In the last article, we told how in 1919 the White Guards, tired of the constant raids of the highlanders, carried out an operation to pacify Chechnya. Its result was that the Chechens laid down their arms and ceased resistance. After the establishment of Soviet power, the Bolsheviks faced the same problem, since the highlanders did not want to obey the central government. This material tells about how the Red Army and the OGPU put things in order in the rebellious territory.

Gotsinsky's rebellion

Few people know that in March 1920 the Red Army entered Chechnya along with the rebels. They hoped with the help of the Bolsheviks to get what they fought for - sovereignty. However, soon both Chechens and Dagestanis were very disappointed: there was no question of independence. The introduction of the surplus and the struggle against religion, as well as the abolition of the local Sharia administration and its replacement by the Soviets, led to the fact that already in September 1920 an uprising broke out in Chechnya and Dagestan. It was of a religious-nationalist nature and was more anti-Russian than anti-Soviet, since the actions of the Soviet government were perceived here as another attempt at Russification. It is no coincidence that it was headed by Imam Nazhmutdin Gotsinsky, who announced the creation of a Sharia state - an imamate.
One of the leaders of the suppression of the uprising was appointed Gikalo, then the commander of the red troops and the military commissar of the Terek region. And he has had some success. Having been defeated in 1921 in open battles against the Red Army, which actively used armored vehicles, aircraft and artillery, Gotsinsky switched to guerrilla warfare. Mobile detachments of mountaineers, based in their native villages, suddenly appeared in different places and dealt sensitive blows to the Bolsheviks. However, the latter already in 1921 announced the liquidation of Gotsinsky's rebellion. But this was far from the case.
In 1922, Gikalo personally led a punitive expedition against the highlanders, which had only relative success. Attempts to seize the "bandit element" - religious leaders, the "rich", the nobility, the most active rebels, the former ranks of the "Wild Division" did not give the desired result or caused even greater exasperation of the population. The leaders of the rebels, on the other hand, successfully eluded persecution, using the support of the "civilian population." At this time, they avoided meetings of their gangs with large detachments of the Red Army and the GPU. Attempts to occupy the villages with the garrisons of the Red troops at the same time as carrying out explanatory work among the population were of little effect. The influence of the mullahs was very high, and attempts to set the "poor" against the "rich" here, thus causing a "small civil war" among the highlanders, were also unsuccessful. At the same time, the garrisons were often blocked by the rebels and destroyed, their supply lines were cut off.
Gotsinsky's uprising, with short breaks, continued until May 1924, when the OGPU detachments liquidated the rebel bases in the Andi and Khasav-Yurt districts. But even after that, the struggle continued. We can safely say that, despite all the colossal efforts of the powerful state repressive machine, by the mid-1920s. in many regions of Chechnya and Dagestan, Soviet power did not exist. Detachments of Chekists relentlessly pursued Gotsinsky, but support protected him from capture local residents who protected him not only as an imam, but also as a guest. Often, when he was actually in their hands, the Chekists were blocked by numerous crowds of people armed with machine guns, rifles, axes. Here and there rebellions broke out again.

"Disarmament with maximum repression"

Under these conditions, the authorized representative office of the OGPU in the North Caucasus developed a plan to eliminate the most dangerous centers of resistance. This plan included the capture by troops in a dense ring of the area of ​​operations of Gotsinsky's bands and his accomplices. This ring should have been gradually compressed. At the same time, the most important part of the special operation was the disarmament of the "civilian population", and the most stringent measures were planned to achieve a positive result. By August 25, 1925, detachments of the Dagestan, Chechen, Vladikavkaz, Terek, Kabardino-Balkarian departments of the OGPU, together with units of the Red Army, under the general leadership of the authorized representative of the OGPU in the North Caucasus, E.G. Evdokimov and the commander of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District I.P. Uborevich were ready for a special operation. Its implementation was envisaged in several stages, one of which was the "disarmament of the Chechen Autonomous Region."
The day before, a special instruction was sent to the commanders of military units and detachments of the OGPU, which stated: "The village planned for disarmament is surrounded by a military unit so that the inhabitants are deprived of the opportunity to communicate with the surrounding areas." After the complete encirclement of the village, representatives of the Chechen Central Executive Committee, the OGPU and the military command present a demand at the gathering for the surrender of all weapons. For this, a period of no more than two hours is set. Residents are warned about the responsibility for not surrendering weapons. If the population does not comply with the requirement, then the command opens artillery fire for 10 minutes, and then, after the lights out, again gives the order to surrender in a shorter time. After the expiration of the indicated period, the task force of the OGPU begins a general search and seizure of the bandit element. "Depending on the situation, artillery fire may open several times." In exceptional cases, in the presence of malicious active or passive resistance to disarmament, arrests of influential persons are allowed, and this measure should be resorted to with maximum tact. "This instruction was developed by the chief of staff of the North Caucasus Military District and approved by the district commander I.P. Uborevich. In total for pacification Chechnya was allocated 7,250 people with 26 guns, 240 machine guns, which were attached to an armored train and two air squadrons.This grouping was divided into seven groups, which began on August 25, 1925 to conduct a special operation. Caucasus Military District" of September 19, 1925: "The operation was built on the rapid disarmament of the most bandit-minded regions by large forces using maximum repression in order to force the population to extradite the leaders hiding there. In the future, with a successful outcome, a smaller splitting of forces was planned in order to cover the whole of Chechnya "

Auls - fire!

At dawn on August 25, 1925, the King's group surrounded the village of Achkhoy. After the weapons were not handed over within the prescribed period, gunfire began. At first they fired over their heads, but after the fifth shot, when it became clear that in this case no one would voluntarily surrender anything, fire was opened to kill. The result appeared quickly: after the tenth shrapnel shot, when two Chechen women were wounded, the inhabitants carried their weapons. At the same time, the task force of the OGPU began searches. As a result, 228 rifles and 32 revolvers were seized. In the same way, the group of the King carried out disarmament in other settlements: "The difference is only in the degree of stubbornness of the inhabitants and the number of shells fired." According to the OGPU, "in some places the population was actively preparing for resistance, the price of cartridges had increased by half." Besides, " civilians"tried to get weapons from the soldiers and officers of the Red Army - attempts were made to buy it, there were cases of attacks on sentries, there were even those who wanted to exchange rifles for women at a rate of 1: 1.
On August 27, 1925, the most powerful of all Apanasenko's group approached the village of Zumsoy, whose population, even against the background of the whole of Chechnya, stood out for its intransigence towards the authorities of Moscow. Apanasenko demanded the surrender of 800 rifles and 200 revolvers, as well as the extradition of bandits hiding in the village and mountains. The residents refused. Zumsoy was subjected to shelling. To no avail. Then, at the request of Apanasenko, aerial bombardment began. As a result, "civilians" surrendered 27 rifles. The next day, the blockaded village was subjected to increased air bombardment and shelling, and the house of the bandit leader Atabi was blown up. This had the expected impact: "Seeing that the repressions continue and the troops do not back down from their demands, the residents surrendered 102 rifles within an hour." About a hundred more rifles and about 50 revolvers were confiscated by the OGPU task force during the searches. On the same day, Kozitsky's group surrounded the village of Keloi at dawn. At the first request, the residents brought only 9 rifles. In response, artillery fire was opened in the village. Soon, a crowd of women rushed to the headquarters of the group, howling, begging to stop shooting and assuring that there were no weapons in Keloi. The old people who arrived also swore that everything that was handed over. At the same time, alarming data was received from the OGPU task force: armed men flashed in the streets, the village was preparing for defense. Ignoring the lamentations of "civilians", Kozitsky intensified the shelling. Following this, another 15 rifles were handed over. During the search, several more rifles and revolvers were seized. However, Kozitsky did not calm down and again subjected the village to fire to be sure. As a result, the residents handed over about 30 more rifles and revolvers. In total, 59 rifles and 9 revolvers were seized here.
The harsh measures taken against banditry in Chechnya and Dagestan began to bear fruit: it took only one aerial bombardment of the village of Nakhchu-Keloy for its inhabitants to surrender all their weapons. Soon the OGPU received information that Emin Ansaltinsky, Gotsinsky's closest assistant, was hiding in the village of Dai. Dai was surrounded on August 26, 1925, and they demanded that he extradite the leader of the bandits. Oath assurances of the elders and women's requests not to undertake any repressions against their village were also heard here, since allegedly not only Ansalta, but even ordinary bandits were not there, and they had long since taken their weapons to the mountains. The command subjected the village to aerial bombardment and shelling. The result - four killed, five wounded and twenty houses destroyed. However, the available forces were not enough, and Kozitsky's group had to be involved in a special operation against the village. The result was not long in coming: "long gone to the mountains" Ansaltinsky with a gang and weapons was handed over to the troops and brought directly to the headquarters of the group. Soon the troops surrounded the villages of Khima and Khakmala. Here they needed four bombardments to surrender their weapons. The stubbornness of the "civilians" was explained very simply: Gotsinsky himself was hiding in a cave near Khakmaloy with a gang of 150 people. A special task force of the OGPU blocked them and arrested them all.
Among all the special operations to disarm the villages and capture the bandits, the actions of the King's group in Urus-Martan, which was then the actual capital of the Chechens, should be noted. It began on September 6, 1925. Residents were immediately required to hand over 4,000 rifles and 800 revolvers, as well as extremist sheikhs. Having information that recalcitrant auls are being mercilessly fired upon, the Chechens handed over about a thousand rifles and 400 revolvers, but they did not give up the sheikhs. Then 900 shells were fired at Urus-Martan and subjected to aerial bombardment. 12 houses were destroyed and 5 people were injured. After that, special units of the OGPU entered the village and immediately ran into the bandits who had settled here. During the battle, the attackers lost 5 people and 10 horses, 9 people were wounded. If we sum up the overall result of the special operation, it can be noted that in three and a half weeks the Red Army and the OGPU achieved the necessary result, which they could not achieve in the previous 5 years. To achieve it, it was necessary to take extreme measures not only against the bandits, but also against the "civilian population", disarming them in the most brutal ways. Of the 242 auls, 101 had to be subjected to artillery shelling, and 16 to air strikes. Losses among the "civilian population" were relatively small: 6 people were killed and 30 were wounded. 119 houses were also blown up. Destroyed 12 bandits. During the special operation, 25,299 rifles, 4,319 revolvers, 1 machine gun and 80,000 cartridges were confiscated. In addition, more than 300 bandits were arrested, among them 3 leaders - Gotsinsky, Atabi Shamilev, Emin Ansaltinsky. The success of the operation was accompanied by the fact that hostages were taken from the families of the nobility and the clergy in hostile villages with the promise of their execution in case of new manifestations of banditry. It should be noted that, despite all the efforts of the OGPU to interrupt the supply of Gotsinsky's gangs with weapons and money, it was not possible to do this before the special operation of August - September 1925. The Chekist leadership hoped that with the capture of Georgia in 1921 and the subjugation of Azerbaijan, it would be possible to reliably block the supply routes of the bandits from behind the cordon. But even when Georgia and Azerbaijan became Soviet, foreign aid to Gotsinsky, albeit to a lesser extent, continued to come through various channels. Moreover, it was provided not only by foreign special services, counting on the separation of the Caucasus from the power of Moscow, but also by emigrant Chechen organizations headed by Topa Chermoev, a former oilman.

New uprising of the mountaineers

In December 1929, during the collectivization, a new uprising broke out in Chechnya. To suppress it, a military detachment of 2 thousand bayonets, 75 machine guns, 11 artillery pieces, 7 aircraft was allocated from the North Caucasus Military District. An attempt by the command to take on December 10, 1929 the village of Goity without the support of artillery, when it was decided not to harm "civilians", was unsuccessful. The next day, after a massive shelling and aerial bombardment, the Red Army took Shali, and a day later - Goity and Benoy. 290 rifles were seized. In addition, they had to take away the old firearms and edged weapons. Losses: 21 dead and 22 wounded soldiers. However, the operation did not end there, as a significant part of the rebels went into the mountains and began to attack trains and destroy bridges. Once, the highlanders even fired at a large party leadership traveling by rail. Terror against government officials and law enforcement agencies also intensified.

