plan, its compliance with the requirements of the objective economic laws of socialism is ensured: these laws are based on modern achievements and prospects for the development of science and technology, taking into account the needs of the public and the possibilities of satisfying them. Five-year plans were approved in 1928. The following tasks are defined in the five-year plans: determining the rate of production growth, introducing the latest technologies in the national economy, the development of concentration, the expansion of cooperative production, the rational distribution of production forces, the development of foreign economic relations, measures to improve the material well-being and cultural level of the people and the solution of existing social problems, as well as actions to improve planning and management.

One of the most important requirements for the content of the five-year plan includes: increasing the efficiency of social production by accelerating the growth rate of technical progress, as well as financial and labor resources; reducing the cost of production; growth of labor productivity; increasing production capacity; reducing the cost of raw materials and fuel; reduction of materials per unit of production; improving the quality of products and services, and other features.

The goals and objectives of the five-year plans are outlined in the annual national economic plans, taking into account the economic situation in the country, changes in the needs of society, and financial and material resources. The five-year period turned out to be optimal for the medium-term plans set, although some five-year plans were completed ahead of schedule. This is due to the strong unity of the people who want to work for the good of their country. The forced industrialization and collectivization helped to achieve this effect. Establishment of a totalitarian regime. Suppression of free thought and dissent.

The five-year plans were developed in two stages. The first stage includes the development and forecasting of the main directions in the development of the national economy for five years ahead. The challenge is to identify problems that may be encountered in the implementation of the plan and eliminate them before it is implemented. Forecasting involves scientific and technical institutions that monitor such indicators as population growth, labor force growth, and mineral reserves. Proposals for the project are being prepared by the union republics, production associations, ministries, and local Soviet bodies. Their proposals and forecasts for the implementation of the five-year plan are the basis for the development of the State planning committee Council of Ministers of the USSR of the project of the main directions of development of the national economy of the USSR. All previously obtained data are entered into the draft Directives of the CPSU Congress. Further, the draft Directives are considered by the Central Committee of the CPSU and submitted for discussion, after which its results will be considered at the next congress of the CPSU. The directives are a program that will help implement the party's economic policy and solve social, economic, scientific and technical problems in five years.

The second stage consists in distributing the set goals according to the time of their fulfillment and dividing them among the union republics. Tasks between ministries and union republics are distributed by the State Planning Committee of the USSR. He also provides a balanced five-year plan to the government of the USSR. Further, the project is in the hands of the Councils of Ministers of the USSR, and they already make changes and amendments to the five-year plan, after which they send it to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, from where the plan comes into force. Further, the tasks of the project are brought to the performers.

Let's summarize the first chapter. The five-year plan is a complex project aimed at improving the social, economic, technical, industrial, and other areas in the USSR. From the beginning of the project to the implementation stage, the five-year plan is constantly reviewed by various departments responsible for the successful implementation of the plan. The five-year plan embodies the economic and social policy of the CPSU.

In the next chapter, I will present each five-year plan in detail. I will answer the main question: "What did the USSR manage to achieve during the years of five-year plans?" And I will also give a detailed report on the tasks I have set.

Chapter 2

I will begin this chapter by describing each five-year plan. I will pay more attention to the first, second and third five-year plans, since in my opinion they are fundamental to further economic development. It was the years from 1929 to 1941 that were among the most difficult in the history of the USSR. These are not only problems in the economic sphere, but also problems in the social sphere.

Although some of the five-year plans were completed ahead of schedule, the CPSU was not able to realize everything that was conceived. Let us now consider what has been achieved in the first five-year period.

First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932)

The tasks that were set in the first five-year plan were to increase the growth of industrial output by 136%, labor productivity by 110%, and reduce production costs by 35%. Also, at the end of such buildings as the Dneproges and Turksib by 1930, it was decided to build over 1200 factories (according to one of the delegates to the 5th Congress of Soviets, when these plans were approved, it seemed that Rykov was sitting on a huge chest with money and distributing factories to everyone who wishes). The advantage was given to heavy industry, 78% of the budget was invested in it. Despite the excessive increase in the productivity of products, at the Sixteenth Party Congress it was decided to fulfill the plan in four, not five years. It was to be expected that not all plans came to fruition. By 1930, the construction of hundreds of objects was frozen. There was a shortage of raw materials, technical equipment and labor. Due to the lack of resources, it was decided to transfer their distribution into the hands of administrative structures. It was they who decided which enterprise and in what order would receive the materials they needed. Of course, this led to the decline of many enterprises that were at the bottom of the list, as they were not involved mainly in the five-year plan. The enterprises that were the first to receive everything they needed, such as the metallurgical plant in Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk, tractor plants in Kharkov and Chelyabinsk, etc., were an example for the whole country in production.

