The Japanese imperialists' invasion of China did not evoke any serious opposition from the Western powers, although Japanese aggression endangered their interests in the Far East. The Western powers continued their Munich policy, which here was called "Far Eastern Munich". Expecting to direct Japanese aggression against the Soviet Union and hoping to come to terms with the Japanese military at the expense of China, they adopted a policy of "non-intervention." At the Brussels Conference in November 1937, the proposals of the USSR to provide collective assistance to China and China on the application of economic sanctions against Japan were rejected by Britain and other representatives of the Western countries. As in Europe, the position of "non-intervention" was in fact an encouragement and connivance to the aggressor.

In the West, the obsession with the elimination of the Soviet state turned into a fiery passion for directing Japanese expansionist energy northward. In Europe, Hitler had to play the role of a battering ram, he had the main role of anti-Soviet policy, while Japan was supposed to help divert significant forces of the Soviet armed forces by active actions in the Far East. Munich policy and the surrender of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939. brought Hitler close to the borders of the USSR and created a favorable opportunity for the implementation of his plans to "destroy Marxism" throughout the world. In the Far East, Japan was to receive China as a reward for aggression against the Soviet Union. Munich diplomacy expanded its scope and turned into world politics.

Inspired by the position of Western countries in May-June 1938, i.e. Simultaneously with the Sudeten crisis in Europe, Japan's militaristic circles launched a noisy propaganda campaign about the so-called disputed territories of the Soviet Primorye bordering Manchukuo. At the end of July, Japanese troops, supported by tanks, aviation and artillery, invaded Soviet territory in the area of ​​Lake Khasan, captured two hills with the aim of further advancing to Vladivostok. The Japanese command was confident in the success of their adventure. In addition, Japan received moral support in Western countries, whose press openly supported this action, encouraging the Japanese to go further. And not only moral. England handed over to Japan customs in the occupied territory of China, which had previously been under its control. By this act, the Chamberlain government financed the aggressor. In addition, she also provided assistance to Japan in the export of coal from Northern China and provided merchant ships for the transfer of military cargo.

The Japanese intervention in the area of ​​Lake Hasan failed. The Soviet troops defeated the Japanese troops and drove them back. It was an instructive lesson that showed the change in the balance of power in the Far East. The Japanese were opposed by a well-trained and equipped army, ready to repulse the invaders. The defeat did not stop the Japanese aggression. The following year, the Japanese militarists made a new attempt to unleash an armed conflict with the Soviet Union. On May 11, 1939, Japanese troops made a sudden attack on the border posts of the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol River. The invasion involved not only the capture of strategically important Mongolian territory, but also the invasion of the Ussuri, Khabarovsk and Amur regions in order to reject the Soviet Far East.

In accordance with the Mutual Assistance Stream of 1937, units of the Soviet Army came to the aid of Mongolia. The fighting between the combined Soviet-Mongolian units and the Japanese group lasted four months and ended on August 29, i.e. four days before the outbreak of World War II. A distinctive feature of these battles was the superiority of the Soviet troops in military equipment and skillful command. In tanks, they had a fourfold superiority, in aircraft - a twofold one. The Soviet command showed excellent skill in conducting large-scale battles, using tank strikes with massive artillery attacks and deep air raids behind enemy lines. The Japanese lost 55 thousand people in battles, the Soviet troops 10 thousand. During the hostilities, the elite units of the Kwantung Army were surrounded and defeated, 130 tanks and 300 aircraft were destroyed. Japan was forced to ask for a cessation of hostilities. September 15, 1939 fighting have been discontinued.

The Japanese army suffered a serious defeat. This dealt a severe blow to the aggressive plans of the Japanese militarists in the Far East. The Kwantung Army was weakened and practically ceased to threaten the Special Region of China. The defeat of the Japanese gave hope for a final victory to the Chinese people. Having received an idea of ​​the strength of the Soviet Union, the Japanese militarists were forced to abandon their aggressive plans for the Soviet Far East and intensify their expansion to the south of Asia. The Japanese government went to reach agreements with the Soviet Union.

Already a month after the formation of the Konoe cabinet, on July 7, 1937, the Japanese imperialists launched an aggressive war in North China. The Japanese government tried to present its actions as forced by an allegedly anti-Japanese movement. Having launched major military operations to seize Northern China, gradually expanding the scope of military operations and moving them inland, Japan did not formally declare war on China and continued to call the campaign the “Chinese Incident”.

In Japanese literature, especially in the post-war period, a false theory was circulating that Konoe was for peace and tried in every possible way to prevent the spread of hostilities in China. According to these statements, the war against China in 1937, like the capture of Manchuria in 1931, was launched by the military against the plans of the government, which allegedly objected to sending troops and sought to localize the "incident".

Facts and documents, however, completely refute this false statement. The beginning of the Japanese-Chinese war in 1937 was considered the attack of Japanese troops on Chinese troops at the Liukoujiao station, near Beiping (now Beijing). The Japanese imperialists have chosen this point.

The location of the attack is because Lukoujiao is located on the railway linking Beijing with Central China. The capture of Lukoujiao prevented the Japanese troops from establishing full control over Beijing.

In order to provoke the incident at Lukou-jiao, the Japanese military continuously, starting in June 1937, carried out night maneuvers, deliberately choosing for them precisely this strategically important area, and not the usual place reserved for maneuvers. -ditch of foreign troops in accordance with the enslaving treaties imposed on China in the past. On July 7, the Japanese military provoked the incident at Lukou-jiao by attacking the Chinese troops, who resisted without waiting for the order of the Chiang Kai-shek government. The battle continued until July 9, after which a truce was concluded, which was used by the Japanese militarists to send reinforcements. While the Chiang Kai-shek clique did not take measures for an effective defense, the Japanese government sent reinforcements to its troops all the time.

July 10, 1937 Japanese General base decided to send large reinforcements to the Japanese garrison zone in North China by transferring two brigades from Manchuria, one division from Korea and three divisions from Japan. The following day, this decision of the general staff was approved by the Konoe cabinet. Having concentrated 20 thousand troops and more than 100 aircraft in the area of ​​Tianjin and Beijing, on July 14, Japanese troops resumed hostilities. On July 26, having received new reinforcements, the Japanese command issued an ultimatum, demanding that the 37th division be withdrawn from Beijing within 48 hours. Otherwise, the Japanese threatened to attack the city. The Chinese command rejected the ultimatum, and on July 27 large-scale hostilities began, which did not stop for eight years, until the end of the Second World War.

The international situation was developing favorably for the aggressive actions of Japan. The German-Italian aggression in Spain not only did not meet with opposition from the reactionary groups in the ruling circles of England, France and the USA, but was even encouraged by them. Italy even earlier, as a result of an aggressive war, entrenched herself in Abyssinia. All this gave the Japanese imperialists reason to expect that Japanese aggression in China would also not evoke opposition from the Western powers. The completion of the process of creating a national anti-Japanese front in China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party forced the Japanese imperialists to hurry, because they feared that the Chinese people would unanimously rise up for a national liberation war, contrary to the treacherous policy of the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Having captured Beijing, the Japanese army launched an offensive in three directions: on Shandong, along the Beijing-Tianjin railway, in a southerly direction along the Beijing-Hankow railway, and in a northwestern direction along the Beijing-Suiyuan railway. railroad.

In August 1937, the Japanese military moved hostilities to the Shanghai region, using as a pretext the incident provoked by them. Chapey. Two days later, Konoe's cabinet issued a statement about sending two divisions to reinforce Japanese troops. As the scope of hostilities expanded, more and more reinforcements of Japanese troops arrived in the Shanghai area. By the end of September, the number of troops in this area was about 100 thousand people, and the fleet that covered them consisted of 38 warships. At that time, a Japanese army of 350 thousand people was already operating throughout China.

In November 1937, after three months of fierce fighting, Japanese troops captured Shanghai. By the end of 1937 they had captured Nanking and the provincial capitals of Chahar, Hebei, Suiyuan, Shanxi, Zhejiang and Shandong. The Japanese fleet, in addition to supporting the army, began patrolling the coast to prevent the supply of food and weapons to the unoccupied part of China.

The Chinese people put up stubborn resistance to the Japanese invaders and rose up in a resolute struggle to defend their country from the attack of the aggressor. The hopes of the Japanese imperialists for a quick and easy victory have failed. The inspirer and organizer of this struggle was the Communist Party of China, which tirelessly called on the people to put up stubborn resistance to the Japanese imperialists. In North China, the Red Army was renamed the 8th National Revolutionary Army, and the Sovetsky District was reorganized into the Special Border Region. In South China, the 4th National Revolutionary Army was created from the detachments of the Red Army. These armies went to the front and dealt serious blows to the Japanese invaders. On August 25, 1937, the Chinese Communist Party published the "Program for Anti-Japanese Struggle and National Salvation." This program mobilized the masses for an all-people struggle against Japanese aggression.