OGPU data are disappointing

Despite the success of the December 1929 special operation, the data of the OGPU were disappointing: a new powerful uprising was brewing in the Caucasus, and Chechens had connections with anti-Soviet groups not only in Dagestan and Ingushetia, but also in Georgia and even with the Terek Cossacks. The ground for discontent was largely due to disrespect for the religious and cultural characteristics of the highlanders and colossal economic pressure. Proceeding from this, the regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks recognized the need to conduct a Chekist-military operation in Chechnya. It was decided to allocate an operational group of troops "for the elimination of banditry." The composition of this group included 2,420 bayonets, 1,140 sabers, at least 28 heavy machine guns, not counting light ones, 21 artillery pieces, and an air link was attached to it. In addition, special units of the OGPU troops were allocated to fight against banditry. A new special operation began on the night of March 14, 1930. The troops of the Operational Group blocked the most threatened areas the day before. They acted according to a previously worked out scenario: the villages were surrounded by troops and they were required to hand over bandits and weapons. The result was the capture of 122 rebels and 9 gang leaders, the destruction of at least 20 militants. On the part of the Operational Group, 14 people were killed, 22 were wounded. The operation was generally successful.
But the command drew disappointing conclusions: "The task of destroying the gangs with a decisive blow, preventing them from dispersing, was not fulfilled." In addition, the inability of the Red troops to fight at night and "the inability to take the slightest risk" were noted. It should be noted that in the USSR, by that time, special mountain rifle troops had not been created, prepared for battles in mountainous areas, with special pack artillery, which could be delivered on horses and donkeys to places where it is impossible to send conventional artillery . Drawing lessons from past events, the red command came to the conclusion that during active hostilities against banditry, it is necessary to reliably block the paths of bandits to their native villages. To do this, it was recommended to introduce garrisons of troops into all settlements, register residents on the spot and catch everyone who comes there.
Despite another defeat of the rebels in Chechnya, on March 23, 1932, a new uprising broke out there in the Nozhai-Yurt region, due to overfulfillment of livestock procurement by 219%. The center of the uprising was in Benoy, and its leaders incited the Dagestanis and Terek Cossacks to act. The rebels planned to seize the oil fields, Gudermes and the villages adjacent to it, disrupt the railway communication by destroying bridges and communication lines. However, a coordinated uprising did not work, it began ahead of schedule. There were two reasons for this: firstly, on March 19, the bandits killed two Red Army soldiers, and secondly, the OGPU agents became aware of the upcoming performance. It should be noted that the "personnel leaders" of the operating gangs, Khusein Istamulov and Dada Kebetov, played an active role in it, who provided great assistance to the local rebel leaders Mutsu Shamilev, who was declared imam, and Usman Ushkhaev.
The following fact is also very indicative: a significant part of the local communist activists joined the rebellion. Their former affiliation with the Communist Party did not prevent representatives of the "Chechen communists" from entering the restored Sharia courts. The number of rebels was at least 1,300 people. However, the authorities began to take measures already on March 19, and the area of ​​the uprising was actually blocked. Attempts by the OGPU alone to cope with the uprising were unsuccessful, and the army joined in the suppression. After a series of fierce battles, in which the army actively used artillery and aircraft, the Chechen rebels were defeated and retreated to the Alkhoroi region, from where they planned to leave to continue the fight in Dagestan. However, the arrival of large military contingents on the border with Chechnya forced them to disperse. According to the Soviet command, the losses of the rebels amounted to 333 people killed, 150 wounded, while the troops lost 27 and 30 people, respectively. At the same time, it was noted that the local population helped the bandits in every possible way, who offered fierce resistance to the troops, continuously counterattacked them, going on the attack with religious songs. Many women fought on the side of the rebels.

Results and lessons

If we analyze fighting against Chechnya in the 19th century, we will see that for about 40 years the highlanders successfully fought against forces that were significantly superior to them. It took the Red Army five years to conquer Chechnya in the 1920s. In our time, with varying success, the counter-terrorist operation continues there. Compared to all these military operations, Dratsenko's actions (we talked about them in the last article) were simply brilliant. The success of the general was accompanied by his special policy: to deal ruthlessly with inveterate bandits, but to spare the "fluctuating in spirit."
However, the actions of the Red Army and the OGPU in August-September 1925 were also very effective. The pacification of the Caucasus by the Soviet authorities was also facilitated by the policy of gradual abolition of the Sharia administration, expressed in the preservation of the Sharia courts for a long time or their parallel operation with the Soviet courts. At the same time, experience shows that negotiations with the Chechens can be effective only after inflicting heavy losses and defeats on them and showing readiness to carry out the punitive policy to the end. Uncertainty in the actions of the Russian authorities may confirm the separatists in the opinion of the weakness of Moscow, which, of course, will lead to the continuation of the struggle.
History does not accept subjunctive mood, but if the White Guard command had acted in the spring of 1919 as the federal forces are doing today, then the entire might of the Volunteer Army would not have been enough to conquer Chechnya. The Soviet command in the 1920s and 1930s, without using large-scale repressions against banditry, risked losing control over the situation in the Caucasus altogether or getting bogged down in guerrilla warfare for decades.
We have already noted that we are by no means calling for a direct borrowing of the methods that were used in the struggle against Chechen separatism at the beginning of the last century. However, given the more modern technology in service Russian army and intelligence agencies, these old methods can be remembered and, by modifying them, get positive results. Yes, we live in a democracy and any uncivilized solution to the problems we face is alien to us. This is true.
But at the same time one should not forget Churchill's profound words: "democracy is not for everyone." The achievements of democracy are intended only for those who work for the benefit of all citizens of the planet and create the basis for the further development of civilization. For bandits and terrorists who threaten the security of this very civilization, there can be no democracy, because they are making every effort to destroy it.
"Human rights activists", who were silent when the bandits destroyed the defenseless Russian-speaking population, should be reminded of how the United States suppressed the protests of the black population of Florida and Texas in the 1960-1970s, how they allow themselves to destroy citizens of other countries only on suspicion of terrorism without asking the opinion of the "world community" about it. Israel does not even want to hear about the UN decisions on the Palestinian issue, since, according to Tel Aviv, they infringe on the interests of the Jews. Remember Great Britain of the Thatcher era, which, ignoring the most severe criticism of most countries of the world, defeated Argentina in the Falklands War.
More examples could be given. But there is no need for this. It is worth simply saying on this occasion that the countries pursuing their national policy bring it to the desired result, not paying serious attention to criticism from competitors. After all, to put your internal politics Depending on whether Lord Judd approves this or that measure, it means putting oneself on the level of the African bantustan, which is semi-colonially dependent on its "big brothers" - the United States or the countries of Western Europe.
The winners are not judged, and such a "squeal" in the case of choosing tough measures to suppress banditry, although very loud, will not last long - Western industrialists will not allow their governments to deprive them of their colossal incomes on the Russian market. This will also be directly dependent on the duration of tough actions to eliminate separatism and the readiness of the Russian leadership to pursue its own, and not imposed from outside, policy.

62 Rebellion of Chechnya.

My answer to the ignoramuses.

- The Chechens rose up against the occupation of Russia, immediately after the surrender of Imam Shamil in 1859, led by Baysangur, Uma Duev, Atabi Ataev and many other former associates of Shamil. In 1861, Chechnya fell once again - 43 villages of Chechnya were burned by the tsarist troops.

- In 1877, the whole of Chechnya again rebelled against the Russian colonizers, a new uprising was led by Alibek-Khadzhi from Zandak, but the Russians again suppressed the uprising - all the villages of mountainous Chechnya were destroyed, Alibek-Khadzhi was executed!

- In 1905, Chechnya rebelled against tsarism, - the uprising was suppressed in 1906, the villages were burned, some Chechens went abroad, others went into partisans - (doomed) and continued to fight against the occupation of the Russians!

- In February 1919, the troops of the Caucasian Volunteer Army of General P. Wrangel entered Grozny, which were joined by an echelon of British troops from Port-Petrovsk. In September 1919, Grozny attacked a detachment of Chechen rebels under the command of Aslanbek Sheripov. In the battle near the village of Aldy, A. Sheripov was killed, but in October 1919 the insurgent "Freedom Army" nevertheless liberated Grozny.

— 1920. The Bolsheviks close mosques, shoot the clergy.-

— Winter 1920. A new uprising in Chechnya, which lasted until 1925, is led by Ali Mitaev. "The Anti-Soviet Movement in Chechnya in the 1920s - 1930s". The results of the punitive operation were as follows: air bombardment fell on 28 villages, 101 settlements in Chechnya were subjected to machine-gun and artillery shelling, many of them were burned, Chechen families go to the mountains, guerrilla war!

- In September 1929, the Plains Chechens join the rebel partisans and a new anti-Soviet uprising breaks out.

- On December 10, 1929, a detachment formed by the North Caucasus Military District began to eliminate the uprising. Chechens are fighting fierce battles in the area of ​​large settlements - Goity, Shali, Benoy, Tsontoroy, Sambi. After shelling and bombing, these settlements were captured, but most of the Chechens went to the mountains.

- At the beginning of 1932, a large-scale uprising broke out again in Chechnya, in which the abreks and a significant part of the Russian population of the Nadterechny Cossack villages also took part. The rough policy of the Soviet government to collectivize the agriculture of Chechnya, which, due to local conditions, is extremely difficult, if not impossible, led to the extreme exasperation of the population.

- Chechens divided into 500-800 people attacked and besieged most of the military garrisons on the territory of Chechnya. The fighting was characterized by unprecedented fierceness, participation in the attacks of women and children. Cooperatives, village councils and Soviet money were destroyed.

- In March 1932, a military operation was again carried out, entire villages were burned and deported outside the North Caucasus.

- Chechnya, exhausted by wars, calmed down for 5 years. —

- In 1937, in connection with the Stalinist repressions and executions of preachers, the scope of anti-Soviet speeches began to grow again, a war broke out. Additional internal troops of the NKVD and army units were introduced into Chechnya, the war ended, as always, in favor of the Soviet government. 2746 activists were arrested and shot, 230 people went missing, 2340 families were deported to Siberia, many went to the mountains!

The mass repressions that began in the late 1930s and, especially, the “general operation to destroy anti-Soviet elements” carried out by the NKVD in 1937, during which more than 10 thousand people were arrested in Chechnya, and almost all religious figures and leaders from district to the republican level led to new uprisings.

Military units of the Red Army and internal troops from 1920 to 1939

years lost killed in battles with the rebels 13,564

- In 1940, a large-scale anti-Soviet uprising began, organized by Hasan Israilov, a graduate of the Communist University of Workers of the East, started in the winter.

- In February 1940, Israilov's Chechen army took Galanchozh, Sayasan, Chaberloi and most of the Shatoi region. The new Chechen government was established in the village of Galanchozh. Khasan wrote the "Temporary Program for the Organization of Checheno-Ingushetia". By November 1941, he abolished the laws of the USSR in 41 settlements.

- In 1941, Mairbek Sheripov, a member of the CPSU, a former prosecutor (younger brother of the late Aslanbek Sheripov, commander of the Freedom Army), declared war on the USSR. In February 1942, his detachment attacked Shatoi, Himokh, Itum-Kale, and other settlements until they rejoined Israilov's army.

- In the spring of 1942, Chechnya was bombed twice, large formations of the Red Army and the NKVD troops were pulled together. In the course of the fighting, 42 villages of Chechnya were destroyed, there were more dead than alive! - Mayrbek Sheripov died in the battle.
- Khasan Israilov fought until 1944, died in battle.
-Abrechestvo has become widespread.

- After the collapse of the USSR, in 1991 the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed.

- In 1994, on the first of December, Russian aircraft having violated the air border of Chechnya, the capital and several settlements were bombed.

- On December 11, 1994, three groups of Russian troops entered Chechnya from three sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), the north-west (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, which directly borders on Chechnya) and the east (from the territory of Dagestan).

- During the two wars, only civilians died, 320,000, of which 40,000 were children, and 8,000 Russian-speaking residents of Chechnya.
Destroyed 70% of residential and economic facilities in Chechnya.
More than 200,000 Chechen citizens have gone abroad, about 25,000 are in prison, several hundred are missing, and several thousand are fighting a guerrilla war.
“THE GOING CRAZY ALONE…”

Dagestan.