The system of priorities worked, but it was not a way out in the current situation, rather it was a half-measure that did not allow the economy of the USSR to collapse in the early 30s of the twentieth century. Another problem was the shortage of qualified personnel. This problem was created by the party itself. From 1928 to 1931 A campaign was launched against the "bourgeois specialists". This decision was made in order to strengthen the power of his party in the country, since almost 80% of the top leadership held their posts under the old government. In total, about 300,000 workers were "cleansed" during this time. And this is 300 thousand skilled workers. The power in the enterprises began to belong to the chief director (necessarily a member of the party), and the education of "such" directors usually did not exceed even the initial one. Communist workers were promoted to responsible posts.

Add to all this mass arrests arranged because of "sabotage in the workplace." If the enterprise did not fulfill the plan, then the responsibility fell not only on the head of the enterprise, but also on all its employees. From this I conclude that an atmosphere of fear and oppression was created at the enterprises.

What can be learned positively from the first five-year plan? And the fact that despite the loss of qualified personnel, the party government has created institutions for advanced training of workers. So from 1928 to 1932. the number of students in workers' faculties increased from 50,000 to 285,000. Approximately 660,000 communist workers "departed from the machine" and took up higher positions or went to refresher courses. The CPSU promised promotion to those communist workers who received the appropriate education, thereby recruiting more skilled workers. Thus, the campaign to promote new workers to positions of responsibility, consisting of communist party, was successful. In view of this, the face of the working class has changed. Unemployment among the working class also disappeared. In industrial and construction enterprises, the number of workers increased from 3.7 million to 8.5 million.

In 1930, a mass migration of peasants to the cities for enterprises began, which entailed new problems. In general terms, this is a decrease in labor productivity, due to new unskilled workers.

An increase in staff turnover, riots, industrial injuries - all this led to defective products, as a result of which the five-year plan was not fulfilled.

But timely measures were able to resolve the problem. The specialists of the old school were called up again. Internal passports were introduced at enterprises to reduce staff turnover and absenteeism at the workplace and piecework wages. Tougher penalties for absenteeism. This is not the whole list of measures that led to a new social system to raise the economy of the state. As planned, the five-year plan was completed in 4 years and 3 months.

In my opinion, despite such a variable economic situation in the country, the first five-year plan was able to achieve some successes, although not those that were set. The table shows the planned indicators before the amendment, which increased them significantly. (See Table No. 1.)

Table number 1.

Indicators in natural terms Planned (according to the optimal variant) Actually achieved in 1932 Electricity, billion kWh. hours 2213.2Coal, mln. t7564.0Oil, mln.t. .9 Combines, thousand pieces 4010 Cotton fabrics, million m 47002694 Woolen fabrics, million m 27088.7

Planned average annual growth rate for 1928 - 1932. the actual amounted to 11.9, which in the end is 41% of the implementation of planned targets.

Three other factors are worth noting:

The production of light industry goods was not given so much attention and the plan was only 70% fulfilled.

The volume of capital investment in industry in relation to the gross national product has increased 3.5 times in five years. True, to the detriment of the standard of living of the people.

Also, the goal was to increase labor productivity by 110%, but this indicator did not move (according to some reports, it even fell by 8%).

Having reviewed the first five-year plan, I will move on to the second.

Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937)

At the end of the first five-year plan, the new five-year plan was already adjusted. Having learned from the bitter experience of the previous five-year plan, the new project did not overestimate the bar for the industrialization of the country. True, the new indicators were higher than the previous ones, but it was believed that after a relatively successful first five-year plan, this plan could be implemented, since it turned out to be more balanced. Another difference from the first five-year plan was the increase in the budget for light industry, which amounted to 18.5% and 14.5% growth per year. The main emphasis was placed on improving the standard of living by increasing wages and reducing the retail price by 35%. It was supposed to raise the level of consumption among the population two, three times.

New methods were developed for industrialization in the country. Heavy industry switched to work without subsidies, based on the example of the Makeevka Metallurgical Plant. In 1936, the experience of economic settlement was expanded. People's Commissars were allowed to manage the funds of an industrial enterprise, also have an account with the State Bank, and sell products. But the new policy did not mean the legalization of private capital.

In industrial production, a separate wage is introduced, where wages depend on productivity. This is a new system to stimulate the working class, forced to improve their skills of people employed in the enterprise. It becomes prestigious to be a specialist in your field. The main motive is to "catch up and overtake the developed countries in order to prove that the Soviet worker is in no way inferior to the workers of other countries." Already in 1935, the result of such a policy was noticeable, expressed in the growth of labor productivity.