The imperialists of the United States and Britain, despite the fact that the Japanese aggression in China endangered their interests in the Far East, continued to encourage this aggression, hoping to reach an agreement with the Japanese invaders at the expense of China and set the Japanese imperialists against Soviet Union.

The only country that provided great and disinterested moral and material assistance to China was the Soviet Union. In August 1937, the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with China and consistently supported the provision of collective assistance to China.

In contrast, the American and British governments made concessions after concessions to the Japanese aggressor. The more accommodating the Western powers were, the more impudent the Japanese aggressors became, who did not stop at open actions against the USA and England. On August 26, 1937, Japanese planes fired on two cars with British officials and wounded the British ambassador; on December 11, Japanese artillery fired on the British ship Ladybird and captured it. On December 12, Japanese aircraft fired on the American ship Penei.

The reactionary circles in the USA and Britain, taking into account the hatred of the popular masses throughout the world for aggression and fascism, had to mask their imperialist policy, calculated to support the Japanese aggressor. To this end, on November 3, 1937, the so-called Brussels Conference of the countries that signed the "Treaty of the Nine Powers" was convened in Belgium. Japan refused to take part in the conference. The Soviet Union, which did not take part in the Washington Conference of 1921, agreed to take part in the Brussels Conference, following its traditional policy of maintaining peace and security throughout the world.

During the conference, it immediately became clear that the Western powers did not intend to take any action to curb the Japanese aggressor. The proposals of the Soviet Union to provide collective assistance to China were not accepted. China's proposals, supported by the Soviet delegation, to apply economic sanctions against Japan were rejected, and the conference limited itself to a declaration condemning Japan's violation of the "Nine Power Treaty" and calling on the belligerents to stop hostilities and resort to peaceful methods.

Such an outcome of the conference was predetermined by the position of the Western powers, which they had taken even before the conference was convened. The American government agreed in advance with the British government that the conference should not discuss effective measures against Japan, including the issue of sanctions. Accordingly, the American delegate at the conference, Norman Davis, was instructed not to raise or support the issue of sanctions.

The United States and Britain, in convening the Brussels Conference, also pursued the goal of pitting the Soviet Union against Japan, so that the Soviet Union alone would enter the war against the Japanese aggressor. However, these calculations of the Western powers were defeated. Nevertheless, the position taken by the United States and Britain at the Brussels Conference led Japan to further increase its pressure on China.

In the autumn of 1937, the Japanese government invited the German ambassador to China, Trautmann, to mediate and negotiate with China. It counted on the quick capitulation of the Chiang Kai-shek government, which offered no active resistance to the Japanese troops and relied on the annihilation of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army. Japan's hopes for the complete surrender of Chiang Kai-shek were even more intensified after the fall of Shanghai on November 11, 1937 and Nanjing on December 13. The occupation of these cities was accompanied by unheard-of atrocities and violence by the Japanese military against the Chinese civilian population. In this way, the Japanese authorities hoped to intimidate the Chinese people and break their will to resist. However, the Chinese people responded to the mass repressions of the Japanese invaders by strengthening popular resistance and strengthening the national front against the aggressor.

The government of Chiang Kai-shek, which was ready to betray the national interests of China and agree to surrender, undertook secret negotiations with Japan. On December 3, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek announced that he accepted the Japanese conditions as a basis, hoping to achieve their mitigation with the help of the powers.

However, the Chiang Kai-shek government's plans for a deal with Japan were frustrated, on the one hand, by the intransigence Chinese people and, on the other hand, the unwillingness of the Japanese government to reduce the demands made on China. On December 20, an extended cabinet meeting was held in Tokyo, where the following proposals to China were adopted: 1. China's rejection of pro-communist and anti-Japanese policies and cooperation with Japan and Manchukuo in anti-communist policy. 2. Creation of demilitarized zones at the behest of Japan under the control of special administrative bodies. 3. Establishment of close economic cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China. 4. Payment of indemnity to Japan.

On December 27, 1937, these conditions were presented to China. Despite their vague nature, they left no doubt that Japan not only set the task of turning China into its colony, but also decided to use it as a springboard for the war against the Soviet Union.

In December 1937, Tojo, while serving as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, submitted to the Japanese War Ministry a proposal to strengthen the air navigation meteorological service in Mongolia "in order to prepare for war against Soviet Russia." On January 24, 1938, the commander of the Kwantung Army, General Ueda, in a special document on the administrative organization of the "new China", presented to the Minister of War, pointed out the need to use China "to prepare for the rapidly impending war against the Soviet Union."

The Japanese government sought to come to an agreement with the government of Chiang Kai-shek as soon as possible in order to end the war in China and concentrate all forces to prepare for war against the Soviet Union. It even agreed to revise the above demands to China, up to the elimination of the indemnity clause, if only to speed up the conclusion of an agreement with the Chiang Kai-shek government, since military operations in China diverted large forces needed to prepare for war against the USSR.

On January 11, 1938, an extended conference was convened with the participation of the emperor, at which it was decided that if China asked for an armistice, Japan would agree to negotiate in accordance with the above conditions. If the government of Chiang Kai-shek does not reconsider its position, Japan will take steps to create another puppet government.

The hatred of the Chinese people for the Japanese invaders and their selfless struggle for national independence did not allow the government of Chiang Kai-shek to openly collude with the Japanese aggressors.

On January 14, 1938, the Japanese government decided to end all relations with the Nanjing government. On January 16, Prime Minister Konoe issued a declaration stating that Japan would no longer maintain relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government and would take steps to establish a new government with which it would cooperate.

On January 22, 1938, Konoe stated that Japan's task was to establish close cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China. On the same day, Hirota formulated the demand for the creation of a "new order in East Asia." :

The decision to create a puppet government in China testified to the unfavorable development of events in China for Japan, to the inability of Japanese imperialism to cope with the growing resistance of the Chinese people.

The failure of Japanese plans to quickly end the war in China

In accordance with the decision taken, the Konoe government took practical steps to set up a puppet government in China.

According to Japanese requirements, the new Chinese "government" was to be anti-communist, pro-Japanese, and maintain close economic relations with Japan and Manchukuo.

As early as December 1937, a provisional "government" was set up in North China. The Konoe government began to pave the way for the creation of a single puppet government for China headed by Wang Ching-wei, a traitor to the Chinese people.

In 1938, the Sino-Japanese war entered a new phase. As a result of the stretching of the front and communications and the ever-increasing resistance of the Chinese people, the offensive operations of the Japanese army were suspended.

In the period from the fall of Nanjing to the capture of Xuzhou, the Japanese army only managed to connect the northern front with the central one. In the battles for Xuzhou, the Japanese troops suffered a severe defeat near Tai'erzhuang, inflicted by the Chinese troops, despite the treacherous inactivity of the Chiang Kai-shek generals. The 8th Army continued to strengthen Japanese resistance at the front and in the rear of the Japanese troops. Parts of the 8th and the new 4th Army penetrated into the rear of the Japanese troops and led an energetic guerrilla war, creating numerous anti-Japanese bases in the occupied regions of North and East China, meeting the sympathy and active support of the masses. The Japanese occupiers were losing control over the occupied Chinese territory and could gain a foothold only at the most important strategic points and along the railway lines.

The unfavorable development of events in China, the growth of economic and domestic political difficulties forced the Konoe government to reorganize the cabinet in May 1938. General Itagaki was appointed Minister of War instead of Sugiyama, Minister of Foreign Affairs was appointed General Ugaki instead of Hirota, and Minister of Finance was Ikeda, a direct protege of Mitsui.

Having completed the reorganization of the cabinet, the Ko-noe government attempted to "improve relations" with England, hoping to get a number of new concessions from her after the British government concluded an agreement with Japan in April 1938 on the transfer of customs to her in the occupied Chinese territory. To this end, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ugaki began negotiations in Tokyo with the British Ambassador Craigie.

The negotiations between Ugaki and Craigie coincided in time with the preparation of the Munich agreement in the West. The compliance of the British government with the aggressive policy of Germany and Italy gave Japan reason to believe that serious concessions could be obtained from England in the Far East.

However, these negotiations did not yield positive results. In September 1938 General Ugaki resigned.

Reactionary circles in the US and Britain continued to encourage Japanese aggression in China. Thanks to British assistance, Japan continued to export coal from North China in the same quantities as before the start of the war. English merchant navy provided great assistance in the transfer of military supplies from Japan to China and back. In 1938, the Japanese chartered foreign ships with a total carrying capacity of 900,000 tons; of this amount, 456 thousand tons of freight fell on English ships.

The United States of America provided especially great assistance to imperialist Japan.