Dagestan, in Russian, is a country of mountains, and this name is rightfully given to it. Almost the whole country consists of a chain of mountains, intertwined and merging with each other in the most bizarre way.
Dagestan occupies a space in the east of the Caucasus from the river. Sulak and up to Babadag, limited from the southwest by the Main Caucasian Range, and from the east by the Caspian Sea. The main Caucasian ridge starts from Barbalo, in Dagestan itself it stretches 230 versts with snowy peaks 12435-13591 f. Another ridge runs almost parallel to it. Side, which, with its bleak appearance, seems even more wild, harsh and inaccessible.
Between these two parallel ridges, however, there are transverse bridges that form depressions running from the northwest to the southeast. Dido, Tsunta, Kapucha, Antracle, Samurskaya and others. The side ridge is not expressed as clearly as the Main one, since it does not represent a continuous chain, moreover, its individual parts have different names.
The main ridge consists of rocks and scree covered with snow in places. Despite the significant average height of the Main Range, snow remains throughout the year only in hollows and hollows and rarely on peaks that do not hold it on themselves due to their sharpness and slope of the ribs. Most of the ridge is freed from snow in mid-June, and in early September the upper parts of the mountains almost along the entire length are again covered with snow, and from that time blizzards and blizzards rage on the peaks (E. I. Kozubsky) 4 . From the main upper node of these mountains to the northeast, the Andean Range separates Chechnya from Dagestan, ending with the grandiose Salatau Plateau of the Green Mountains. This ridge is also distinguished by its unusually wild appearance and inaccessible character. This severe and barren species stands out especially on the Dagestan side, while on the Chechen side it is covered with greenery and pastures. The Gimrinsky or Koysubulinsky mountains go along the right bank of the Sulatau.
The main rivers originate on the Side Range. These will be Andean, Avar, Kazikumukh and Kara-Koysu. All these Koisu merge together and form Sulak. In the southern part, the Samur flows with its tributaries Kurakh-chai and others.
Depending on your geographical location, Dagestan is divided into three parts: Nagorny, Primorsky and the Samur and Kyurinsky-Tabasaran valleys. Mountainous Dagestan lies between the Main and Andean ranges and the Sulaco-Caspian watershed. Here he represents such a plexus of waters that it is far from easy to understand. The coastal region is made up of mountain slopes to the Caspian Sea and the coastal plain. The area is very beautiful and very fertile in places. Finally, the Samur and Kyura-Tabasaran basins are rich in vegetation and significantly fertile.
“Nagorny Dagestan, occupying a central position relative to the areas adjacent to it, due to the inaccessibility and militancy of the tribes inhabiting it, is of great strategic importance during our struggle with the highlanders. Surrounded on all sides by high ridges with a limited number of passages and accesses, extremely mountainous and rugged, it is like a natural fortress ... Thanks to this, it served as a source of all disturbances and a reliable refuge in which hordes of mountaineers took refuge after defeats (pol. Tomkeev) " . 5
So he was under Yermolov, so he is in 1878, so he is now.
Especially in this regard, the Bogosskaya Valley (12323 f.) draws attention to itself. It is located between the Andean and Avar Koisu and constitutes the Avar plateau, which is, as it were, an isolated island. “This mountain plateau is equally inaccessible from everywhere, and by nature itself is intended to command the peoples who settled at its foot, in the era of the Caucasian War it was of very great strategic importance. If Dagestan in general, according to Yermolov's definition, … - the page is missing (approx. OCR corrector) ... Litl, Mukratl, and others. After the Avars, the Kazikumukhs follow in numbers. if the former were distinguished by militancy and robbery, then the latter were more artisans. Of the other societies of the Highland Caucasus, one can name: Gumbet, Andia, Bagulal, Tsunta-Avah, Unkratl, etc. The main nest and stronghold of Dagestan was the Ankratl union.
In view of the natural barriers in the communication of individual parts of Dagestan, it is clear that these communities differed from each other not only in customs, customs, but also dialects and even the confession of Islam.
Lezghins are by nature highly impressionable, receptive, excitable and expansive. Their natural environment, Mountainous Dagestan, poor, wild and barren, gave almost no food to the mind, and it remained all the time of their existence in a childish state. But this natural environment greatly contributed to the contemplative life, the development of fantasy and imagination. These aspects of life were so ordinary, so constant, so repeated that they could easily bring the Lezgin to ecstasy and confidence in the invisible, as if in the visible and desired and expected, as if in the present.
The poor natural environment of Chechnya did not give the Lezgin the opportunity to engage in farming, arable farming and cattle breeding, therefore the Lezgin was infinitely poor, ate little and poorly, was poorly and dirtyly dressed, lived in a sakla built of stone, dirty and full of insects, always hungry and cold. But he loved war, he loved weapons, he cherished them terribly and mastered them to perfection. He put his soul into the weapon and gave his life to its use. He was a hunter, a warrior, a robber and a robber by nature.
By social order Lezgin is the most perfect democrat. The Lezgins had neither princes, nor nobles, nor tribal foremen. They were all equal, they were all independent, they were all freedom-loving to infinity. They did not allow any violence against themselves. Even the Muslim clergy had little influence on them. They chose their elders, and they ruled not because they had right, but because they got right. Once the Lezgin is aware of the need for something, he submits to her.
The poverty of life and the situation in mountainous Dagestan makes the Chechens think and take measures of seasonal hunting. And this natural predator, a fearless robber, living next to the soaring and reigning king of predators - the eagle, found a fishery beyond the mountains. There was fertile Kakheti. There were riches of nature, there was an abundant domestic life, there lived relaxed and degenerate Georgians. It was there that the Lezgins directed their predatory raids. In those raids, the Lezgins saw a means of subsistence, satisfaction of the predatory instinct, courage, prowess, valor and heroism. His predatory success is a heroic and public merit. And he gave her his whole life. Death itself was not terrible for him, because, living on robberies, he was complacent, and in death he found peace, which is why he treated death with contempt.
Islam fell on this soil, Islam, which sets the goal of life to help a fellow believer and an endless struggle with infidels of other faiths. And in the event of a fall in the struggle, an immediate Mohammedan paradise awaited him. Lezgin, hungry, cold, ragged, goes straight to the atmosphere of a happy paradise and houris. Yes, for such a situation, not one hungry Lezghin, but, perhaps, many of today's Christians will deliberately agree to rush into battle ...
It was on this soil that Islam fell, preaching a continuous struggle against the contemptible giaour, especially against the enemies of the head of the church, the padishah, the Turkish sultan.
And the first of these damned giaurs was the Urus. That is why in all the wars between Russia and Turkey, Chechnya and Dagestan were supporters of Turkey and raised an uprising against Russia.
But there were reasons for hatred and anger among the Lezghins against the giaur Urus and special ones. Of course, Russia did not need the barren and impenetrable Dagestan. But the predatory raids of the Alozan and Dagestan Lezgins were intolerable. The interests of Georgia and Russia did not allow this. That is why Russia waged a bloody hundred-year war in Chechnya and Dagestan. She lost tens of thousands of her sons' bodies and lost rivers of her children's blood. Chechnya was defeated, but not conquered. Subdued, but not humble. The fire died down, but under the cover of ashes, the fire smoldered, and sparks flew out from time to time all the time. That is why, at the moment of aggravation of relations between Russia and Turkey, the smoldering fire of Dagestan turned into a fire.
This fire was greatly fanned by the Turkish emissaries, who were always there in abundance, as well as by the Mohammedan mullahs, who are now almost all Turkish subjects.
This fire of anger and enmity of the Lezgins was fanned sometimes by the rude and arrogant attitude of the Russian administration in Dagestan. The Chechen and the Lezghin, realizing the necessity and personal benefit from what, will endure any pressure, any oppression, any despotism from any power, if he sees the meaning in this. But if this oppression is a gross arbitrariness, serves as an expression of a personal whim and does not bring any benefit to the Chechen, in this case the Chechen becomes embittered endlessly, falls into despair and acts like a true predator. Unfortunately, the Russians acted precisely in this direction and, without giving the Chechens anything good, brought them to the last degree of bitterness against Russia and the Russians. What goes around comes around.
In this regard, the Dagestanis were distinguished by sharpness, stability, perseverance and determination. From here came the main leaders of the mountain movements, such as Kazi-Mulla, Hadji-Murat, Kibit-Magoma and Shamil.
Primorsky Dagestan is somewhat different. The mountains are lower and richer, the valleys fertile. It is also cut up by mountains, divided into departments, but more accessible and more connected. There were rich forests, abundant fields and the proximity of the sea. Seaside Dagestan is divided by the Kotka ridge into two, formerly separate, parts: Kaitag and Tabasaran. Although the mountains here are not particularly high, they are cut by deep gorges of the rivers Bugan-chai, Akusha-chai, Levashi-chai, etc. The very brave Akushinsky Lezgin society once lived here, which was first defeated by the Russians. Akushins, and now Dargins, have always been distinguished by courage and courage 6 .
Kazikumukh is in the worst position 7 . It is located in the center of Dagestan, in the upper reaches of the river, Kazikumukhsky-Koysu. This tribe is known to us under the name Kazikumukh, but they call themselves Lacu, and their country Lacras-Kana. This country consists of many gorges, it is barren, which is why the Laks often go down to Georgia and Shirvan for robbery, where they are presented with a sure and not particularly difficult prey! Being engaged in work and trade in Dagestan, Kazukumuhi in Time of Troubles hired for war with anyone and at any time. They adopted Mohammedanism in 777 from the Arab commander Abuselam, who appointed Shahbal as their ruler. The Tarkovsky shamkhals originated from him.
Mehtula also lies here, formed, as is believed, 200 years ago by Mehdi, who came from the house of Tarkov shamkhals.
In southern Dagestan, between the Main and Side ridges, the Samur basin is located with the river. Samur. This hollow is too isolated and has very limited communication with neighbors. From here, attacks were especially frequent on Georgia through Elisuy and Zagatala.
After the conquest of the Caucasus, Dagestan submitted, but did not reconcile with its position. Here, more than anywhere else, the mullahs had an influence on the people. According to Muslim teachings, the head of the Sunnis is the Turkish Sultan, and the Russians are infidels, and the main dream of life of every Dagestani is to overthrow the yoke of the infidel. There was no complete trust in the Russians. Therefore, any signal from beyond the Russian Sea or Erzurum easily ignited Dagestan and raised it against the Russians.
General Melikov was at the head of Dagestan. The first rebel movement in Dagestan took place in early May 1877, and the place of this uprising was the north of Dagestan, Gumbet. On May 15, Colonel Nakashidze was moved there. He had to pass the famous Andean Gate. There was something to fear, but everything went well. The Dagestanis did not set up an ambush here. The main place of origin of the rebellion was the village of Siukh. Nakashidze directed his blow there. Steadfastly and courageously, the rebels withstood the blows, but could not hold out for a long time. Soon they began to run away and went to Ciligl. A new attack by the Russians laid down 80 Gumbetovites killed and 100 wounded.
Having finished here, Prince Nakashidze hurried to Mekhelty, Artluh and Danukh. Soon, here, too, the matter ended in humility, and by the end of May, Prince Nakashidze was already resting in Botlikh.
However, at this time, a rebellion broke out at a completely different end, in the extreme southwest, in Dido, especially Asaho. The uprising threatened the Alozani and the Tushians. Prince Nakashidze quickly rushed to Dido. The sudden arrival of the Russian detachment cooled the ardor of the rebels. But the fanaticism and militancy of the Didovites were stronger. The first on the way was Kemetl. The detachment included Russians, the Didoevskaya militia, the Avar squad, the Telavis, the Tushins and other not entirely reliable elements. However, the glorious onslaught of Captain Krivenko quickly crushed Kemetl, and the rebels concentrated in Asaho.
“Aul Asakho is surrounded on three sides by rocky, hard-to-reach cliffs; the fourth, the only western side convenient for the offensive, representing the gentle slope of the Asakhovsky heights, descending to the river and occupied by the inhabitants of arable land, was defended by three high towers. The river Asakho with its steep banks separated us from the village. There were two paths to climb.
All these difficulties were not difficult for the Russians. Soon the Russians were in Asakh, where a merciless massacre of saklys began. Seeing such bitterness, it was proposed to surrender, or at least take out women and children who could die. But this was the answer:
“Our home is our grave. Our families must die with us."
Indeed, many of the women died, taking part in the battle openly on sakli.
When the outcome was clear, and the huts were already burning, the highlanders were again offered to surrender. But they again refused, and everyone with their families died on the spot.
The battle of Asaho lasted three days. A lot of ours got hurt too. But this ended the uprising in Dido, and the Didovians asked for pardon.
Dagestan has been quiet for the time being, and Dagestan detachments even went to Chechnya to Chaberloi and Ezen-am or Lake Trout.
But the Turkish emissaries did their job. A lot of indignation was helped by our hajis, who went to Mecca. On the way they were intercepted by the Turks and plentifully stuffed with fanatical nonsense. The name of Kazi-Magoma, the son of Shamil, was especially powerful. The main place where the Hajjs preached was Sogratl, where there was a hundred-year-old Abdurazman-Khadji, already out of his mind, whose name was used by his son, Magoma-Khadji.
Ghazavat was proclaimed in the most insistent manner. Along with this, the most impudent rumors were spread about the incredible victories of the Turks and the defeats of the Russians, that the Turks were already in the North Caucasus, that the Turks were on the Terek, etc.
Of course, those who were more thoughtful saw the absurdity of the rumors, but the general excitement, which wanted victory over us, and the certainty that our military resources were insufficient in Dagestan, which forced the use of the local militia against the natives, acted too excitingly and carried everyone to freedom from Alen giaurs. The center of the rebellion now became Sogratl, where Magoma-hadji, the son of Abdurakhman-hadji, worked. In addition, the son of the famous Kibit-Magoma Murtuzali worked in Tilitla, as well as retired major Jafar, captain Abdul-Mejid and naib headquarters captain Fotali-bek worked in Kazikumukh.
It is interesting that the Kazikumukhs, mostly merchants and artisans, rarely opposed Russia, but now they were also involved in the general trend.
In Akush, the movement was led by the descendants of the Qadis - in Tabsarani Mehdi, in the Kura region of Mohammed-Ali, in Samur - Kazi-Ahmed-bek. All these leaders, through an uprising, dreamed of restoring their own position and right.
In the west, the uprising manifested itself in Andi, the Avar plateau, as well as in Uschukul and Gimry. Here, apparently, the Chechen uprising influenced the people.
A sharp uprising broke out in Central Dagestan near Gunib. The highlanders tried to capture the bridge on Kara-Koysu, the only one connecting Temi-khan-Shura with Western Dagestan.
On August 29, a crowd of Gergebil residents rushed to the soldiers guarding the bridge. Soon this small team lay down in battle. After this, the Gergebils occupied the guard buildings and began to arrange blockages. The very position of the rebels indicated that they acted deliberately and decisively. It cost us dearly to take the bridge from the rebels, but it was done. The detachment of Colonel Voyno-Oransky was small and, having taken away the bridge, he had to take only a defensive position in Gunib. Meanwhile, the rebels kept coming and coming and completely cut off Gunib from all other parts. Sogratl rejoiced. Prince Nakashidze came to the rescue of the Gunib detachment with the Dargin detachment from Khunzakh. In Kumukh, captain Fatali-bek was sent to help Sogratl with a detachment of militia. But Fatali-bek, together with his relative Abduli-Majid, declared themselves rebels and, having entered Kumukh, arrested the officials of the administration at night, and in the morning rushed to the fortification of Kumukh. The fortification was old, dilapidated, half-collapsed, the towers and barracks were not repaired, the detachment was more than small. Caught by surprise, our soldiers desperately defended themselves until they had exterminated all the cartridges, and then everyone lay down for the honor of the motherland.
On the same day. On September 8, indignation arose in Tsudakhora and Kupa.
The position of the Russians in Dagestan was unenviable. Nevertheless, the skillful and courageous actions of Prince Nikashidze, Voyno-Oransky and Tar-Asaturov everywhere brought us a glorious victory. With cruel passion, the Dagestanis rushed at ours, but everywhere they were beaten off with huge damage. Especially great were the losses of the rebels under Levash, when they lost more than 400 people and among them Fatali-bek.
In general, both in the region of Gunib, and in all other places of Dagestan, where the uprising manifested itself, everything calmed down and calmed down, at least outwardly.
Despite obvious failures and heavy defeats, the rebellious state did not stop. Already at the end of September it broke out in Tindali. and also in Tilgle. In the first half of October, the movement in Chechnya was suppressed, and the heroes of the rebellion fled from Chechnya to Dagestan. The uprising manifested itself at Etheli, Miarsu. Gangs appeared at Andia and Gumbet, waiting for the arrival of Alibek, Uma Duev, and others. Indeed, on September 27, Alibek appeared at Andi's. and Uma at Chamalal, a particularly rich party of rebels appeared at Godober. The rebellion in Dagestan rose with particular force, and to stop it in Chechnya, Smekalov's military forces moved to Dagestan.
By October 20, Murzateli and Uma Duev appeared at Tilitl. and this is where Smekalov headed. The brutal bombardment of Tilitl began. The highlanders hid in the huts and fired back from there. Taking by storm would cost big losses. Therefore, General Smekalov offered Murzateli to surrender and hand over Uma Duev. Seeing the significant ruin of the village and the complete impossibility of holding out against the Russian forces, Murzateli surrendered, and Uma fled. Tilitl was completely hidden, and its inhabitants were resettled.
Previously, it was indicated that the Kazikumukhs had taken the fortifications. This news, like a spark, set fire to an uprising in the districts of Kyurinsky and Tabasaransky, as well as on Samur. The leader in Tabasaran was Umalat-bek - Rustan-Kadiev, and in the Kyura district Magomet-Ali-bek - Garun-bek-Ogly, the staff captain of the police, dissatisfied with our government for being removed from the post of naib for drunkenness. But the uprising here was very soon pacified.
Meanwhile, Mekhti-bek-Utsmiyev moved to Dashlagar. Ter-Asaturov came to the aid of the Dashlagarites. Then Mehdi decided to rush to Petrovsk. Ter-Asaturov caught up with him at Kayakent. There was a fierce battle, but the rebels were badly defeated.
False rumors about glorious Turkish victories, more and more emissaries arriving, a rumor about the appearance of Kazi-Magoma - all this worried the Dagestanis to the extreme and caused an uprising even in the south of Dagestan. Kazi-Kumukh became agitated again, the Kyurinsky and Kaitago-Tabasaran districts revolted. Samur was also unreliable. Meanwhile, there were few Russians. I had to use the local police, extremely unreliable. The Dagestanis themselves have changed the way they attack. They saw that the more they were crowded, the more they were destroyed. Now they have adopted the Chechen way of gathering in small detachments: disturbing our small detachments, attacking the carts, repelling horses and separated soldiers, quickly flying from place to place; in case of defeat in one place, jump to another, and then return back again - the restoration of the auls cost nothing: there is plenty of stone, and the architecture is infantile. External obedience was false. They also gathered in large crowds, but a peculiar, terribly rugged terrain sheltered them. And yet, the Dagestanis suffered severely.
The rebels were gathering near Derbent. Our troops went there too. But ours had to carry a convoy with them. The guards at the wagon train were usually small. Such convoys were a special bait for the rebels: prey, and, moreover, quite easy. And now our convoy was in danger. He had to pass through a very wild forest and the Kisi-Mishi ridge. Of course, the rebels will take the opportunity to profit from the good and rein in the infidels.
Wanting to divert attention from the convoy, Ter-Asaturov attacked Bashly. First, the highlanders fell for the bait. But then they realized what was happening and in huge numbers rushed to Kisi-Mishi. The procession was hard. Step by step, tree by tree, they had to take it, and yet the Russians made their way almost without loss. The artillery of Colonel Lavenetsky was especially successful: "there was almost no shot that did not fall in the crowd of rebels." The soldiers were ecstatic. Soon the wagon train connected with the main detachment and became safe.
Meanwhile, there were unfavorable rumors from Derbent. The city is surrounded by rebels, the citadel is abandoned, the garrison, administration and the remaining Christian population have moved to the lower part of the city and are preparing for defense. The Muslims occupied the upper part of the city, where they fortified themselves with barricades and blockages. The middle city will be abandoned. Communication with the surrounding area is interrupted. Without cover, no one dared to go beyond the city walls. An attack was expected every minute. The entire path ahead of the Russian detachment was occupied by the rebels, who were especially concentrated at Dzhemkent and Berikey.
Leaving the gallantly passed Kisi-Mishi, the detachment led by General Komarov moved to Derbent. The night captured him over Dzhemkent. There were rebels on the heights of Mamat-Katan. From the heights of Chermi-tau, the singing of “Dhikr” rang out all night. Mehdi Utsemiyev declared a gazavat, fortified the villages of Dzhemkent and Berikei. He made a mess. He concentrated huge crowds and decided not to give way to the Russians. It was given an oath to fight in the name of Islam and put giaours. Derbent was appointed as an expiatory sacrifice. There, after the extermination of the giaurs, Umalat-bek, Asabek and Izmail - effendi were sent. In Derbent there was already a self-proclaimed Kurin khan Mohammed-Ali-Garun-bek-ogly.
Meanwhile, the Russians had a difficult journey along the Temerka valley. On September 22, the detachment moved towards Dagestan under the hidden shots of the highlanders. Again Lovetsky had to work with honor. I had to cross mountain rivers, where mountaineers lay behind every pebble. Berikey has already had a bloody skirmish. But all this did not prevent Ter-Asaturov from reaching Derbent on September 23.
Here the first resistance was offered at Khan-Mashed-Kan, where a large crowd of rebels gathered at the house of Mehdi Utsmiyev. A successful action of artillery and then the soldiers smashed Utsmiyev's house, and he himself was forced to flee with a crowd. In the evening the detachment was in Derbent.
From Derbent, Komarov already arranged a punitive campaign on Temerek and the nearest rebellious villages and collected a significant tribute.
Meanwhile, the dispersed Dagestanis began to revive again.
Jafar appeared at Chumla, Mehdi was heading there, and Umalat-bek appeared at Tabasarani. The main crowd, more than 4 thousand, was at Yagikent. That's where our combat squad went. In the evening it began to rain. The highlanders quickly hid in the sakli, and shots rained down from there. The center of the gathering was the palace of Mekhti-Utsmiyev. Russian grenades disturbed him a little too. Night stopped the advance, but the mountain volleys continued into the night. The next morning the work continued. Our battery, from 250 paces away, treated the palace of Utsmiya, built on a dominant height, with grenades. At two corners of this castle, towers for flank defense were visible, and loopholes were made in all buildings. Making a breach, however, was not easy: the shells, breaking through the very pillars, burst inside the courtyard, leaving only small round holes in the walls. At the same time, they acted against the entire village. Soon the aul was taken. The castle remained. Although part of it was collapsed, it was difficult to take it. The assault was repulsed. And at this time, a feat worthy of historical imprinting of the name was accomplished.
During the advance of the hunters, one of them, Yegor Kurbanov, was wounded in the stomach and remained in place. Comrades could not capture him. Then the private of the Samur regiment Nikolai Yudin, handing over his gun to his comrades, went to the castle, grabbed the wounded and returned back. A hail of enemy bullets rained down on the daredevil, but he returned unscathed to the detachment.
The coming night brought the fight to a halt. At night, the defenders of the castle broke through the opposite side of the house from our detachment and everyone fled. The castle was destroyed. There they found 43 dead and wounded rebels. In general, in this battle, the rebels suffered heavy losses and lost three badges. The highlanders fled to Majalik and Tabasaran. Our detachment pursued the rebels in various directions.
A new battle took place near Iran-Kharabi 8 . There was a small detachment of Colonel Myatbeli. The rebels found out about this and in the amount of more than 3 thousand attacked the detachment. However, their enterprise ended all the same with their defeat.
The main body of the rebels was now heading towards Duvek. Mekhti-Utsmiyev and Umalat-bek went there. Komarov sent his detachment to Duvek, where more than 3 thousand highlanders gathered. The roads were impossible. The rains completed the horror of the campaign. The aul is located very impregnably and is protected by fences and blockages.
It was not easy for the Russians to take Duvek, but they took it, having found more than 200 mountain bodies there. Umalat-bek fled to Tabasaran.
Mekhti-Utsmiyev went to Bashly, where again up to 2 thousand highlanders concentrated around him. The uprising in the south of Dagestan almost ended with the destruction of this gang. The main instigators of the rebellion were expelled. Upon arrival in Derbent Komarov, the Kuran Khan Mohammed-Ali-bek appeared to him with a confession.
The main points of the uprising were Sogratl - the center of Muslim learning, Kumukh - the center of industry and trade and Tsudahar - the center of military prowess, because the Akushins were considered invincible and for the first time found their winners in the person of the Russians. It was they who defeated Shah Nadir and forced the Persians to flee.
In October, information began to reach about the serious condition of Lieutenant Bulgakov's detachment on Georgievsky Bridge. The detachment consisted of only 130 people, meanwhile it was besieged by thousands of highlanders. Bulgakov was known for his courage, courage and enterprise, but these qualities will not last long before the masses.
That is why, perhaps hastily, assistance was sent to Bulgakov, delivering him from the besiegers.
Now the enemy concentrated at Tsadahar under the leadership of Abdul-Mejid. Tsudahar was a very fortified aul, in which each saklya was a fortress. The seriousness of the situation was intensified by the fact that Akushintsy worked here. The entire Tsudahar was protected from the front by strong stone blockages with a high stone tower armed with a falconet. Accessible from other sides were also extensively protected. After a long shelling, our troops rushed to storm. After a fierce battle, most of the inhabitants fled, and those who doomed themselves to death remained to protect. They set fire to the mosque and the two-storey saklya. When they were knocked out from here too, they went down to the basement. The last attack put all the defenders in place.
In Tsudahara, many badges were taken, a lot of different weapons, property, and 116 prisoners. But that wasn't important. What mattered was that the fall of Tsudahara completely disarmed the Highlanders. The destruction of the stronghold and the model of courage and courage led the rebels not only into confusion, but into complete despondency and despair. The uprising turned out to be untenable - the care of the expulsion of the giaurs and freedom had to be postponed. The rebellion in Kumukh was over, - Gunib also fell silent. One of the prominent leaders, Jafar, and his retinue were captured.
Meanwhile, in Sogratl, where the rebellion began, began and matured, did not subside. Here the "ghazavat" was proclaimed. From here, the indignation spread to Chechnya and the whole of Dagestan, and its existence had to be put to an end. Imam Mohammed-Abdurakhman stayed here. Here arrived the main breeders of Chechnya: Alibek, Abdul-Medzhib_Fataev, Abass Pasha, Dada Zalmaev and Uma Duev. Now it was decided to put an end to Sogratl.
Russian troops arrived. The usual deadly battle began, for each of the defenders knew that he would not be spared.
Often the rebels did not wait for assaults and themselves attacked the Russians with furious fury. There were moments when the latter involuntarily leaned back and were again carried forward by the selfless courage of the officers. So it was with part of the Kabardian regiment, but General Petrov drew his saber and shouted: “Follow me, with hostility!” rushed forward and dragged the Kabardians after him. All Russian troops showed selfless stamina, courage and courage here. The battle lasted two days, and finally Sogratl was completely destroyed.
With this blow, almost all the heads of the hydra of the rebellion were cut off. The defeated rebels were extradited: Abdul-Medzhib-Fataev, Abbass Pasha, Magoma-hajdi (imam). Uma Duev with his sons, Dada Zalmaev and other prominent rebels. Finally, the hundred-year-old Abdurakhman was also brought. One Alibek-hadji managed to escape to Vedeno, where he himself gave himself up into the hands of the head of the region.
The Samur region is so separated from the whole world by mountain ranges that it constituted a completely separate independent region. Only in the southwestern corner did it come into contact with the Cuban region, and even there it was separated by the river. Samur. It had its good and bad sides. The isolation kept the inhabitants of the region in itself, and gossip and talk were less brought there. But on the other hand, the Russians did not have any contact with their own people, and in case of a small number they had no opportunity either to receive help, or to deliver military supplies, or even food. This latter was present just now.
Preparations for the uprising and the uprising itself on the Samur were very late. In addition, the uprising itself was coercive. A rumor was spread that Jafar was going to Samur with Turkish pashas in order to force the Samurs to take part in the rebellion. It also became known that Jafar declared ghazawat.
Meanwhile, the Russian detachment was insignificant. Panic broke out among the residents. Shops were closed, goods were hidden in pits, there was no market, people were hiding. Akhtintsy came to the head of the region, Colonel Uzbashev, and demanded that he call an army from other places, because with such a small garrison they would not go against Jafar, but would stick to him. Where could Uzbashev get troops from? I had to make up three hundred militia from Samurians, and not a single Akhtinian entered the militia. Uzbashev left the village and moved to the fortification. All this coincided with the news of the uprising in Gunib and Kumukh. But then, on September 20, the news came of the defeat of the highlanders near Levashi and Kayakent, and everything quieted down, trade resumed, and preparations for the bayram went on at full speed. On September 28, Uzbashev was with more important residents on holiday and everywhere they were nice and amiable, and on October 1 in the fortress they received a note thrown from the translator: “An uprising broke out in Akhty. All with icons. At the head of Kazi-Mahmed-bek. The management house is surrounded by guards. They are not released anywhere. Don't send soldiers to the market, they want to kill them. What should we do?".
Indeed, there was a complete uprising in the village. Several people from the fortress went to the village, and the soldiers were seized and sent as a gift to the imam in Sogratl, who executed them. Of course, as far as possible, the fortress was already in a defensive position before. Small stocks of food have been made. Take care of the well. Reduced portion of meat.
By evening, the rebels began to surround the fortress and attack. The buckshot soon sobered them up and forced them to keep a decent distance. Thousands of rebels opened fire from orchards and vineyards. The fortress was blocked. The rebels led a trench attack. Lieutenant Komarov with a detachment 50 times smaller in number fought back as best he could, and kept the enemy at a decent distance.
On October 29, Kazi-Ahmet-bek handed over a letter to Uzbashev, in which he told him that the rebels had taken Deshlagar, Qusar, and so on. and demanded surrender. Uzbashev answered this demand with grapeshot grenades. Meanwhile, the trenches of the highlanders were approaching the fortress. I had to take action. And now Major Komarov takes 60 soldiers, divides them into three detachments, rushes into the trenches, destroys everything that is horrible in them, cuts down the nearest gardens and returns to the fortress. After this damage, the rebels no longer dared to dig trenches.
The outing lasted three and a half hours. The rebels were brutally taught. But the defenders perked up, cheered up and again perked up. And then they were completely disheartened. And there was something to come from. The blockade lasted 52 days. Everyone suffered deprivation in food, clothing, and even housing. The uninterrupted guard service exhausted the workers to the extreme. And the unknown future oppressed me like a heavy stone. But now everyone is up and happy. Everywhere there was a cheerful animation. Everyone forgot about the hard work that had been done. There were distant songs. Repeatedly transmitted talk of exploits. The future was unconsciously good.
But the besiegers fell silent. Shots were heard, but somehow rarely, lazily and reluctantly. And our soldiers did not even answer them.
"Let them come closer..."
On November 4 late in the evening Magomed-Sherif-Mahmud-ogly from Akhtin appeared in the fortress and announced the good news that General Komarov was coming to the rescue. The rebels also learned about this and quickly fled. Kazi-Ahmed-bek also asked latats ... Soon others appeared with the same joyful news. On November 5, early in the morning, all the inhabitants of Akhta appeared at the fortification and begged for mercy on their knees, and a messenger from General Komarov flew in behind them, congratulating the garrison on the lifting of the siege and with the news of his imminent arrival. At the same time, our team caught Mekhti-bek-Utsmiyev, who had run away, and brought him to General Komarov.
There was also indignation in the Cuban district, and a crowd of thousands blockaded Qusar. It was mainly the Samsyr fugitives who led the horses here. But these crowds were quickly dispersed by our detachment with proper lessons.