The ruble was not left without attention, a policy was carried out to strengthen it. On January 1, 1935, ration cards for bread went out of use, followed by ration cards for meat, fats, granulated sugar and potatoes on October 1 of the same year. In January 1936 the rationing system was abolished.

At the same time, the Stakhanovite movement was born, consisting in a narrow distribution of labor, when each worker specialized only in his own work. Such a distribution at times increased the quality and speed of the plan. The stimulation of the Stakhanovites was not only moral, but also monetary, thanks to which their number grew relentlessly. "Stakhanovite schools" appear, in which more experienced workers pass on their knowledge to less experienced ones. This is another factor in increasing labor productivity.

Unfortunately, the second five-year plan was not without its drawbacks. Forced labor was still used. After the first five-year plan, the number of prisoners only increased, and at the end of the second five-year plan their number was 1,668,200. The labor of special settlers was also used. Such work could be called almost free. The incentive for such "workers" was early release, material rewards, medals and orders. In my opinion, it was precisely such work that played an important role in the development of industrialization. Over two million workers who work, one might say, on incentive alone. It was with their help that the Moscow-Volga Canal, Magnitogorsk and the White Sea-Baltic Canal were built. Of course, the result of such work was a high mortality rate.

Now let's turn to the statistics (table No. 3), see Appendix.

From it we see what a leap was made during the years of the second five-year plan in comparison with the end of the first.

Table number 4.

Five-Year PlanPlanned Average Annual Growth RateAverage Annual Actual Growth Rate% of Plan Targets FulfilledSecond Five-Year Plan20,914,670

The percentage of fulfillment of planned targets increased by 29% compared to the previous five-year period. Both in the first and in the second five-year plans it was not possible to achieve the planned average annual growth rate, but nevertheless it was possible to increase it noticeably.

Table number 5

Assessment of the second five-year period

Indicator Implementation of the plan compared to 1932 Labor productivity Increased by 55% Construction program Decreased by 4.1% Volume of capital construction Increased 2.5 times Electrical constructionGrowth 1986 thousand kW. Coal industryIncreased by 1.5 timesFerrous metallurgyIncreased by 1.5 times, against 2.3Food industryIncreased by 2.3 times

Observing the growth of indicators, we can say with accuracy that the economic policy of the USSR was on the right track. The second five-year plan did not repeat the mistakes of the first, but created other problems for itself. Such as a decline in the standard of living on collective farms, a slowdown in the growth of agriculture, long queues for food and "blat". But if you close your eyes to all these disadvantages, the USSR created a powerful military-industrial complex. Ranked first in Europe in terms of production volume.

Now consider the third five-year plan.

Third Five-Year Plan (1938-1941)

This is the last five-year plan, which I will talk about in more detail, in the future I will give dry statistics and, based on it, I will draw a conclusion for the period from 1946 to 1991.

Let's start with the fact that the beginning of the five-year plan fell on the beginning of the Second World War. The defense had to allocate a quarter of the state. budget. In 1940 appropriations were increased to 1/3, and in 1941 almost to half of the country's budget. According to official data, the average annual growth rate of military production was 39%. The production of tanks was doubled. Even non-military enterprises received orders for military equipment. The main geographic location of the new plants was the Urals, Siberia and middle Asia.

The objective of the Third Five-Year Plan was to catch up with the developed countries in terms of industrial output per capita. The main indicator was quality, not quantity. The chemical industry developed and the first steps were taken in the automation of production. In just 3 years, production increased by 34%, a figure close to fulfilling the five-year plan, but not enough.

A new problem, which took us by surprise, is the shortage of qualified personnel, the need for which has grown in comparison with the second five-year plan. So on October 2, 1940, a system was created for the preparation of state labor reserves. Workers of the highest and middle qualifications were still taught by institutes and technical schools.

Education has become more accessible. By 1940, the number of educational institutions was 4600. The number of other cultural institutions also increased. The level of healthcare has risen. In my opinion, all these achievements were canceled out by hunger, a housing crisis and a decrease in purchasing power. Wages rose, but rose along with prices. Despite the industrial leap, society was fed worse than in 1913.

In 1940, the number of workers grew to 23-24 million people.

At the beginning of the winter of 1941, gross industrial output dropped 2.1 times. Such a sharp jump is associated with the occupation of the USSR by German troops.

The third five-year plan was destined to be interrupted because of the war. Having considered the third five-year plan, I conclude that the government of the USSR, although it made plans for 5 years ahead, did not look into the future. In the third five-year plan, the same problem with the shortage of qualified personnel as in the first one arose. But it is also worth noting that the placement of new industrial plants as far as possible from the front line played an important role in the Second World War. Even after the war, these factories continued to function and develop. And it was on them that the production of new military equipment was mastered.