For three years - from 1937 to 1939 - US exports to Japan amounted to 769,625 thousand dollars. Of the total amount of American exports to Japan, the export of military materials in 1937 was 53%, in 1938 - 63%, in 1939 - 71% (only for 9 months).

In 1938, American banks provided the Kuhara-Agokawa military-industrial concern with a loan of $50 million for the construction of factories in Manchuria. At the same time, Japanese companies received a loan from the Morgan banking group in the amount of $75 million.

Receiving actual support from the United States and Britain and taking advantage of the capitulatory moods of the Chiang Kai-shek government, the Japanese troops intensified their offensive in a southerly direction. On October 22, 1938, they occupied Canton; on October 25, Hankow fell; in February, 1939, Hainan Island was captured.

While conducting operations to seize important strategic points in southern China, the Japanese government simultaneously took steps to organize a central Chinese puppet government. In November 1938, the terms of the "agreement" with the future puppet government were drawn up. According to these conditions, China was completely deprived of political and economic independence and was regarded as an appendage of Japan in the implementation of its aggressive policy directed against the Soviet Union.

In connection with the forthcoming organization of a Chinese puppet government, on December 16, 1938, the Chinese Affairs Council was established under the Japanese government under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The competence of this body included questions of political, economic and cultural relations with the regime of Wang Jing-wei.

On December 18, 1938, in accordance with the plan developed by the Japanese, Wang Ching-wei fled from Chongqing to Hanoi.

On December 1, Konoe published the main conditions for settling relations with China: China recognizes Manchukuo and concludes an anti-Comintern pact with Japan; Japan gets the right to keep troops in the points established by her; Inner Mongolia is turning into a special anti-Comintern region; Japan receives priority rights in the development of the natural resources of China, especially Northern China and Inner Mongolia.

On May 8, 1939, the Japanese brought Wang Ching-wei to Shan-hai, from where he was sent to Tokyo. Wang Ching-wei accepted all Japanese demands. On March 30, 1940, in Nanjing, occupied by Japanese troops, a puppet central government headed by Wang Ching-wei, a traitor to the Chinese people, was established.

The war economy and the situation of Japanese workers

29 May 1937 Japanese war ministry approve-lo " five year plan» development of the military industry. The plan was to switch a large number enterprises of the main industries for military production and a large volume of military orders. Particular attention was paid to the development of the military industry on the Asian continent. The Japanese imperialists hoped to turn the industry of Japan and Manchuria into a single complex of the war economy based on the use of the material resources of Northern China. Along with an increase in the production of military materials, the plan provided for the systematic accumulation of stocks of strategic raw materials through increased imports from abroad.

To implement the plan for the development of the military industry, the Japanese ruling circles intended to establish state control over finance, trade, transport, labor, distribution of raw materials and consumption. The priority of the military industries was established.

The first serious step towards the establishment of so-called control over production was taken in March 1938, when the Konoe cabinet passed the law "on the general mobilization of the nation" through the parliament. On the basis of this law, many separate resolutions were adopted on the militarization of the country's economy and the further reduction of the rights of workers.

In order to deceive the masses in Japan, a version was spread that the representatives of the zaibatsu were allegedly fighting the military and government bureaucracy against the law on the "general mobilization of the nation", since this law allegedly infringed on the interests of monopolists. Pointed to paragraph 11 of the law, which stated that in case of need caused by wartime, the government is authorized by imperial decree to determine the procedure for paying income to companies.

However, this reservation of paragraph 11 of the law on "general mobilization of the nation" could not threaten the profits of the Japanese monopolists in any way, since they occupied leading positions in the Japanese state apparatus.

In fact, the representatives of the Japanese monopolies themselves insisted on the adoption of the law "on the general mobilization of the nation", since it opened up additional opportunities for them to ensure huge profits. Already during 1932-1936. in the joint-stock industrial companies included in the Japanese statistics, net profit doubled. During the years of the war in China, the profits of the Japanese monopolies increased even more. The Japanese monopolies were directly interested in the further expansion of the war of conquest in China, which brought them huge profits.

The entire economy of Japan adapted to meet the needs of the aggressive war. Primary attention was paid to the development of energy to support the military industry. In "March 1938, a law was issued on the control of electricity, in accordance with which the Japan Electricity Generation and Transmission Company was founded. The consumption of electricity by the military industry increased from 13,091 million kWh. in 1937 to 20,628 million kWh in 1941, while over the same period, electricity consumption by the population decreased from 10,309 million kWh to 9,785 million kWh. civil needs also declined.

By 1941, the capacity of oil refineries had increased 4 times. In order to save fuel and create large strategic reserves in Japan, control over the distribution of oil was established.

Imports served as the main source of oil products, the main part of which was supplies from the USA. The United States supplied oil products to Japan until 1941, when there was a reduction in imports due to the introduction by the American government in 1939 of restrictions on the export of oil.

Much attention was paid to increasing the production of hard coal.

After the start of the aggressive war in China, 40% of the military expenditures of the Japanese budget went to this war and 60% to general military preparations.

In order to expand the military industry, the Japanese government paid huge subsidies to monopoly concerns, which in the form of taxes additionally placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the working people.

The militarization of the economy contributed to an even greater concentration of production and the centralization of capital.

American monopolies continued to supply Japan with strategic goods, machine tools, and various equipment. In particular, until 1941, Japan imported 90% of all imported machine tools from the USA.

The development of energy, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, machine tool building provided the necessary basis for the mass production of aircraft, tanks, aircraft engines and other types of modern weapons. The production of aircraft engines increased from 1,426 in 1937 to 11,654 in 1941.

Military spending, which in 1937 accounted for 73% of all budget expenditures, in 1941 reached 80%.

The militarization of the Japanese economy led to an artificial increase in the production of heavy industry and a decrease in the production of light industry. In the light industry, those branches developed that could be quickly switched to the production of military products, the rest of the branches, which mainly satisfied the needs of the general population, reduced output, which had a severe impact on financial situation workers.

The militarization of industry was accompanied by a further attack by the capitalists on the standard of living and the rights of the workers, and an intensification of their exploitation. The working day lasted 14-16 hours. Even by an official government decree, the working day was set at 12-14 hours. Along with the lengthening of the working day, the intensification of labor increased. The number of non-accidents at work has increased.

The increased militarization of the economy directly affected the decline in the living standards of the Japanese population. The capitalist monopolies sharply intensified the exploitation of the working class, the robbery and ruin of the peasantry, artisans, office workers, and the urban petty bourgeoisie. The decline of peaceful branches of industry, the growth of inflation and the associated high cost, the decline in agricultural productivity - all this extremely exacerbated the situation. The real wages of workers were systematically declining. Although after the start of the war in China there was some increase in the earnings of workers in connection with overtime and piece work, the increase in prices significantly exceeded the increase in wages.

The rise in prices did not stop even after the issuance by the Japanese government on September 10, 1939 of a decree on freezing the prices of goods.

The Japanese peasants were also in a difficult situation. The mobilization of the male labor force into the army, the lack of agricultural tools and the rise in prices for artificial fertilizers led to a decrease in productivity. The peasants were ruined by unbearable taxes and the high rents they paid to the landowners. By 1939-1940. land rents have risen significantly and are higher than at any time in the past decade. The situation of the peasants worsened even more due to the fact that in 1941, at the request of the authorities, they were forced to sell at fixed prices all surpluses of rice, wheat, barley, etc. Rice production decreased in 1941 to 8245 thousand tons compared to 10,324 thousand tons in 1939.

The impoverishment of the countryside caused the peasants to leave for the city, replenishing the army of the unemployed. Despite the growth of the military industry, unemployment in Japan was not eliminated. According to official data, the number of completely unemployed was 400 thousand, and together with the semi-unemployed reached 2 million people.

During the war years, brutal police terror raged in Japan. The Communist Party of Japan was subjected to heavy blows, the arrests of the leadership led to the virtual liquidation of the party center.

As a result of the splitting activities of the leadership of the right-wing socialists, there was no unity in the labor movement in Japan. The workers were fragmented and poorly organized. In 1937, only about 400 thousand workers were united in trade unions in Japan, which accounted for 6.2% of all industrial workers.

The Konoe government stepped up its repression. In December 1937, the newly appointed Minister of the Interior, retired Admiral Suetsugu, disbanded legal leftist organizations, including the Nihon Musanto Party, and began mass arrests. In December 1937, 400 progressives were arrested. At the beginning of 1938, several thousand advanced workers and representatives of the progressive intelligentsia were arrested for violating the "public security law."

After the adoption in March 1938 of the law “on the general mobilization of the nation”, the country established the strictest control over the political and social activities of progressive elements and suppressed any manifestation of opposition to government policy. This law gave the government the unlimited power to ban strikes, close newspapers, ban meetings, rallies and demonstrations. The government, making extensive use of these unlimited powers, banned strikes and dispersed trade unions.