The Alozani fertile valley was a part, but it is so fertile, so beautiful, so seductive that the Lezgins gradually ousted the Georgians and formed a special Lezgin region, partly in the form of the Elisu Khanate, partly in the form of the Jaro-Belokan community, which now forms Zagatala.
This entire valley is cut by numerous rivers and streams, starting at the Main Range and flowing into Alozan. It is covered with pastures and forests. vineyards, orchards, arable land and glades. Only to the east the valley becomes more severe.
Strictly speaking, the prosperity of the inhabitants would have had little to do with indignation. But those were Lezgins. They were Mohammedans. They were natural predators. Yes, and the neighbors - the Georgians were so insignificant in themselves that they presented an involuntary temptation to robbery and robbery, especially since they were giaurs.
Obeying the general Lezgin mood, the Alozan Lezgins made an attack on Georgia, and most importantly on the Nukhinsky district. But they were soon calmed down. They got especially good in the Elysui Gorge. Therefore, the Alozan uprising was insignificant and could easily be besieged. Thus ended the uprising in Chechnya and Dagestan.
Our general conclusions are as follows:
1. The Lezgin (Chechen, Dagestan and Alozan) movement is based on religious and political grounds.
2. It is supported by the preaching of Turkish emissaries and the suggestion by Muslim pilgrims who have communion with Turkey.
3. This movement is closely connected with the state of our relations with Turkey and has always been excited, excited and will be excited with the deterioration of Turkey's relations with Russia, the Slavs and Christians.
4. An important support for this religious-political fanaticism is the ignorance and unenlightenment of both the Mohammedan clergy and the Mohammedan mass of the population.
5. An important condition contributing to this state is the isolation of Chechnya and Dagestan in general and in particular from Russia.
6. The closest connection between Chechnya and Dagestan also contributes a lot, which adversely affect each other in bitterness against Russia.
7. To reduce these unfavorable conditions, one should:
a. Separate temporarily Chechnya and Dagestan.
b. Bring Chechnya closer to Russia by immediately annexing the North Caucasus to Russia.
in. To renew the forest clearings made by Yermolov, Paskevich, Vorontsov and others. and now overgrown.
d. Possible large quantity roads and will put in the best conditions the means of communication for both trade and military needs.
e. Immediately build a pass railroad, which will bring the Caucasus closer and connect with Russia. This need, if not economic, is undoubtedly state and national.
e. Raise education in Mohammedan schools, and, without touching at all on the teachings of Islam, put teaching in Russian so that they do not turn into malicious Jewish heders.
well. To increase the number of public schools and organize them in the manner of vocational schools, in accordance with the needs of the locality.
h. To arrange secondary schools of a professional nature with a bright national tinge of the general character of a sovereign nation.
and. Give the Caucasus higher educational institution in Vladikavkaz, not in Tiflis.
j. Pay attention to the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina and, without any difficulty, direct it outside the borders of Turkey.
l. Eliminate Turkish influence as much as possible in terms of political influence.
m. Unconditionally stop access to Turkish emissaries in Chechnya and Dagestan.
n. Under no circumstances should Turkish subjects be allowed to be mullahs, since now almost all mullahs in Chechnya and Dagestan are Turkish subjects.
8. In case of the slightest hint of movement, in the form of zikrism and zelimkhanism, immediately take the measures that were practiced by Yermolov, Paskevich, Smekalov and others.