It's time to move on to the rest of the five-year plans. I will present the conclusion for each of them in conclusion.

Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950)

By 1948, the level of industrial production was brought closer to the pre-war level. More than 6,200 large industrial enterprises have been rebuilt and restored. 1946 On December 25, the first nuclear reactor in the USSR was built.

In 1948, the building of the first atomic industrial reactor "A" of plant No. 817 was built and on June 18 of the same year the reactor "A" was launched. The successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb was carried out on August 29, 1949 at the constructed test site<#"center">Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-1955)

The task is to restore the national economy. More than 3,000 large industrial enterprises have been built in the USSR. The national income grew by 71%, the volume of production by 85%, the volume of agricultural production by 21%, capital investments by 1.9 times.

Increased growth in coal production. An oil refinery was built in Omsk. In 1952, the Volga-Don shipping canal was opened. The world's largest gas pipeline Stavropol - Moscow was built. About 13 million hectares of new land have been put into circulation.

Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960)

The main task of the sixth five-year plan, like the fifth, was to raise the national economy. 2400 more large enterprises have earned. The growth of national income increased by 0.5 times, gross industrial output increased by 64%, gross agricultural output by 32%. The world's first artificial satellite was launched into space on October 4, 1957. Europe's largest plant in Ivanovo began its work. Gorky, Irkutsk, Volga, Kuibyshev hydroelectric power stations were built. Obtaining a nuclear missile shield.

Table No. 7, No. 8 (see application)

Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965), Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-1970), Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975)

I combined one seven-year plan and two five-year plans, since the development of the national economy remained a priority. A comparison of the indicators of the three plans is shown in Table No. 9.

Table No. 9 Comparison of the indicators of the development of the national economy in the 9th Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) with the indicators of the 7th and 8th Five-Year Plans

National income used for consumption and accumulationTotal volume for the 9th five-year plan, billion rubles. Total volume for the 9th Five-Year Plan to the total volume, % of the 7th Five-Year Plan (1959-1965) of the 8th Five-Year Plan (1966-1970) Nat. income used for consumption and accumulation1563186134Products of industry2308218145Products of agriculture455137113Volume of investments502203142Commissioning of fixed assets469202144Retail trade turnover933206140Payments and benefits received by the population from companies. consumption funds (in actual prices) 393225143Money income of the population (in actual prices) 1178213142

Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980)

National income grew by 24%, gross industrial output by 43%, gross agricultural output by 10%. In another source, these figures are underestimated - the national income increased by 21%, the volume of gross industrial output by 24%, the volume of gross agricultural output by 9%. Such dispersion in the data is due to the fact that after the failure to fulfill the plan of the first five-year plans, data on them were not published.

Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1976-1980)

National income grew by 16.5%, gross industrial output by 20%, gross agricultural output by 11%. Almost 50 million people have been provided with housing.

Twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-1990)

Although at the beginning of the five-year plan more than 400 large enterprises had been built and the construction of 36,000 new ones had begun, a decline in construction production in the country is nevertheless outlined. The volume of housing construction decreased, unit costs increased, efficiency decreased, the industry plunged into a systemic crisis.

Conclusion

Having considered the tasks in the main part, I will go straight to the purpose of my essay - to identify positive as well as negative sides this process. I consider the positive side of the five-year plans to be the huge leap in the economy that was made in a relatively short period of time. It is hard for me to imagine what would have happened if the USSR had not deployed a policy on nuclear weapons on time. Thanks to the industrial and technical rise, the launch of the world's first satellite became possible. Another plus is the growth of knowledge from 92.1 million people (total 151.6 million in 1928) to 287.4 million people. (total 288.0 million in 1990). The negative side is the Stalinist repressions. Despite the fact that this is a political sphere rather than an economic one, this factor had a huge influence in the Stalinist five-year plans. In my opinion, it was these repressions that prevented the USSR from developing further. How many valuable personnel were lost because of them, and these are not only skilled workers, but also professors, doctors of science, etc. If the attitude towards people in a non-party was the same as for those who are in it, I think it would be possible to avoid so many deportations and emigration of the "bourgeois" educated population, so important for the development of the country. From the history of five-year plans, I learned for myself that I need to look a few moves ahead. The recommendation would be to conclude that for the same problem, you need to immediately look for several alternative solutions, since in the future it may repeat itself and half measures will not help to cope with it.

In conclusion of my work, I would like to note that the period of the USSR five-year plans is one of the most interesting periods in the history of Russia, not only from an economic, but also a social point of view.