The reformist leadership of the All Japan Federation of Labor and the right-wing socialist leadership of Shakai Taishu-to embarked on the path of open cooperation with the militaristic government, called on the working class to abandon the class struggle and help the government achieve victory in the war of aggression in China. Instead of the liquidated trade unions, the so-called societies for serving the fatherland in the field of production (sangyo hokokukai) were created. Under their leadership, local “service societies” were organized at Japanese enterprises, turned by entrepreneurs into a tool for even more brutal exploitation of workers.

The entire population of Japan was under the strict control of the police authorities, which was carried out through the so-called neighborhood groups. The leaders of these groups, usually appointed from reactionary elements, enjoyed great influence, as they distributed L food cards introduced in Japan in 1940-1941, fuel coupons, manufactured goods cards, and distributed fertilizers and agricultural implements in the villages. "Neighbourhood groups" helped the authorities in carrying out various activities aimed at intensifying the exploitation and robbery of workers. They were engaged in compulsory subscription to military loans, helped to extort taxes, organized the collection of "gifts" for the army from the population, forced residents to engage in military training in their free time, etc.

Armed provocations of Japanese militarists on the borders of the USSR

Following its traditional policy of peace and good-neighbourly relations with all states, the Soviet Union persistently suggested that Japan conclude a non-aggression pact. As already mentioned, in the period from 1931 to 1933, I "degraded the ruling elite twice rejected a similar proposal from the Soviet government.

Rejecting the Soviet proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact, the Japanese authorities further intensified preparations for an aggressive war against the Soviet Union. From 1932 to 1937, the strength of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was increased fivefold, aviation threefold, artillery fourfold, and tanks more than tenfold. In 1938, the term of service in the Kwantung Army was extended, as a result of which its strength increased by 50%. All these and other preparations testified to the systematic preparation of Japan for an aggressive war against the Soviet Union.

This was also evidenced by the location of military installations, airfields and communication lines in Manchuria and Korea. The scale of the preparation of the military bridgehead in Manchuria for the war against the USSR was evidenced, in particular, by the fact that the military barracks built there could accommodate an army of one and a half million, and 3 / 4 of these barracks were concentrated in areas, of which, in accordance with according to the plans of the Japanese General Staff, an attack on the Soviet Union was to be launched | 8 .

Preparing a military attack on the territory of the Soviet Union, the Japanese imperialists systematically violated the Soviet border in Manchuria, organized border clashes and sent mass saboteurs into Soviet territory. So, for example, in 1938, 1754 saboteurs were transported across the Soviet state border. During the same year, Japanese border troops committed 124 violations of the Soviet border, there were 40 cases of violation of the air borders of the USSR by Japanese aviation and 120 cases of violation Japanese ships water borders of the USSR.

Me limiting themselves to this, the Japanese imperialists decided to seize part of the Soviet territory in the region of Lake Khasan, which was of great strategic importance.

On July 14, 1938, the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow visited the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and demanded that Soviet troops be tasted from the western shore of Lake Khasan so that the Zaozernaya height located on this shore would go to Manchuria. A week earlier, the Japanese command began to concentrate significant infantry units and artillery in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthis height. On July 29, Japanese troops launched an offensive against the Bezymyannaya height. On the night of July 30-31, they also launched an offensive on the Zaozernaya height: on August 6, Soviet troops drove the Japanese from the Zaozernaya height and hoisted a red flag on it.

The scale of the fighting during the Khasan events can be judged from the fact that the Japanese invaders brought into action the 19th Infantry Division of the so-called Korean army, which was reinforced by heavy artillery (about 1000 guns) and 2 thousand soldiers sent by the Kwantung Army . During the fighting, Japanese artillery fired 12,000 rounds.

Military operations were preceded by enhanced diplomatic training; Japanese diplomats spent two weeks trying to figure out how the Soviet Union would react to the threat of force. At the same time, the Japanese command was concentrating large troops near the Soviet border, the concentration of which was completed by July 25, 1938. All this testified that the Khasan events were not an “ordinary” border incident, but were carefully a prepared military attack calculated to seize Soviet territory. However, in this undeclared war against the Soviet Union, the Japanese invaders failed to achieve their aggressive goals, because the Japanese troops were defeated by Red Army units that came to the aid of the border troops.

The deterioration of the economic situation in Japan, the lack of prospects for a successful end to the war in China, and the failure of the anti-Soviet military provocation in the area of ​​Lake Khasan predetermined the resignation of the Konoe cabinet.

On January 1, 1939, the Konoe cabinet resigned, giving way to the new government of Baron Hiranuma, who had previously held the post of chairman of the Privy Council. Ko-noe remained in the government of Hiranuma as a minister without portfolio, simultaneously holding the post of chairman of the Privy Council.

The ruling circles of Japan did not draw the necessary conclusions from the lesson learned by the Japanese troops during the Khasan events, and did not abandon their plans of conquest. Hiranuma declared that he would continue the policies of the Konoe cabinet. This statement was soon confirmed by actions. In 1939 the Japanese imperialists unleashed new military operations against the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic. This time the provocation was organized on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol River and aimed to seize Soviet territory and cut off the Soviet Far East from the USSR. At the same time, the Japanese command intended to seize a significant part of the territory of the MPR in order to turn it into its military base.

The Japanese command carefully prepared an attack in the area of ​​Khalkhin Gol. From January 1939, armed detachments of Japanese troops began to systematically violate the state border of the MPR. At the same time, the Japanese command began to concentrate units of the 23rd Infantry Division in this area and transferred the Bargut cavalry regiment there. A special railway line was drawn to the area of ​​the alleged offensive. In mid-April 1939, the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army sent a special topographical detachment to this region in order to make a topographical survey of the area of ​​forthcoming military operations.

On May 10, 1939, Japanese troops crossed the state border of the Mongolian People's Republic in the Khalkhin Gol region and attacked the Mongolian border posts. At the same time, the Japanese command continued to concentrate troops and equipment in the area.

The command of the Kwantung Army issued an order to destroy the army of the Mongolian People's Republic. On June 30, the 23rd division was ordered to cross the Khalkhin-gol river, attack and destroy the Mongolian troops.

All this testified that the military operations unleashed by the Japanese invaders against the Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviet Union in the Khalkhin Gol region were in the nature of an undeclared aggressive war. This was also evidenced by the fact that, in order to carry out its aggressive plan, the Japanese government created a special 6th army, consisting of two infantry divisions, three regiments of the Manchurian cavalry, three regiments of heavy artillery, anti-tank units and seven infantry regiments. The Japanese General Staff ordered the 6th Army to bombard the cities of the Mongolian People's Republic and the rear of the Mongolian army.

Military operations continued from May to September 1938 inclusive and ended only after the complete defeat of the Japanese troops by the troops of the Soviet Army and the army of the Mongolian People's Republic. The Soviet and Mongolian troops destroyed the 6th Japanese Army, stopped on their border and did not pursue the Japanese troops on Manchurian territory, although the path to Hailar was open before them.

At the Tokyo trial of the main Japanese war criminals, documents and testimonies were presented that irrefutably proved that the military operations in the Khasan region in 1938 and in the Khalkhin Gol region in 1939 were part of the general plan of Japanese aggression against the Soviet Union .

Negotiations to strengthen the "anti-Comintern Pact"

Preparing an attack on the Soviet Union and, in fact, having already begun military operations against the USSR and the MPR near Khasan and Khalkhin-gol, the ruling circles of Japan tried to justify their actions by "fighting against the threat of communism."

As already mentioned, the "anti-Comintern Pact" served as the basis for Japan's aggressive policy towards the Soviet Union. In 1937, the General Staffs of the Japanese and German armies came to an agreement regarding the exchange of secret intelligence information about the Soviet Union. To this end, it was decided to increase the use of Russian white émigrés.

In his message to Hitler dated May 4, 1939, Japanese Prime Minister Hiranuma stated: “I am very pleased with how effective the anti-Comintern agreement concluded between our countries turned out to be in the implementation of the tasks assigned between them.” And on February 23, 1941, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nazi Germany, Ribbentrop, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador Oshima, stated: “It was friendship with Japan that helped Germany to arm itself after the anti-Comintern pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan was able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China.

In the first half of 1938, new negotiations began between Japan, Hitler's Germany and fascist Italy, connected with the desire to strengthen the Anticom-Intern Pact.

In March 1939, the Japanese government decided to invite Germany to conclude a military alliance set against the USSR.

During the negotiations, it turned out that Germany insisted that this military alliance be directed not only against Russia, but also against other countries, namely the USA, England and France. As a result of differences of opinion on both sides, the tripartite pact was not concluded at that time.