18.10.2011

This article was published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta in 2000. The events in question are the Russian uprising in Chechnya in 1958.

“After the XX Congress of the CPSU, the rehabilitation of both individual citizens and entire peoples who suffered during the years of lawlessness began. On January 9, 1957, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kliment Voroshilov, signed the Decree "On the restoration of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the RSFSR." "In order to create necessary conditions for the national development of the Chechen and Ingush peoples” the representatives of these peoples were allowed to return to their former place of residence.

From the very beginning, the authorities tried to give a systematic character to the complex mechanism for the return of the Ingush and Chechens. However, the resettlement process soon got out of hand. In 1957 alone, more than 200 thousand people arrived in the autonomous republic, which significantly exceeded the figures provided for by the four-year resettlement plan. This created serious problems with employment and housing. In addition - the mass acquisition of weapons, mutual responsibility, murders on the basis of blood feuds, rape, attacks on residents of the republic representing other nationalities.

The arriving sheikhs, mullahs and teip authorities, influencing the youth in a nationalistic and religious spirit, sought to revive the ideas of muridism and obedience to Sharia law. This led to a sharp increase in criminal offenses among young people. For 9 months in 1957, 22 murders were committed in Grozny. 285 people were brought to criminal responsibility by the militia bodies. In the first half of 1958, as compared with the same period in 1957, the number of murders in the Chechen Republic of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a whole increased by 2 times, and cases of robbery and hooliganism, which caused serious bodily harm, by 3 times. Throughout the republic, quarrels over houses and household plots, scandals and group fights with the use of knives and firearms have become commonplace. So, for example, at the end of 1957, anti-Russian leaflets were distributed in Grozny, attacks by Chechen youth on students of vocational schools and officers of the Soviet Army were also recorded.

“Things are very bad,” one of the Russian residents of Chechnya wrote to her relative in Russia, “Chechens come, do whatever they want, beat Russians, cut, kill, set fire to houses at night. The people are in a panic. Many have left, and the rest are going."

And indeed, as a result of intimidation, with the full connivance of the republican authorities, during 1957, 113 thousand Russians, Ossetians, Avars, Ukrainians and citizens of other nationalities left the CHI ASSR.

The justified indignation of the population by the excesses of hooligan elements from among the Chechens, as well as the inability of the authorities to really protect non-indigenous residents, provoked the Russian population of Grozny to mass riots that took place in the city on August 26 and 27, 1958, which became a classic example of the "Russian rebellion" described more than once in the historical literature , desperate and cruel.

On the evening of August 23, 1958, in the suburb of Grozny, the village of Chernorechye, where workers and employees of the Grozny chemical plant mainly lived, a Chechen Lulu Malsagov, while intoxicated, started a fight with a Russian guy Vladimir Korotchev and stabbed him in the stomach. A little later, Malsagov, along with other Chechens, met Yevgeny Stepashin, a factory worker who had just been demobilized from the army, and stabbed him several times. Stepashin's wounds turned out to be fatal, but Korotchev was saved.

Rumors about the murder of a twenty-two-year-old Russian guy quickly spread among the workers of the plant and the residents of Grozny. Despite the fact that the killer and his accomplices were immediately detained by the police, the public reaction was unusually violent, especially among young people. Demands for severe punishment of the murderers began to be heard.

On August 25-26, many people arrived in the village of Chernorechye to say goodbye to the deceased, demanding the public execution of the murderers of Stepashin. Many of those gathered at the coffin of the deceased insisted on the need to hold a mourning meeting with the participation of the leadership of the regional committee and city committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the CHI ASSR. However, at the direction of the same regional committee, no rally was permitted. Nevertheless, announcements appeared on the territory of the chemical plant and in Chernorechye about an allegedly upcoming mourning meeting organized in connection with the murder of the worker Stepashin.

But both in the regional committee and in the city committee of the party did not consider it necessary to enter into polemics with the townspeople and give them any explanations. The authorities fenced themselves off from the indignant people with a police cordon, which was instructed not to allow the funeral procession to the building of the regional committee of the CPSU.

However, the crowd, together with the coffin of the deceased, managed to achieve their goal. Large groups of Grozny youth who joined the residents of Chernorechye overturned several cars that were set up as a barrier, and the demonstration poured into Lenin Square, where a mourning meeting began.

Meanwhile, some of the protesters made an attempt to enter the building of the regional committee, and at 19:30 they succeeded. A group of young people broke into the regional committee and tried to force Gayerbekov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Chechen Republic of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Chakhkiev, and other workers, to the square. With great difficulty, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs managed to expel the demonstrators who broke through there from the regional committee and detain the most active of them.

To calm the audience, the secretaries of the regional party committee G.Ya. Cherkevich, B.F. Saiko, secretary of the city committee A.I. Shepelev. However, instead of a detailed conversation about the problems that concern people, they called for an end to the riots. In response, exclamations were heard from the crowd: “Get the Chechens out of Grozny”, “Let N.S. Khrushchev, we will talk to him”, “Long live the Grozny region!” etc.