Literature

1.Kuzakova O.A., Bobko E.I. History of the world economy: Proc. Benefit. - St. Petersburg: SPbGIEU, 2011.

2.Simchera V.M. Development of the Russian economy over 100 years: 1900-2000. Historical series, secular trends, periodic cycles. - M.: Economics, 2007.

.Nicolas Werth, History of the Soviet State, 1900-1991

4.<#"center">Application

Table #3

Production of certain types of machinery and equipment

Equipment 1932 1937 1937, % to 1932 Machine tools, thousand units 19.748.5246.2 Forging and pressing machines, pcs. 11253125277.8 Metallurgical equipment, thousand tons 6.918.4266.7 Coal cutters, pcs. 298572191.9Oil equipment, thousand tons1.95.3278.9Steam and gas turbines, thousand kW239.01068.0226.9Hydraulic turbines, thousand kW59.588.3148.4Steam boilers, thousand m ² 163.3268.2164.2 Diesel engines, thousand liters With. 95.8259.7271.1 Electric motors over 100 kW, thousand kW300.0612.0204.0 Electric motors up to 100 kW, thousand kW1358.01221.089.9 units 8281528191.1 Cars, thousand units 23.9199.9836.4 Tractors in terms of 15-horsepower, thousand units 50.866,% 130.9 Grain combines, thousand units 10,043,9439.0 Excavators, pcs. 85522614.1Food engineering, million rubles 26.685.0319.5

Table number 7

The volume of capital investments in the national economy of the USSR in 1946-1958

Total Including in million rubles mln. (without collective farms) transport and communications residential buildings, objects of education, healthcare, etc. Collective farms Population for the construction of residential buildings and apartments. 163,399 74,311 65,234 5,775 15,553 18,479 49,281 17,188 15,389 100 45.5 39.9 3.5 9.5 11.3 30.2 34,096 15,707 13,651 1,108 3,8795 150 3,915 65,731 31,394 28,098 2,260 6,359 7,050 18,668 6,727 5,251 63,572 27,210 23,485 2,407 6,699 6,453 20,803 7,311 6,223

Table No. 8

Commissioning of fixed assets of the national economy in the USSR, production capacities and facilities in 1946-1958.

Unit of measurement Total for the period 1946-1958 Including 1 including Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950) Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-1955) Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1958) Large industrial enterprises. Fixed assets of state and cooperative enterprises and organizations Production capacities: cast iron steel coal power plants New railways Railways electrified Residential buildings: state and cooperative ... built by the population at their own expense and with the help of a state loan Schools and boarding schools Kindergartens and nurseries Hospitals and polyclinics Sanatoriums and rest homes Number of enterprises bln. rub. mln. t/year mln. kW thousand km mln. total area the same thous. places thousand places thousand beds "12 090 146.2 27.9 23.5 311.4 42.4 7 7.3 300.1 118.7 4545 966.7 226.9 211.16200 29.7 8, 9 8.9 107.3 8.4 2.3 1 72.4 30.4 1181 101.8 63.5 142.23200 57.7 10.3 8.9 116.1 17.6 3.1 2, 2 113 38.8 1912 416.5 77.3 48.62690 58.8 8.7 5.7 88 16.4 1.6 4.1 114.7 49.5 1452 448.4 86.1 20.3

Table number 10

This is how the USSR developed

Years 1940194519671990Population (million people) 191170236290Electricity (billion kWh) 48n/a5891. 7288 Angular (million TN) 16649495703 Neft (million TN) 3119288570 Chugun (million TN) 15958110 Stoy (million TN) 1812102154GAZ (billion cubic cubic meters) -159815Avo (thousand) 1451027292. 120540 tractor (thousand) .) 4010101121 Cement (million tons) 5.73.885137 Fabrics of all kinds (million sq. m) 3. 3002. 1006.20012. 700Обувь кожаная (млн. пар) 21163522820Вся посевная площадь (млн. га) н/дн/д188208Зерновые (млн. тн) 9647136218Поголовье скота (млн. голов) крупного рогатого554797116свиней28115176овец и коз9670138140Мясо (млн. тн) 531220Молоко (млн. тн) 332680109Парк (тыс .): Tractors 6843973. 4852. 609 grain harvesters 182148553655 trucks 228621. 0541. 443Doctors (thousand) 1551865981. 305Hospital beds (thousand) 791n/d2. 3983. 896Club institutions (thousand) 118n/a129136Theatres908892518713Museums518n/a1. 0122. 311 Public libraries73. 63454. 329123. 382133. 700Scientific institutions1. 821n/d4. 7248.172

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