On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany. In this regard, Prime Minister Hiranuma resigned, motivating her by the fact that he takes responsibility for the fact that "Japan's likely adversary, Soviet Russia, has concluded an agreement with Germany" .

The new government "was formed by General Abe, whose rise to power coincided with the outbreak of World War II.

The Abe government declared Japan's non-participation in the European war. All the attention of the new cabinet was directed to the expansion of military operations in China. A unified command was introduced, and General Nishio was appointed commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Japan on all fronts in China, and former Minister of War Itagaki was appointed his chief of staff.

However, the heroic resistance of the Chinese people, led by the Communist Party, despite the capitulation actions of the government of Chiang Kai-shek, thwarted the aggressive plans of the Japanese military. The Japanese troops made no new gains in China.

In December 1939, the Abe government faced widespread discontent in the country caused by food difficulties. The rationed distribution of food products was accompanied by innumerable abuses. The "regulatory" government apparatus could not ensure an uninterrupted supply of rice to industrial centers and, in particular, Tokyo. Unrest arose in the Japanese capital, which, according to foreign observers, threatened to turn into "rice riots."

The Abe government was forced to resign. It was replaced in January 1940 by the cabinet of Admiral Yonai, who basically continued the policy of his predecessor. Soon, however, sharp divisions arose in Jonai's cabinet. They were connected with the fact that the initial course of the Second World War (the “strange war” in Europe, which revealed the weakness of England and France in the face of German aggression) aroused the predatory appetites of the Japanese imperialists. The policy of non-participation in the war, which was continued by the Yonai cabinet, became increasingly unacceptable to the Japanese ruling classes, who were afraid to miss the "opportune moment" for the implementation of their expansionist plans.

Contrary to the opinion of Prime Minister Yonai and Minister of Foreign Affairs Arita, who considered it inexpedient and even dangerous, "without resolving the" Chinese problem "," disperse forces "and outline new objects of aggression, influential Japanese circles insisted on the urgent implementation of the program "full expansion". Supporters of this program pointed to the desirability of strengthening relations between Japan and Nazi Germany, spoke in favor of the fastest completion of the fascistization of the country, and urged Japan to enter the war on the side of the Axis powers.

The army leadership and, in particular, Minister of War Hata insisted on the rejection of the policy of non-intervention in the European war, the immediate conclusion of a military alliance between Germany and Japan and the creation of a single political organization of the fascist type in accordance with the "new political structure ”, proposed by Konoe. Jonai, on the other hand, considered it premature to conclude an agreement with Germany and objected to the "new political structure."

Disagreements in the Japanese government intensified after the surrender of France in June 1940. Yonai ignored the demand of the military leadership to order the Japanese troops concentrated near the borders of the French Indo-China, "to enter the territory of this French colony, referring to the incompleteness of the "Chinese incident" . .

The policy of Prime Minister Yonam and Foreign Minister Arita before the fall of France was to maintain the "status quo". Repelling the demands of the monopolies, the Japanese military strove for vigorous action in order to make full use of the defeat of France and Holland and seize their colonial possessions.

Yielding to these demands, Jonah agreed to go for a rapprochement with Germany. However, he again spoke out against internal "reforms" in the fascist spirit.

At the end of June 1940, Foreign Minister Arita prepared a speech on the radio, which contained the following phrase: “The Government will never depart from the policy of the Axis Powers and has always been sympathetic to the German demands for a new order in Europe, all the more that Japan herself was striving for a new order in Asia.

The army leadership, fearing that the change in tactics of Prime Minister Yonai and Foreign Minister Arita might strengthen the position of the cabinet, demanded through Minister of War Khata that the above phrase be deleted from Arita's report on the grounds that "it is in contrary to all previous government policy.

On July 14, 1940, Hata demanded in writing that Ionai resign. Jonai refused to comply with this demand and, in turn, suggested that Hat.a submit his resignation. “My point of view,” declared Jonai, “is absolutely at odds with that of the Minister of War. No.need.for.a.new organization. Since you cannot agree with me, I ask you to resign and recommend a new Minister of War.

On July 14, Hata resigned. On the same day, Ionai's cabinet resigned in full force, as the military leadership refused to recommend a new person for the post of Minister of War.

The formation of the government was again entrusted to Konoe.

The Konoe government and the implementation of the program of fascisization and expansion of aggression

The outbreak of war in Europe, which created a favorable environment for the implementation of Japanese plans of conquest in the Pacific zone, prompted the ruling circles of Japan to speed up the organization of the "new order" in East Asia.

Already at the end of 1939, in official Japanese documents, the fascist "new order" began to be deciphered as "the creation of an East Asian bloc of peoples." The final formula was made even more colorful for propaganda purposes: "Creating a Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere."

"Common Prosperity" provided for the accession to Japan of other, non-independent, dependent or colonial Asian countries.

In the book of a certain Ishihara, published in 1940 in Japan and devoted to the problem of building a Great East Asia, the latter included Japan, Manchuria, China, Thailand, Indo-China, Malaya, the Dutch Indies, British Borneo, New Guinea, the Philippines , Australia, New Caledonia, Portuguese Timor and Soviet Primorye.

On the color map attached to Ishihara's book, New Zealand, Burma and almost all of Eastern Siberia were additionally included in the East Asian sphere.

United States, South America, India, Iran, Arab countries, a significant part of the African continent were shaded on the map in the book of Ishihara as areas lying in the sphere of "trade expansion of East Asians" .

At the end of August 1940, that is, at the moment when, after the surrender of France, a sharp weakening of the Positions of England was revealed, the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri pointed out: “The borders of the East Asian bloc should not be regarded as stable. They will expand to include Malaya, Burma, Australia and New Zealand."

Focusing on Hitler's Germany and fascist Italy, the Japanese ruling circles copied the fascist methods of cracking down on democratic forces, suppressing any opposition in order to completely militarize the country.

Having set out to completely fascistize the state system of Japan, the Konoe government announced the urgent need to introduce a "new political structure."

The first step was the elimination of all legal opposition to the military-fascist course by dissolving the parliamentary political parties. A noisy campaign was launched against the "harmful political fragmentation" that allegedly resulted from the existence of political parties. Unlike Hitler's Germany and fascist Italy, Japan did not create a "single" fascist party. The reactionary monarchy became the ideological center of the fascist "transformations". Partly voluntarily, partly under the threat of violent actions, all the bourgeois-petty-bourgeois and right-wing socialist parties of Japan "disbanded themselves."

Following this, the government announced the creation of an organization designed to "mobilize the nation around the monarch", to actively promote the implementation of the fascist program of militarization of the country. This organization was named the Throne Relief Association. As a surrogate for the Fascist Party, the Throne Relief Association was constructed as a purely bureaucratic institution. At the head of the central "headquarters" of the association was the prime minister, its departments were filled with generals, admirals and senior officials, local branches were headed by governors. "Association" was on the state budget.

The actual leaders of both the government and the "Association for Assistance to the Throne" were large capitalist monopolies, directly interested in military orders, in the policy of colonial conquests, acting through the military and court-bureaucratic elite closely associated with them.

The organization of the "new political structure" was accompanied by an intensification of political terror against progressive elements, ferocious reprisals against leaders of the workers' and democratic movement, and unbridled propaganda of chauvinism and fascism. Under the guise of fascist-monarchical calls for "the unity of the nation around the emperor," the reactionaries carried out a campaign against the working people. The capitalists, who carried out profitable military orders, arbitrarily lengthened the working day, introduced a hard labor regime for workers. An intensified militarization of higher and secondary educational institutions was carried out.

"New economic structure" as a form of domination of Japanese monopolies

The offensive of fascism in Japan was directly connected with the strengthening of the dictatorship of the Japanese monopolies, which achieved the establishment of a "new political structure" for the complete subjugation of the entire state apparatus. Not satisfied with the selection of ministers and other top dignitaries, the Japanese monopolists took the implementation of Japan's economic policy directly into their own hands, creating the so-called new economic structure. Demagogically proclaiming the slogan of "state control" over the economy, the Japanese big capitalists demanded that direct "control" over all the most important sectors of the economy be transferred into their hands. As a result, the so-called control associations for various types of production were created, which acted as state bodies authorized to monitor a given branch of the economy, “regulate” the distribution of labor, the supply of raw materials and fuel, set prices, etc. Chairmen "control associations" were appointed representatives of the largest concerns, monopolists in the given branch of production, who thereby obtained the opportunity, acting as representatives of the state, to secure maximum profits for themselves.

Fascist propaganda tried to present the creation of a “new economic structure” as a “limitation” of capitalism, as a “state regulation” of the economy, etc. In reality, the “new economic structure” meant the complete subordination of the state apparatus to monopolies, the provision of additional conditions for their huge profits.