The crowd kept coming and coming. From the tables of the book market organized the day before, everyone began to speak freely. The protesters began to attack military and police vehicles and roll them along with the soldiers to the streets adjacent to the square. Two Chechens who were passing by on a motorcycle were stopped and beaten. The first stones flew into the windows of the regional committee.

By 11 p.m., several more cars with soldiers from the local garrison arrived at the rally site, who, together with the police, managed to disperse the crowd and detain 41 active rioters. By half past one in the night, order was completely restored on the square.

However, on the evening of August 26, a rumor spread among those gathered that at 9 o'clock in the morning a new rally would take place at the same place, at which members of the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the CPSU, who had urgently arrived from Moscow, were supposed to speak.

The next day at 7 o'clock in the morning, groups of townspeople, mostly women, began to appear near the building of the regional committee. There were even leaflets calling for the resumption of the protest. One of these leaflets said: “Comrades! Yesterday they carried the coffin of a comrade slaughtered by Chechens past the regional committee. Instead of taking appropriate action against the killers, the police dispersed the workers' demonstration and arrested 50 innocent people. So let's quit work at 11 o'clock and go to the regional party committee demanding the release of our comrades!

By 10 o'clock in the morning a crowd had gathered near the building of the regional committee - about 2 thousand people. A critical moment came when people came close to the building of the regional committee, broke the cordon of soldiers and policemen and began to break in the doors of the main entrance.

Soon the secretary of the Grozny city committee of the party, Shepelev, and the chairman of the city executive committee, Bryskin, came out to meet the protesters, who were immediately seized by the crowd and escorted to the Lenin monument, where an impromptu tribune was built. But neither Shepelev nor Bryskin were allowed to speak. The people wanted the powers that be to listen to their opinion this time.

By noon, about 10,000 people had gathered on Lenin Square. The speakers insistently repeated their demands for the release of the comrades who had been arrested the day before. Above the heads of the people, calls were heard from the speakers: “Free the arrested youth!”, “Send the Chechens out of Grozny!” By 2 p.m., part of the crowd, numbering more than a thousand people, approached the buildings of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic. Several people entered the balcony of the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and demanded the release of all those detained the day before. Under pressure from the masses, the authorities made concessions and released everyone to freedom.

Another group managed to break into the KGB building and inflict some material damage: windows were broken, doors were broken, etc. The Chekists managed to quickly eliminate the breakthrough, and without the use of weapons.

The heated crowd immediately turned its anger on any people of Chechen nationality who appeared near the square. So, during the rally, two Chechens Mataev and Temirov were captured, who were immediately beaten. From the beatings Mataev soon died.

At about 3 p.m., a group of demonstrators, having separated from the main mass, headed towards the Grozny city committee of the CPSU. Having broken the door, people broke into the room and staged a pogrom. And two hours later, the protesters stormed the building of the regional committee, where, having seized a dozen typewriters, several activists began to print leaflets and appeals, which were immediately read from the balcony to the audience.

A resolution of the meeting addressed to the authorities was also hastily written. “Given the manifestation on the part of the Chechen-Ingush population of the brutal attitude towards the peoples of other nationalities, expressed in massacres, murders, violence and bullying,” it said, “the working people of the city of Grozny, on behalf of the majority of the population of the republic, propose:

1. From August 27, 1958, rename the CHIASSR into the Grozny region or into the Interethnic Soviet Socialist Republic.

2. The Chechen-Ingush population is allowed to live in the Grozny region no more than 10% of the total population.

3. To resettle advanced progressive Komsomol youth of various nationalities from other republics for the development of the wealth of the Grozny region and for the development of agriculture ... "

One of the activists, a truck driver, presented an ultimatum to the head of the local military aviation school, Major General Stepanov, who was in the regional committee: either go out to the crowd and make a statement to them that the Chechens would be evicted from Grozny, or be torn to pieces in a few minutes.

A group of secretaries of the primary party organizations of the city and other party workers tried to stop the rebels in the building of the regional committee. However, all of them were beaten by the demonstrators and driven out into the street.

Having captured the banner in the regional committee, part of the crowd numbering 500 people went to storm the main post office. Bursting into the building, the demonstrators demanded to be connected to Moscow.

Unable to get through to Moscow, the crowd went to the intercity telephone exchange. When trying to get inside, the worker of the chemical plant Andrianov was killed by the guards and 2 more people were injured. Under the threat of violence, telephone operators nevertheless arranged for the activists of the rally to communicate with the reception room of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Khrushchev. At 11 p.m., a group of demonstrators with a red flag headed for the Grozny railway station and delayed the departure of the Rostov-Baku train. People walked around the carriages and asked the passengers to tell residents of other cities that "in Grozny, Chechens are killing Russians, and the local authorities are not taking any measures." On the outside of the cars appeared the inscription: “Brothers! Chechens and Ingush kill Russians. The local government supports them. The soldiers are shooting at the Russians!”

Troops appeared at the station around midnight, but the protesters threw stones at them. In the course went butts. Soon the crowd nevertheless managed to disperse, and the train was sent to its destination. At the same time, the military units managed to restore order in the square near the building of the regional committee.

The next day, police and state security agencies began an intensive search for active participants in the riots. Every day there were more and more arrests, the number of which exceeded a hundred. Over the next two months, the local court barely had time to announce sentences: from a year of probation to 10 years in prison. Among the charges against 91 convicts, article 59-2 (riots) appeared. This is how the authorities dealt with those who dared to doubt the correctness of its course.

But the brutal repressions of activists of mass protests in Grozny did not have the expected intimidating effect. So, a few days after the riots, at a meeting organized by the party committee of one of the enterprises, where it was supposed to stigmatize the “anti-Soviet and chauvinist” actions of August 26 and 27, one of the workers who spoke said: “The working class of the city rose correctly, the counter-revolutionaries were not on the square, the counter-revolutionaries sat in the regional committee of the CPSU ... "

These words once again clearly testify to which direction the people's anger of the inhabitants of Grozny was directed during the two days of August 1958.

Due to their ideological blindness, both the central and local authorities were unable to objectively assess the causes of the outburst of popular anger. From the very beginning, the actions of the working masses were interpreted as the actions of "hooligan and criminal elements under chauvinistic and anti-Soviet slogans." Even in the course of the subsequent investigation, not one of the investigators asked the arrested people what exactly prompted the people to the demonstration. Only one thing worried the authorities: who wrote, who hit, who called ...

The communist leaders thus froze the solution of the problems of interethnic relations in Checheno-Ingushetia, which decades later turned into a bloody drama.

O. MATVEEV,
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, N162, 2000

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War Chechens took an active part in the fighting in the rear of the Red Army. Germany in the North Caucasus, as well as in the Balkans, relied on Muslims.

Not wanting to fight against the Nazis, the Chechen population massively evaded conscription into the Red Army (63% of those subject to conscription) or deserted, leaving with weapons in mountain detachments. Almost all the peoples of the Caucasus fought against fascism - (for example, the Ossetians were mobilized almost without exception). But Chechen groupings of up to 40 thousand people (!) Beat the rear of the Red Army. In addition to small arms, they were armed with artillery and mortars received from German "friends". They were trained by abandoned Nazi instructors. German agents helped create the fascist organization "Caucasian Eagles" (approximate number - 6540 people), which operated near the front.

The leaders of the Eagles were the brothers Khasan and Khusein Israilov and their nephew Mohammed Hasan Israilov (also known by the surname Terloev). Terloev formed bandit groups in the Galanzhou and Itumkalinsky districts, as well as in Borzoi, Kharsinoe, Dagi-Borzoi, Achkhen and other villages. He himself reported that in Checheno-Ingushetia, in addition to Grozny and Gudermes, 5 rebel districts were organized - a total of 24,970 people. Representatives were also sent to neighboring republics.

Why did Stalin deport Chechens and Ingush in 1944? Today two myths are widespread. According to the first, Khrushchev's, there were no reasons for eviction at all, the Chechens and Ingush fought bravely at the front and worked hard in the rear, and became innocent victims of Stalin's arbitrariness: Stalin, allegedly, expected to straighten up small peoples, finally break their desire for independence.

The second myth, nationalistic, was put into circulation by Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, who, when the Germans approached Chechnya, went over to their side, organized a detachment to fight the partisans, served in the Gestapo, and after the war worked in Germany at the radio station "Freedom". Avtorkhanov in every possible way inflates the scale of the Chechen "resistance" to the Soviet regime and also completely denies the cooperation of the Chechens with the Germans:

“... even being right at the borders of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, the Germans did not transfer a single rifle, not a single cartridge to Chechen-Ingushetia. Only individual spies and a large number of leaflets were transferred. But this was done wherever the front passed. But the main thing is that the Israilov uprising began in the winter of 1940, that is, even when Stalin was in alliance with Hitler ”(Avtorkhanov A. Murder of the Chechen-Ingush people. M., 1991. P. 59-60 ).

Mass desertion of Chechens. Chechen-Ingush gangs

So, why did Stalin evict peoples, including Chechens and Ingush? The reasons were:

1) Mass desertion. Here is what is said in the memorandum addressed to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria "On the situation in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic", compiled by the deputy. People's Commissar of State Security Bogdan Kobulov on the results of his trip to Checheno-Ingushetia in October 1943:

“The population [of the republic] during the war decreased by 25,886 people and totals 705,814 people. There are about 450,000 Chechens and Ingush in the republic. There are 38 sects in the republic, numbering over 20 thousand people. They carry out active anti-Soviet work, shelter bandits, German paratroopers. When the front line approached in August-September 1942, 80 members of the CPSU (b), including 16 heads of district committees of the CPSU (b), 8 executives of district executive committees and 14 chairmen of collective farms. Anti-Soviet authorities, having contacted German paratroopers, on the instructions of German intelligence organized an armed uprising in Shatoevsky, Cheberloevsky, Itum-Kalinsky, Vedensky and Galanchozhsky districts in October 1942. The attitude of the Chechens and Ingush towards the Soviet government was expressed in desertion and draft evasion in the Red Army. During the first mobilization in August 1941, out of 8,000 people to be drafted, 719 deserted. In October 1941, out of 4,733 people, 362 evaded the draft.

In January 1942, when completing the national division, only 50 percent were called up personnel. In March 1942, out of 14,576 people, 13,560 deserted and evaded service, who went underground, went into the mountains and joined gangs ... A group of Chechens ... sheltered the paratrooper of the German intelligence service Lange and ferried him across the front line. The criminals were awarded knightly orders and transferred to the CHI ASSR to organize an armed uprising. According to the NKVD and the NKGB of the CHI ASSR, there were 8,535 people on operational records, including 27 German paratroopers; 457 people suspected of links with German intelligence; 1410 members of fascist organizations; 619 mullahs and active sectarians... As of November 1, 1943, 35 bandit groups with a total number of 245 people and 43 lone bandits operate in the republic.

Over 4,000 people - participants in the armed uprisings of 1941-1942. - they stopped their active work, but they do not hand over their weapons - pistols, machine guns, automatic rifles, hiding them for a new armed uprising, which will be timed to coincide with the second German offensive in the Caucasus.

Let us estimate the scale of Chechens and Ingush evasion from service in the Red Army. At the beginning of the war, their number was approximately 460 thousand people, which, after mobilization, should have given approximately 80 thousand military personnel. While in the ranks of the Red Army, 2.3 thousand Chechens and Ingush died or went missing.

Is it a lot or a little? The Buryat people, twice as small in number, which was not threatened by the German occupation, lost 13 thousand people at the front, one and a half times inferior to the Chechens and Ingush Ossetians - 10.7 thousand. After the deportation, 8894 people were dismissed from the army (including the Balkars, whose people were evicted immediately after the liquidation of the Chi ASSR). As a result, we get that about 10 thousand Chechens and Ingush served in the ranks of the Red Army, that is, less than 1/8 of the draft contingent. Rest 7/8 evaded mobilization or deserted.

Meanwhile, banditry, organization of uprisings, cooperation with the enemy during the Great Patriotic War were punished in the USSR to the fullest extent. Aiding in the commission of crimes, harboring criminals were also punished. And almost all adult Chechens and Ingush were involved in this. It turns out that the accusers of Stalin's arbitrariness, in fact, regret that several tens of thousands of Chechen men were not legally put up against the wall!

2) Banditry.

It was desertion that served as a resource for recruiting members into bandit cells. Chechen deserters formed the backbone of future bandit formations that fought against the Red Army. From July 1941 to 1944, 197 gangs were destroyed on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The losses of the bandits amounted to 4532 people: 657 killed, 2762 captured, 1113 surrendered. Thus, in the ranks of the gangs that fought against the Red Army, almost twice as many Chechens and Ingush died and were captured than at the front! And this is not counting the losses of the Vainakhs who fought on the side of the Wehrmacht in the "eastern battalions"!

And since banditry is impossible without the complicity of the local population in these conditions, many "peaceful Chechens" can also be attributed to traitors. The old "cadres" of abreks and local religious authorities were knocked out long ago. However, they were replaced by a young change - brought up by the Soviet government, Komsomol members and communists who studied in Soviet universities, clearly showing the validity of the proverb "No matter how much you feed the wolf ...". The largest of the Chechen field commanders During the Great Patriotic War, Khasan Israilov, known under the pseudonym "Terloev" in 1929, joined the CPSU (b) at the age of 19 and entered the Komvuz in Rostov-on-Don the same year. In 1933, to continue his studies, Israilov was sent to Moscow to the Communist University of the Workers of the East. In 1935 he was arrested under Art. 58-10 part 2 and 95 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and sentenced to 5 years in the camps, but already in 1937 he was released. Returning to Chechnya, he worked as a lawyer in the Shatoevsky district. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Khasan Israilov and his brother Hussein developed a stormy activity in preparation for a general uprising of the Chechens. They created numerous battle groups.

Initially, the uprising was scheduled for the autumn of 1941 (and not for the winter of 1940, as Avtorkhanov lies) and was supposed to be timed to coincide with the approach of German troops to the borders of the republic. However, Hitler's blitzkrieg broke down, and the date for the start of the rebellion was postponed to January 10, 1942. But due to the lack of a clear connection between the rebel cells, it was not possible to postpone the uprising. A unified action did not take place, resulting in scattered premature actions of individual Chechen groups. On October 21, 1941, residents of the Khilokhoy farm in the Galanchozhsky district plundered the collective farm and offered armed resistance to the task force trying to restore order. A detachment of 40 people was sent to the area to arrest the instigators. However, his commander made a fatal mistake by dividing his people into two groups. The first of them was surrounded by rebels, disarmed and shot. The second began to retreat, was surrounded in the village of Galanchozh and was also disarmed. The performance of the Chechens was suppressed only after the introduction of large forces. About a week later, an uprising broke out in the village of Borzoi, Shatoevsky district. The crowd that had gathered there disarmed the police, defeated the village council and plundered the collective farm cattle. With the rebels from the surrounding villages who joined, the Borzoevs tried to resist the approaching NKVD task force, however, unable to withstand its blow, the Chechens scattered through the forests and gorges.

Plan of the Caucasian Federation, vassal of the German Empire

Israilov actively engaged in party building. He built his organization on the principle of armed detachments by districts. On January 28, 1942, at an illegal meeting in Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz), Israilov established the "Special Party of Caucasian Brothers" (OPKB). Its program provided for "the creation in the Caucasus of a free fraternal Federal Republic of the states of the fraternal peoples of the Caucasus under the mandate of the German Empire." The party has developed its own symbolism:

“Coat of arms of the OPKB - EAGLE a) the head of an eagle is surrounded by the image of the sun with eleven golden rays; b) on its front wing, a scythe, a sickle, a hammer and a handle are drawn in a bunch; c) in his claws of his right foot, a poisonous snake is drawn in a captured form; d) a captured pig is depicted in his claws of his left foot; e) on the back between the wings are drawn two armed people in Caucasian uniforms, one of them shoots a snake, and the other cuts a pig with a sword ...

The explanation of the GERB is as follows:

I. The eagle means the Caucasus.

II. The sun stands for Liberty.

III. Eleven sunbeams represent the eleven fraternal peoples of the Caucasus.

IV. The scythe denotes a cattle breeder-peasant; Sickle - a farmer-peasant; Hammer - a worker from the Caucasian brothers; The pen is science and study for the brothers of the Caucasus.

V. The poisonous snake is a defeated Bolshevik.

VI. Pig - Russian barbarian, defeated.

VII. Armed people are brothers of the OPKB, fighting against Bolshevik barbarism and Russian despotism.”

"National Socialist Party of Caucasian Brothers" and "Chechen-Mountain National Socialist Underground Organization". Mayrbek Sheripov

To better cater to the tastes of the German masters, Israilov renamed his organization the National Socialist Party of Caucasian Brothers (NSPKB). Its number soon reached 5,000 people. Another large anti-Soviet grouping in Checheno-Ingushetia was the Chechen-Mountain National Socialist Underground Organization, created in November 1941. Its leader Mayrbek Sheripov, the younger brother of the famous commander of the so-called "Chechen Red Army" Aslanbek Sheripov, who was killed in September 1919 in a battle with Denikin, was a member of the CPSU (b), was also arrested for anti-Soviet propaganda in 1938, and in 1939 he was released for lack of evidence of guilt and was soon appointed chairman of the Forestry Council of the ChI ASSR. In the autumn of 1941, he united gang leaders, deserters, fugitive criminals from Shatoevsky, Cheberloevsky and part of the Itum-Kalinsky districts around him, established contacts with religious and teip authorities, trying to provoke an armed uprising. Sheripov's main base was in the Shatoevsky district. Sheripov repeatedly changed the name of his organization: the Society for the Salvation of the Highlanders, the Union of Liberated Highlanders, the Chechen-Ingush Union of Mountain Nationalists, and, finally, the Chechen-Mountain National Socialist Underground Organization.

Capture by the Chechens of the regional center of Khima. Assault on Itum-Kale

After the front approached the borders of the Chechen Republic, in August 1942 Sheripov got in touch with the inspirer of a number of past uprisings, an associate of Imam Gotsinsky, Dzhavotkhan Murtazaliev, who had been in an illegal position since 1925. Taking advantage of his authority, he managed to raise a major uprising in the Itum-Kalinsky and Shatoevsky regions. It began in the village of Dzumskaya. Having defeated the village council and the board of the collective farm, Sheripov led the bandits to the center of the Shatoevsky district - the village of Khimoy. On August 17, Khimoy was taken, Chechen rebels destroyed party and Soviet institutions, and the local population looted their property. The capture of the regional center was successful thanks to the betrayal of the head of the department for combating banditry of the NKVD of the Chi ASSR, the Ingush Idris Aliyev, who was associated with Sheripov. A day before the attack, he withdrew from Himoy the task force and the military unit guarding the regional center. The rebels, led by Sheripov, went to capture the regional center of Itum-Kale, along the way joining their fellow countrymen. One and a half thousand Chechens surrounded Itum-Kale on August 20, but they could not take it. A small garrison repulsed all their attacks, and two companies that approached put the Chechen rebels to flight. The defeated Sheripov tried to unite with Israilov, but on November 7, 1942 he was killed by state security officers.

German saboteurs in the Caucasus

The next uprising was organized in October of the same year by the German non-commissioned officer Reckert, who was abandoned in Chechnya with a sabotage group. Having established contact with the gang of Rasul Sakhabov, with the assistance of religious authorities, he recruited up to 400 people and, supplying them with German weapons dropped from aircraft, raised a number of auls in the Vedensky and Cheberloevsky districts. This rebellion of the Chechens was also suppressed, Reckert died. Rasul Sakhabov was killed in October 1943 by his bloodline Ramazan Magomadov, who was promised forgiveness for his bandit activities. And other German sabotage groups were met by the Chechen population very favorably.

They were instructed to create detachments of highlanders; carry out sabotage; block important roads; commit terrorist attacks. The most numerous sabotage group in the amount of 30 paratroopers was abandoned on August 25, 1942 in the Ataginsky district near the village of Cheshki. Lieutenant Lange, who headed it, got in touch with Khasan Israilov and Elmurzaev, the former head of the Staro-Yurtovsky district department of the NKVD, who fled from service in August 1942, taking 8 rifles and several million rubles. However, Lange failed. Pursued by the Chekists, he, with the remnants of his group (6 Germans), with the help of Chechen guides, crossed back over the front line. Lange described Israilov as a dreamer, and he called the program of the “Caucasian brothers” written by him stupid.

Osman Gube - failed Caucasian gauleiter

Making his way to the front line through the villages of Chechnya, Lange continued to create bandit cells. He organized “Abwehr groups”: in the village of Surkhakhi (10 people), in the village of Yandyrka (13 people), in the village of Middle Achaluki (13 people), in the village of Psedakh (5 people), in the village of Goity (5 people). Simultaneously with the Lange detachment on August 25, 1942, Osman Gube's group was abandoned in the Galanchozh region. Avar Osman Saydnurov (he took the pseudonym Gube in exile) in 1915 voluntarily joined the Russian army. During civil war at first he served as a lieutenant with Denikin, but in October 1919 he deserted, lived in Georgia, and since 1921 - in Turkey, from where he was expelled in 1938 for anti-Soviet activities. Then Osman Gube took a course at a German intelligence school. The Germans pinned special hopes on him, planning to make him their governor in the North Caucasus.

In early January 1943, Osman Gube and his group were arrested by the NKVD. During interrogation, the failed Caucasian Gauleiter eloquently admitted:

“Among the Chechens and Ingush, I easily found people who were ready to serve the Germans. I was surprised: why are these people unhappy? Chechens and Ingush lived prosperously under Soviet rule, much better than in pre-revolutionary times, as I was personally convinced of. Chechens and Ingush do not need anything. This struck me as I recalled the constant deprivations in which the mountain emigration found itself in Turkey and Germany. I did not find any other explanation, except that the Chechens and Ingush were guided by selfish considerations, the desire under the Germans to preserve the remnants of their well-being, to provide services, in return for which the invaders would leave them part of the livestock and food, land and housing.

The betrayal of the Chechen party leadership

Contrary to Avtorkhanov's assurances, the Germans widely practiced dropping weapons by parachute for Chechen bandits. A reasonable question arises: where did the local internal affairs bodies look? The NKVD of Checheno-Ingushetia was then headed by the Ingush Sultan Albogachiev, who had previously worked as an investigator in Moscow and who had shown particular cruelty during the investigation into the case of Academician Nikolai Vavilov. Having received a promotion, Albogachiev returned to his native Chechen Republic on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. It soon became clear that the newly minted People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Checheno-Ingushetia was not eager to eradicate banditry. This is evidenced by the minutes of the meetings of the Chechen-Ingush Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks:

- July 15, 1941: "People's Commissar Comrade. Albogachiev did not organize an active fight against banditry and desertion”;

- the beginning of August 1941: "Albogachiev, heading the NKVD, by all means dissociates himself from participating in the fight against terrorists";

- November 9, 1941: "Albogachiev did not comply with the decision of the Bureau of the Chechen-Ingush Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the fight against banditry ... was based on passive methods, as a result, banditry was not only not eliminated, but, on the contrary, became more active."

During one of the Chekist operations, the NKVD soldiers found a duffel bag of the bandit leader Israilov-Terloev with his diary and correspondence. It also contained a letter from Albogachiev:

“Dear Terloev! I am very upset that your highlanders started the uprising ahead of schedule (meaning the October 1941 uprising). I'm afraid that if you don't listen to me, we, the workers of the republic, will be exposed... Look, for the sake of Allah, don't name us to anyone. Don't let yourself be arrested. Know that you will be shot. You write me a letter of a hostile bias, threatening me, and I will also begin to persecute you. I will burn down your house, arrest some of your relatives, and I will speak out against you anywhere and everywhere. This should prove that we are irreconcilable enemies. Write information about the results of the uprising, and I will be able to send them to Germany.

To match Albogachiev were his subordinates. There were many traitors in the internal affairs bodies of the Chechen Republic. These are the heads of the district departments of the NKVD: Staro-Yurtovsky - Elmurzaev, Sharoevsky - Pashaev, Itum-Kalinsky - Mezhiev, Shatoevsky - Isaev, the heads of the district police departments: Itum-Kalinsky - Khasaev, Cheberloevsky - Isaev, the commander of the fighter battalion of the Prigorodny district department of the NKVD Ortskhanov and others. What can we say about ordinary employees of the "organs"? The documents are full of phrases like: “Saydulaev Akhmad, worked as an operative of the Shatoevsky District Department of the NKVD, went into a gang in 1942”, “Inalov Anzor, a former policeman of the Itum-Kalinsky branch of the NKVD, freed his brothers from the penal colony, arrested for desertion, and disappeared, seizing weapons “... Local party leaders did not lag behind the Chekists. Let us repeat the phrase from Kobulov’s note: “When the front approached in August-September 1942, 80 members of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks quit their jobs and fled, including 16 heads of district committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 8 executives of district executive committees and 14 chairmen of collective farms.” At this time, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic included 24 districts and the city of Grozny. Thus, 2/3 secretaries of district committees fled. It can be assumed that those who remained were mostly not Chechens, but "Russian-speakers", such as, for example, the secretary of the Nozhai-Yurt RK of the CPSU (b) Kurolesov. Particularly "distinguished" was the party organization of the Itum-Kalinsky district, where the 1st secretary of the district committee Tangiev, the 2nd secretary Sadykov and other party workers disappeared. On the doors of the local party committee it was just right to post an announcement: "The district committee is closed - everyone has gone to the gang." In the Galashkinsky district, after receiving summons to appear in the military registration and enlistment office, the 3rd secretary of the district committee of the CPSU (b) Kharsiev, an instructor of the district committee and a deputy of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Sultanov, deputy. Yevloev, chairman of the district executive committee, Tsichoev, secretary of the Komsomol district committee, and other responsible Chechen officials. Others (the head of the organizational and instructor department of the district committee of the CPSU (b) Vishagurov, the chairman of the district executive committee Albakov, the district prosecutor Aushev), remaining on the ground, got in touch with the already mentioned commander of the sabotage group Osman Gube and helped him prepare an uprising. The Chechen intelligentsia also acted treacherously. An employee of the editorial office of the Leninsky Put newspaper, Elsbek Gimurkaev, together with Avtorkhanov, went to the Germans, and the People's Commissar for Education Chantaeva and the People's Commissar for Social Security Dakaeva assisted them.