"Regulation" and "control", which were carried out by "control associations" in industry, in practice created a "paradise for the capitalists" and at the same time a military penal regime for workers deprived of any legal opportunity to defend their rights before the vested " state powers” ​​by monopolists.

The "new political structure" and the "new economic structure" were the two sides of the fascist policy of oppression and enslavement of the Japanese working people and the further expansion of aggression.

The foreign policy of the Konoe government. Tripartite Pact 27 September 1940

The Japanese imperialists, without abandoning their long-standing anti-Soviet plans and without ceasing their attempts to gain a foothold in China, from the beginning of the war in Europe began to pay special attention to expansion in a southerly direction, into the countries of Southeast Asia. This was due primarily to the fact that the Japanese imperialists, who were striving to seize the strategic raw materials (oil, rubber, tin, bauxite) of French Indo-China and the Dutch Indies (Indonesia), hoped to extract all the benefits from the fact of the military defeat and occupation of France and Holland by the Nazis. troops. In seeking to seize the wealth of Southeast Asia, Japan sought to significantly increase its military potential in order to provide itself with an easier opportunity for the further implementation of an aggressive program that provided for a military attack on the USSR.

The expansion of Japan to the south caused concern in the ruling circles of the United States and England. As long as Japanese imperialism, along with the seizure of China, carried out provocative attacks on the territory of the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic, the ruling circles of the United States of America and Britain viewed Japanese aggression favorably. The United States especially generously supplied Japan with various military materials, hoping that sooner or later Japanese imperialism would start a war against the USSR.

The direction of Japanese aggression not to the north, but to the south was a serious disappointment for the American and British "Munich".

Preparing to enter the world war, the Japanese ruling circles hastened negotiations on concluding a military-political alliance with Hitler's Germany and fascist Italy. Relying on the fascist "axis", Japan hoped to more easily capture the French and Dutch colonies in the Pacific.

On September 27, 1940, a "tripartite pact" was signed between Germany, Italy and Japan. This document was an official agreement of the three aggressors on a joint struggle for the redivision of the world.

In the introductory part of the "tripartite pact" it was said: "The prerequisite for a lasting peace is that every nation of the world should receive the space it needs." Thus, the main goal of the union of Germany, Italy and Japan was proclaimed the implementation of territorial seizures.

Article 1 stated: "Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the creation of a new order in Europe."

Article 2 read: "Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in creating a new order in the Great East Asian space."

Article 3 formulated the obligation of the three states to support each other "by all political, economic and military means", including the case "if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by any power that is currently does not participate in the European war and in the Japanese-Chinese conflict. Thus, the pact established a direct interdependence between the European and Pacific fronts of World War II.

The pact contained a clause stating that it supposedly did not affect the relationship of its participants with the Soviet Union. The false nature of this reservation in the light of subsequent events is beyond doubt.

The "Triple Pact" officially introduced the term "new order", which meant the claims of aggressive countries to the forcible subjugation of foreign territories and peoples. The signing of this pact largely predetermined the expansion of the sphere of military operations, the transformation of the war into a truly world war.

The "Triple Pact" finally formalized Japanese claims to dominance in the "Great East Asian space" without further geographical specification. The deliberate vagueness and vagueness of the Japanese formula "East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" led to the fact that even in Japan itself, in particular in parliamentary circles, the desire to have a clearer understanding of this subject was repeatedly expressed.

In January 1941, one of the deputies of the Japanese parliament persistently sought clarification from the government of what exactly the plans for creating a "sphere" consisted of. Prime Minister Konoe limited himself to answering that "the creation of a sphere of common prosperity is absolutely necessary for the existence of Japan."

In September 1941, one of the official representatives of the Japanese military propaganda service, Colonel Mabuchi, "explained" that "Japan's future is not secured until Japan's resources are backed up by the resources of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" .

By concluding the "tripartite pact", Japanese imperialism stepped up pressure on the French colonial authorities. As early as September 22, 1940, Japanese troops occupied the northern part of Indo-China. At the beginning of 1941, the Japanese imperialists "formalized" this act with an agreement with the Vichy government, which actually transferred French Indo-China under the complete control of Japan.

Strengthening their positions in Indo-China (in particular, by provoking a military conflict between Thailand and French Indo-China), the Japanese imperialists at the same time put pressure on the Dutch colonial authorities in Indonesia, seeking to obtain preferential rights from them. for the export of oil. The Japanese-Dutch negotiations, however, did not lead to the satisfaction of all Japanese demands due to opposition from the United States and partly from England. Japanese expansion to the south caused a sharp aggravation of Japanese-American imperialist contradictions.

The direct reaction of the United States to the signing of the "tripartite pact" was the establishment of restrictions on the export of strategic raw materials to Japan. In October 1940, an agreement was signed between the United States and England on the joint defense of the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific possessions. The British government opened the Birch-China road, through which the supply of the deep regions of China could be carried out under the conditions of the Japanese blockade.

Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact. Japanese-American negotiations on the eve of the Pacific War

The defeats inflicted on the Japanese militarists by the Soviet Army near Lake Khasan in 1938 and on the Khalkhingol River in 1939 had a sobering effect on the ruling circles of Japan and for a certain time forced them to abandon provocative attacks on Soviet territory and on the territory of Mongolian People's Republic. Imperialist Japan was also forced to reckon with the fact of the existence of the Soviet-German treaty of August 23, 1939, which temporarily postponed a direct armed attack by Japan's ally, Hitler's Germany, against the Soviet Union.

The ruling circles of Japan found themselves compelled to maneuver in their relations with the Soviet Union and offer it to begin negotiations on the conclusion of a neutrality pact.

In the spring of 1941, these negotiations were conducted in Moscow on behalf of the Japanese government by Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

The significance for the USSR of the Soviet-Japanese treaty, as well as the Soviet-German treaty of 1939, was determined by the fact that it was intended to limit the scope of the Second World War, and was supposed to make it difficult for the aggressor to attack the USSR. But, as it later became known, when signing the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union on April 13, 1941, Matsuoka was already well aware of the impending German attack on the Soviet Union. Simultaneously with the negotiations on the conclusion of a neutrality pact with the USSR, Matsuoka raised the question of extending the “anti-Comintern pact” for another five years, the term of which expired on November 26, 1939, before Ribbentrop.

Imperialist Japan intended to sabotage the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact and, at the right moment, to take advantage of the "victory" of Nazi Germany over the USSR in order to go to war and seize the Soviet Far East.

At a meeting of the leading military and political figures of Japan in the presence of the emperor on July 2, 1941, it was decided to make every effort to resolve the "Chinese incident", accelerate the advance to the south and, depending on the situation, resolve the "northern problem", and to achieve these goals, keep in mind the removal of any obstacles. At this meeting, it was decided that 1) Japan would not temporarily intervene in the war "with the USSR and would use weapons "if the German-Soviet war develops in favor of Japan"; 2) until then, Japan will, under the guise of diplomatic negotiations, "secretly conduct armed training against the USSR."

The Japanese government feared that the war might end in a German victory before Japan could muster the forces necessary to capture all of Eastern Siberia.

This is confirmed by a telegram sent from Tokyo to Berlin on July 31, 1941 addressed to the Japanese ambassador in Germany. The telegram stated that the Russo-German war had given Japan an excellent opportunity to resolve the "northern question" and that Japan was continuing its preparations to seize this opportunity. At the same time, fear was expressed that if the Russo-German war proceeded too quickly, Japan would not have time to take effective concerted action.

Despite the perfidious policy of the ruling circles of Japan, the Soviet-Japanese treaty nevertheless played a positive role, being an undeniable success. Soviet diplomacy. It should be noted that the announcement of the signing of the Soviet-Japanese treaty caused extreme dissatisfaction among the imperialist circles in the USA and Britain, who still continued to hope that Japan could be used against the Soviet Union.

Despite the great tension in Japanese-American relations, reflecting the severity of the imperialist antagonism of the two pretenders to dominance in the Pacific Ocean, intermittent negotiations continued between the United States and Japan for almost the entire 1941. In the course of these negotiations, the ruling US circles made attempts to "appease" aggressive Japanese imperialism, clearly counting on Japan taking advantage of the situation and opposing the USSR.

In these negotiations, the Japanese government strenuously sought to recognize Japan's "right" to keep its troops in North China and Inner Mongolia for the purpose of "fighting communism", i.e., fighting against the national liberation movement of the Chinese people and against the USSR. The US ruling circles, however, could not agree to Japanese domination of China, Indo-China, and all of East Asia.

Japanese diplomacy tried to play on anti-Soviet sentiments in the ruling circles of the United States, dragging out the negotiations in every possible way. The Japanese imperialists camouflaged their preparations for a surprise attack on US and British military bases, demonstrating an imaginary desire to reach a compromise in diplomatic negotiations at all costs. In addition to the Japanese ambassador to Washington, Admiral Nomura, in November 1941 the former Japanese ambassador to Berlin, Kurusu, was sent to the United States to participate in the negotiations.