Often traitors did not hide selfish interests. Mairbek Sheripov in the fall of 1941 cynically explained to his followers:

“My brother, Aslanbek Sheripov, foresaw the overthrow of the tsar in 1917, so he began to fight on the side of the Bolsheviks, and I know that the end of Soviet power has come, so I want to meet Germany halfway.”

The Chechens had "protectors". For example, the future Khrushchev Prosecutor General R.A. Rudenko, who then held the post of deputy head of the Department for Combating Banditry of the NKVD of the USSR. Having visited Checheno-Ingushetia in the summer of 1943, he presented a report stating: “The growth of banditry must be attributed to insufficient party explanatory work among the population ... lack of work with legalized bandit groups ... excesses in the conduct of Chekist operations ... So, from January to June 1943. 213 people were killed, of which only 22 people were on operational records. According to Rudenko, one can shoot only at those bandits who are registered, and with others - to carry out party-mass work.

But from the very report of Rudenko, the opposite conclusion follows - the actual number of Chechen bandits was ten times greater than the number of those on operational records: the core of the gangs was made up of professional abreks, to which the local population joined. Unlike Rudenko, Stalin and Beria, who grew up in the Caucasus, were well aware of the mountain principles of mutual responsibility and the collective responsibility of the clan for the crime of one of its members. Therefore, they decided to liquidate the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The Chechens themselves said:

“The Soviet government will not forgive us. We don’t serve in the army, we don’t work on collective farms, we don’t help the front, we don’t pay taxes, banditry is all around. Karachays were evicted for this - and we will be evicted”

Operation Lentil. Deportation of Chechens and Ingush in 1944

After the victories over the Germans, it was decided to deport the Chechens and Ingush. Preparations began for the operation, which received the code name "Lentil". The commissioner of state security of the 2nd rank I.A. was appointed responsible for it. Serov, and his assistants - B.Z. Kobulov, S.N. Kruglov and A.N. Apollo. Each of them headed one of the four operational sectors into which the territory of the republic was divided. Beria personally supervised the operation. An exercise was announced as a pretext for bringing in troops. The concentration of troops began about a month before the operation. On December 2, 1943, the Chekist groups created to accurately record the population began work. It turned out that over the previous two months, about 1,300 previously hiding Chechen rebels were legalized in the republic, including the “veteran” of banditry Javotkhan Murtazaliev. These bandits handed over only a small part of their weapons.

"State Defense Committee comrade. Stalin February 17, 1944 Preparations for the operation to evict the Chechens and Ingush ends. 459,486 people subject to resettlement were registered, including those living in neighboring regions of Dagestan and in the mountains. Vladikavkaz ... It was decided to carry out the eviction (including the landing of people in trains) within 8 days. In the first 3 days, the operation will be completed throughout the lowlands and foothill areas and partially in some mountainous areas, covering more than 300 thousand people.

In the remaining 4 days, evictions will be carried out in all mountainous regions, covering the remaining 150 thousand people ... 6-7 thousand Dagestanis, 3 thousand Ossetians from the activists of the neighboring regions of Dagestan and North Ossetia, as well as rural activists from Russians in areas where there is a Russian population ... L. Beria.

It is indicative: Dagestanis and Ossetians are involved to help in deportation. Previously, detachments of Tushins and Khevsurs were involved in the fight against Chechen gangs in the adjacent regions of Georgia. The bandits of Checheno-Ingushetia annoyed the neighboring peoples so much that they were happy to send them away.

Finally, everything was ready:

“The State Defense Committee to Comrade Stalin on February 22, 1944. For the successful implementation of the operation to evict the Chechens and Ingush ... the following was carried out:

1. It was reported to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Mollaev, about the government's decision to evict the Chechens and Ingush and about the motives for this decision. Mollaev shed tears after my message, but promised to complete all the tasks for the eviction. (According to the NKVD, the day before, the wife of this “weeping Bolshevik” bought a gold bracelet worth 30 thousand rubles.) Then, in Grozny, 9 senior officials from Chechens and Ingush were scheduled and convened together with him, who were announced about the eviction of Chechens and Ingush and his reasons.

... 40 party and Soviet workers from Chechens and Ingush are attached to us in 24 districts with the task of picking up 2-3 people from the local activists for each settlement for agitation. A conversation was held with influential clerics in Checheno-Ingushetia Arsanov, Yandarov and Gaysumov, they were called upon to provide assistance through the mullahs.

... The eviction begins at dawn on February 23 this year, it was supposed to cordon off the areas in order to prevent the exit of the population ... The population will be invited to the gathering, part of the gathering will be released to collect things, and the rest will be disarmed and delivered to the places of loading ... Beria "

At 2 am on February 23, all settlements were cordoned off, radios and telephones were turned off. At five in the morning, the men were called to meetings, where they were told the decision of the government. Immediately, the participants in the gatherings were disarmed, and at that time task forces were already knocking on the doors of their houses. Each task force, consisting of one operative and two fighters of the NKVD troops, was supposed to evict four families. The house of the deportees was searched, firearms and cold steel were confiscated. The head of the family was asked to extradite persons who helped the Nazis. The reason for the deportation was announced:

“During the period of the Nazi offensive in the North Caucasus, Chechens and Ingush in the rear of the Red Army created bandit groups, killed Red Army soldiers and Soviet citizens, sheltered German paratroopers.

Conditions for eviction. No resistance to deportation in 1944 by Chechens

Property and people were loaded onto vehicles and, under guard, were sent to the collection point for subsequent deportation. It was allowed to take food with you, small inventory at the rate of 100 kg. per person, but not more than half a ton per family. Money and household jewelry were not subject to seizure. For each family, two copies of registration cards were drawn up, where things seized during the search were noted. For agricultural equipment, fodder, cattle, a receipt was issued for the restoration of the economy at a new place of residence. The remaining movable and immovable property was rewritten. All suspects were arrested. In case of resistance or attempts to escape, the perpetrators were shot.

"State Defense Committee comrade. Stalin Today, February 23, at dawn began an operation to evict the Chechens and Ingush. The eviction is going well. There are no noteworthy incidents. There were 6 attempts to resist, which were stopped. 842 people were arrested from the persons planned to be seized. At 11 o'clock. in the morning 94 thousand 741 people were taken out of settlements. (more than 20 percent to be evicted), 20 thousand 23 of this number were loaded into railway cars. Beria"

The deportation was prepared in the strictest secrecy. Nevertheless, it was not possible to avoid information leakage. According to the NKVD, on the eve of the eviction, the Chechens, accustomed to the indecisive actions of the authorities, were militant. Legalized gangster Iskhanov Saidakhmed promised:

“If you try to arrest me, I will not surrender alive ... The Germans are now retreating ... in order to destroy the Red Army in the spring. You have to hold on no matter what."

Dzhamoldinov Shatsa, a resident of the village of Nizhny Lod, said:

“We need to prepare the people to raise an uprising on the very first day of the eviction”

However, as soon as the authorities demonstrated firmness, the "belligerent highlanders" obediently went to the assembly points, not thinking about resistance. With those who resisted, they did not stand on ceremony:

“In the Kurchaloi region, legalized bandits Basaev Abu Bakar and Nanagaev Khamid were killed during armed resistance. The dead were seized: a rifle, a revolver and a machine gun.

“During an attack on a task force in the Shali district, one Chechen was killed and one was seriously wounded. In the Urus-Mordanovsky district, four people were killed while trying to escape. In the Shatoevsky district, one Chechen was killed while trying to attack sentries. Two of our employees were lightly wounded (with daggers)."

A week later, the deportation was largely completed:

"State Defense Committee comrade. Stalin on March 1, 1944. I report on the results of the operation to evict Chechens and Ingush ... By February 29, 478,479 people were evicted and loaded into railway echelons, including 91,250 Ingush and 387,229 Chechens. 177 echelons have been loaded, of which 154 have already been sent to the place of the new settlement. Today a train with former top officials and religious authorities of Checheno-Ingushetia has been sent... The operation proceeded in an organized manner and without serious cases of resistance.

... A combing of forest areas is being carried out ... During the operation, 2016 Chechens and Ingush were arrested. 20072 firearms were confiscated, including 4868 rifles, 479 machine guns and machine guns.

... The leaders of the party and Soviet bodies of North Ossetia, Dagestan and Georgia have already begun to develop the new regions that have ceded to these republics. All measures have been taken to successfully carry out the operation to evict the Balkars... From March 15, the eviction of the Balkars will be carried out. L. Beria"

The lion's share of the deported Chechens and Ingush was sent to Central Asia- over 400 thousand to Kazakhstan and over 80 thousand - to Kyrgyzstan. The weapons confiscated from them would be more than enough for a whole division. It is easy to guess that all these trunks were by no means intended to protect the herds from wolves.

A number of authors claim that a third or even half of the deported Chechens and Ingush died during transportation to a new place of residence. This is not true. According to NKVD documents, 1,272 special settlers died during transportation (0.26% of their total number), another 50 people were killed while resisting or trying to escape. Allegations that these figures are underestimated, since the dead Chechens were allegedly thrown out of the cars without registration, are not serious. Put yourself in the place of the head of the echelon, who received one number of special settlers at the starting point, and delivered a smaller number to the place of deportation. He would immediately be asked: where are the missing people? Dead, you say? Or maybe they ran away? Or released by you for a bribe?

But what about those few Chechens and Ingush who really honestly fought in the ranks of the Red Army? Contrary to popular belief, they were not subjected to wholesale eviction. Many of them were exempted from the status of special settlers, but were deprived of the right to reside in the Caucasus. So, for example, for military merit, the family of Captain U. Ozdoev, who had five state awards, was deregistered for special settlement. She was allowed to live in Uzhgorod. There were many such cases. Chechens and Ingush women who were married to persons of other nationalities were not evicted.

Another myth related to deportation is associated with the allegedly courageous behavior of Chechen bandits, who managed to avoid deportation and partisans almost until the Chechens returned from exile. Of course, someone could have been hiding in the mountains all these years. However, there was no harm from them - immediately after the deportation, the level of banditry in the territory of the former Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic decreased to that characteristic of "calm" regions. Most of the gang leaders were either killed or arrested during the deportation. Khasan Israilov, the leader of the National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers, was hiding longer than many. In November 1944, he sent a humiliated letter to the head of the UNKVD of the Grozny region, Drozdov:

“Hello… dear Drozdov. I wrote telegrams to Moscow. Please send them to the addresses ... Dear Drozdov, I ask you to do everything possible to get forgiveness from Moscow for my sins ... Please send me through Yandarov 10-20 pieces of carbon paper, Stalin's report of November 7, 1944, military-political magazines and at least 10 pamphlets... Dear Drozdov, please inform me about the fate of Hussein and Osman, where are they... Dear Drozdov, I need a medicine against the tuberculosis bacillus, the best medicine has come. With best regards, Khasan Israilov (Terloev)."

The request remained unanswered. December 29, 1944 Israilov was killed as a result of a special operation.

Growth of the Chechen population in places of deportation.

But, perhaps, having ensured minimal losses of Chechens and Ingush during deportation, the authorities deliberately starved them in a new place? Indeed, the death rate of special settlers there was high. Although not half or a third of those deported died. By January 1, 1953, there were 316,717 Chechens and 83,518 Ingush in the settlement. Thus, the total number of deportees decreased by about 80 thousand, of which, however, some did not die, but were released. Until October 1, 1948 alone, 7 thousand people were released from the settlement.

What caused such a high death rate? The fact is that immediately after the war, the USSR was struck by a severe famine, from which not only Chechens, but all nationalities suffered. The traditional lack of diligence and the habit of getting food by robbery also did not contribute to the survival of the Chechens and Ingush. Nevertheless, the settlers settled down in a new place and the 1959 census already gives a larger number of Chechens and Ingush than it was at the time of the eviction: 418.8 thousand Chechens, 106 thousand Ingush. The rapid growth in numbers is best evidence of the "difficulties" of the life of the Chechen people, freed for a long time from military service, "constructions of the century", harmful industries, international assistance and other "privileges" of the Russian people. Thanks to this, the Chechens managed not only to preserve their ethnos, but also to triple it over the next half century (1944 - 1994)! The "genocide" and deportation did not prevent Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was taken to Kazakhstan as a baby, from graduating from the Higher Military School of Long-Range Aviation Pilots and the Air Force Academy. Gagarin, to be awarded the Orders of the Red Star and the Red Banner.

Based on the materials of the book by Nikolai Grodnensky "The Unfinished War: The History of the Armed Conflict in Chechnya"

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