The anti-Soviet calculations of Japanese politicians were not justified. Months passed after the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, and the defeat of the Soviet Army and the disorganization of the Soviet state still did not come.

The Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, came to Ribbentrop with a complaint about this. Ribbentrop called Keitel, and the latter strongly convinced Osim that "everything was in order" and that some "delay" compared to the calendar plan for ending the Soviet-German war was due to purely "technical reasons" that could be easily overcome.

In August 1941, an attack on the USSR was planned by Japanese government authorities for the summer of 1941, and it was still assumed that all of Eastern Siberia would be included within the boundaries of "Great East Asia".

Government of General Tojo. Japanese attack on American and British bases in the Pacific

In November 1941, the Konoe government resigned. The reason for it was declared disagreements "on foreign policy issues." He was replaced by the government of General Tojo, who combined the post of prime minister and minister of war in his hands. .

The motivation for Konoe's resignation and Tojo's official statement that "Japan cannot be indifferent to the development of international events resulting from the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the USSR" were interpreted in the USA and England as the intention of the new Japanese government already in the near future to enter the war with the USSR.

Since the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, the Japanese imperialists have repeatedly violated the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. In Manchuria, the Japanese Kwantung Army, almost a million strong, stood in full combat readiness. Since Tojo himself belonged to military circles extremely hostile to the Soviet Union, the assurances of the American bourgeois press, which corresponded to the secret desires of American imperialism, about the inevitability of an imminent Japanese attack on the USSR, were widely disseminated. Objectively, this contributed to the Japanese policy of lulling the vigilance of the Americans in order to ensure the surprise of the strike. Nomura and Kurusu continued to "negotiate" in Washington.

On the night of December 7–8, 1941, Japanese naval and air forces attacked the main base of the American Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor (Hawaiian Islands), as well as Manila, Guam, and the British colony Hong Kong.

The American fleet suffered serious damage: 8 battleships in addition, another 10 American warships of other classes were sunk or badly damaged.

Thus, without declaring war, Japanese imperialism went to war with the USA and Britain in the Pacific.

From the book "Essays on the Modern History of Japan", publishing house of the USSR Academy of Sciences,

Moscow, 1957

The Shanghai incident, used by Japan as a pretext for starting hostilities, was provoked on August 9, 1937. Two days earlier, at a meeting of the Japanese Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministers of War and Navy, it was decided that "the main area for the use of armed forces on the mainland should be the regions of Hebei - Chahar and Shanghai"

The opening ceremony of the Throne Relief Association was held on October 12, 1940 (Seishii nippon rekishi nenghyo, p. 468).

38 On December 7, 1940, the Konoe cabinet adopted a program to establish a "new economic structure" ("Szyshin nippon rekishi Yenhyo", p. 464).

57 C. D. Edwards. Japanese corporations. M, IL, 1950, p. NO.

Article 3 of the pact was interpreted as a challenge to the United States, a power that had not yet participated in the European war and in the "Tspono-Kntay conflict." .

The text of the decision of the meeting on July 2, 1941 on the question of relations with the USSR is as follows: -stvenny initiative measures to covert weapons for the war against the Soviet Union. In the meantime, we will continue diplomatic negotiations with great caution, and if the course of the Soviet-German war takes a favorable turn for Japan, then we will use weapons to solve northern problems and thereby ensure the stability of the situation in the northern regions. Cit. according to the text of the “Sentence of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in the case of the main Japanese war criminals”. Russian translation, see M. Yu. Raginsky and S. Ya-Roeenblit. International Trial of Major Japanese War Criminals, p. 243, app.

M. Yu. Raginsky and S. Ya. Rozenblit. The international trial of the main Japanese war criminals, p.

In his memoirs, Konoz depicts the matter in such a way that the reason for the resignation was the disagreement of the Minister of War Tojo with the continuation of negotiations between Japan and the United States, which Konoe allegedly insisted on. But right there, Konoe claims that the appointment of Tojo as prime minister did not mean that Japan was heading for war with the United States. Konoe Fumimaro. Heiwa e no doreku (Peacekeeping Effort), p. 100.

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE BEGINNING OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE FIGHT. THE DEFEAT OF THE SOVIET MOVEMENT (1931-1935)

Parameter name	Meaning
Article subject:	JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE BEGINNING OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE FIGHT. THE DEFEAT OF THE SOVIET MOVEMENT (1931-1935)
Rubric (thematic category)	Politics

The beginning of open aggression in China by Japanese imperialism. The world economic crisis that began in 1929 sharply aggravated the whole range of socio-economic contradictions in the imperialist states, incl. and in Japan. In this situation, the desire of the monopolies and the military increased to soften the contradictions in the country on the path of aggression against China. The seizure of China and its resources was considered by the ruling classes of Japan as a base for an attack on the USSR, for a war for dominance over Asia. The first step in the implementation of these plans of Japanese imperialism was the seizure of the northeastern provinces of China (Manchuria).

September 18, 1931 ᴦ. The command of the Japanese Kwantung Army ordered an offensive and by the morning of September 19 sent troops into the cities of Shenyang, Changchun, Andong, and others.
Hosted on ref.rf
Soon, the main cities and regions of Northeast China were occupied by Japanese troops. Chiang Kai-shek ordered the troops of Chang Hsueh-lyap, who were in the northeast, to withdraw to the south without a fight and appealed to the League of Nations for help.

At the same time, the ruling circles of England, France and the United States, which determined the position of the League of Nations, hoping that the Northeast of China captured by the Japanese would become a springboard for Japan's attack on the Soviet Union, did not take effective measures to curb the aggressor. In December 1931 ᴦ. The League of Nations decided to send a commission headed by Lord Lytton to China to "study the Manchu question on the spot". Only by September 1932 ᴦ. The commission submitted a report to the League of Nations, according to which Japan's actions were recognized as aggression. Only the Soviet Union immediately condemned the aggression of the Japanese imperialists.

In order to force the Nanjing government to recognize the legitimacy of the Japanese seizures in China, the Japanese military, having provoked an "attack" on Japanese citizens in Shanghai, sent in January 1932 ᴦ. military landing at the mouth of the Yangtze. The Nanjing government fled to Luoyang, ordering the 19th Army stationed in the Shanghai area to withdraw without a fight. At the same time, contrary to

1 ʼʼMaterials on the third ʼʼleftʼʼ lineʼʼ. Beijing, 1957, Sat. 1, p.
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85 (in Chinese).

kazu began fighting with the Japanese landing force. In Shanghai, strikes broke out among workers and employees of Japanese enterprises, as well as merchants, artisans and students. Volunteer groups sprang up. The fighting for the city continued throughout February. Japanese troops bombarded and burned down Shanghai's Zhabei working area, but the city's workers steadfastly fought on. Only in early March, units of the 19th Army, which had not received reinforcements, were forced to withdraw, being under the threat of encirclement.

Encountering serious resistance and not having the strength to advance in China in several areas, the Japanese at the end of March began negotiations with representatives of the Nanjing government. According to Us, some agreement concluded in May 1932 ᴦ. in the presence of representatives of England, the United States, France and Italy, the Japanese troops received the right to stay ʼʼ until order is restoredʼʼ. The Chinese government undertook, at the request of Japan, to take measures to stop the anti-Japanese movement and to withdraw the 19th Army from the Shanghai area.

At the beginning of 1932 ᴦ. the Japanese authorities, having established control over the entire territory of Manchuria, began to stage a "movement for independence from China". In March, representatives of the puppet authorities announced, under Japanese dictation, the creation of an "independent" state of Manchukuo in northeastern China. The Japanese invaders appointed Pu Yi, the last emperor of the Manchu dynasty, who was overthrown from the throne in 1912 ᴦ, as the supreme ruler of this ʼʼ stateʼʼ. After the renunciation of the dynasty on a state pension, first in Beijing and then in Tianjing, Pu Yi shortly before the "creation" of Manchukuo was kidnapped by Japanese intelligence from his palace and taken to the northeast. The capital of Manchukuo was declared Chanchun, renamed Xinjing (ʼʼ new capitalʼʼ). In March 1934ᴦ. Pu Yi was proclaimed emperor. From the very beginning, Japanese ʼʼadvisersʼʼ, the real government of Manchukuo, were assigned to Pu Yi and his ʼʼministersʼʼ.

September 15, 1932 ᴦ. The Japanese government "recognized" Manchukuo and signed an agreement with him, which legalized the Japanese military, political and economic presence in these territories. Manchukuo turned into a springboard for further Japanese aggression in the Far East. When in February 1933 ᴦ. Assembly of the League of Nations approved the report of the Lytton Commission, Japan categorically refused to accept the commission's proposals and at the end of March 1933 ᴦ. announced its withdrawal from the League of Nations. In March 1933 ᴦ. Japanese troops occupied the province of Rehe and approached Peiping and Tianjin. In May 1933 ᴦ. In the city of Tanggu, the Nanjing government concluded an armistice agreement with the Japanese command. Under this agreement, part of the province of Hebei along the line passing northeast of Beiping and Tianjin was declared a 'demilitarized zone'. Beiping

a political council was established, which received the right to negotiate on mixed issues. The troops of Zhang Xue-liya were withdrawn from Hebei.

In connection with the seizure of North-East China by Japan, the problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway became more acute. The Japanese military organized a series of anti-Soviet provocations that made it impossible for the normal operation of the road. The reactionary Japanese press openly called for the seizure of the CER. The Soviet government, not wanting to aggravate the situation in the Far East, offered Japan to buy from the USSR its share of ownership of the CER. In the summer of 1933, negotiations on this issue began in Tokyo, which, after lengthy delays on the Japanese side, ended in March 1935 ᴦ. the signing of an agreement on the sale of the Soviet share of ownership of the CER to the government of Manchukuo.

The Northeast accounted for over 11% of the territory of China, it gave about l U total exports of agricultural products. It produced about 60% of soybeans, over 15% of the salt mined in China. With its occupation by Japan, China lost about 40% of the forest area, about 35% of the explored coal reserves at that time, over 40% of production and 50% of oil reserves, about 70% of production and 80% of iron reserves. Lands, enterprises and property of the Chinese bourgeoisie, landlords, and militarists fell into the hands of the Japanese. The colonial police regime established by the invaders put the population of Manchuria in the position of colonial slaves.

The actions of the Japanese military, its plans and claims showed that it had no intention of limiting its aggression in China to the Northeast. Under these conditions, certain sections of the petty and national bourgeoisie, the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, and representatives of individual regional bourgeois-landlord groups began to join the struggle against Japanese aggression. The strikes and demonstrations of the students and workers of Shanghai began again. In December 1931 ᴦ. 30,000 students from various Chinese cities arrived in Nanjing to demand decisive action against the aggressor from the Kuomintang government. On December 17 they held a demonstration in Nanjing under the slogan of struggle against aggression. The police opened fire; 30 were killed and over 100 arrested.

At the end of 1931 ᴦ. partisan struggle began in Manchuria. Part partisan detachments led by the communists. Some of the Kuomintang generals—Ma Chzhanshan, Li Du, Ding Chao, and Su Ping-wen—also came out against the Japanese invaders and the Chinese puppet authorities. The Japanese were forced to concentrate large forces against the partisans, which in late 1932 - early 1933 ᴦ. drove the partisans into the mountainous and border areas and dispersed the largest rebel armies. Parts of General Su Ping-wen forced in December 1932 ᴦ.

retreat to the Soviet-Chinese border, were interned on the territory of the USSR.

To strengthen its position in the international arena, the Nanjing government went in December 1932 ᴦ. to restore diplomatic relations with the USSR. This action was in the interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples. At the same time, the Soviet Union was guided by the desire to use every opportunity to provide assistance to peoples subjected to imperialist aggression, as well as the natural desire to hinder the aggressive actions of the Japanese military, advancing towards the border of the USSR.

Kuomintang regime in 1931-1935. Japan's aggression prompted the Kuomintang factions to suspend internecine struggle for some time. In September - October 1931 ᴦ. negotiations began in Hong Kong to end the war between Nanjing and Guangzhou. November 12-22, 1931 ᴦ. in Nanking, the Fourth Congress of the Kuomintang was held with the participation of representatives of the Guangdong-Guangxi grouping, which elected a new composition of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Kuomintang, in which the numerical ratio of the Nanking and Guangdongguangsi groupings turned out to be almost equal. The congress adopted a provisional constitution and approved a new "Organic Law" in which the rights of the chairman of the government were significantly curtailed: according to the new law, he was not the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and could not hold other government posts.

According to the constitution of 1931 ᴦ., the highest authorities in the country in the intervals between congresses of the Kuomintang were the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and the Central Political Council (CPC) that existed under it. In Beijing and Guangzhou, regional branches of the CPC were created - the Northern and Southwestern political councils, which had the functions of local legislative bodies.

Formally, the constitution granted the Nanjing government enormous rights and was aimed at the maximum centralization of the country, but in reality China remained politically fragmented. As before, the sphere of control of the Guangdong and Guangxi militarists, who used the Southwestern Political Council in their own interests, was still practically autonomous. Until 1935 ᴦ. the Sichuan militarists did not recognize the control of Nanjing; Nanjing could not really control the vast areas of Northwest China and the local authorities and groups that existed here. Power in the localities was determined, as before, not by the provisions of the constitution, but by the number and armament of local militaristic troops.

At the beginning of January 1932 ᴦ. A new national government was formed in Nanjing. Wang Ching-wei became the chairman of the government, Chiang Kai-shek took the key post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Wang Jing's group

Wei, which included mainly the leaders and representatives of the former ʼʼreorganizationistsʼʼ, achieved seats in the civilian departments of the government apparatus, renouncing in return the demand for the democratization of the party-political system. Having paid for entry into the national government with the rejection of many program provisions, the "reorganizationists" began to lose political influence. They tried to compensate for this weakening of their positions by maintaining ties with the military-political groups in the South and South-West of the country, with the Guangdong and Guangxi militarists. In foreign policy, Wang Ching-wei's group advocated an orientation towards Japan.

In the North-West of China, also virtually independent of Nanjing, there were several other military-political groups. In the province of Shanxi, Yan Xi-shan, who had an army of 50-60 thousand people, had uncontrolled control; in the province of Shaanxi dominated moved here in 1933 ᴦ. from the northeast with 150,000 army "young marshal" Chzhap Xue-liang and local general Yang Hu-cheng - governor of Shaanxi province. In the provinces of Gansu, Qinghai and Ningxia, in areas inhabited by Chinese Muslims, the brothers Ma Bufai, Ma Hong-kui and Ma Bu-qing ruled, controlling local trade routes. In Xinjiang since 1933 ᴦ. only the military governor Shen Shih-ts'ai, who formally recognized the Nanking government, gained strength.

The most influential grouping in the Nanjing government was the grouping of party and military leaders associated with Chiang Kai-shek (called the Zhejiang group due to regional connections). Through their representatives in the Nanjing government, in the apparatus of the Kuomintang, in the army, in the governments of the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Fujian, Hubei, Henan, and from 1935 ᴦ. in the provinces of Sichuan, Hunan, and Guizhou, in the mid-1930s, the Chiang Kai-shek group controlled the government, the army, and the most economically and politically important regions of the country. At the same time, she herself was by no means homogeneous. There were four main groups that competed with each other.

One, the so-called group of political spiders, brought together extremely reactionary Kuomintang politicians, administrators, and military men. Its Japanese-educated leaders led the provincial governments of Hubei, Fujian, and Jiangxi, held important positions in the army and the foreign ministry, and advocated and promoted China's policy of rapprochement with Japan. The backbone of another group - Whampu (or Huangpu) - were graduates of the military school - the Huangpu Academy. Its support was the army of Chiang Kai-shek, the total number of which reached by 1935 ᴦ. 1 million people. The leaders of the group, Generals Chen Cheng and Hu Tsung-nan, who commanded the elite units of Chiang Kai-shek operating against the Red

army of China, under the pressure of nationalist and patriotic sentiments among the officers since 1933 ᴦ. began to advocate a rebuff to Japanese aggression. Chen Cheng at the beginning of 1933 ᴦ. offered Nanjing to transfer his army from Jiangsp to the north against Japan.

The third group within the Chiang Kai-shek group - ʼʼSiSiʼʼ (an abbreviation of the first letters of the English spelling of the names of its leaders - the brothers Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu) - arose in the bowels of the growing Kuomintang party apparatus. By the beginning of 1933 ᴦ., according to official data, there were over 1,270,000 party members and candidates in the Kuomintang, of which about 385,000 people were in civil organizations, about 100,000 were in foreign organizations, and about 785,000 were in the army. , which clearly demonstrated the role of the army in the Kuomintang regime as a whole.

The Chen Li-fu group - Chen Kuo-fu controlled the press, education. Chen Guo-fu was also one of the leaders of the political counterintelligence of the Kuomintang and headed the government of Jiangsu province. Chen Li-fu acted as an ideologist, as the author of an idealistic, nationalist doctrine - the ʼʼphilosophy of lifeʼʼ, which the Kuomintang tried to implant as the official philosophy of the party. This group opposed rapprochement with Japan from a nationalist standpoint. At the same time, it joined forces with the most reactionary forces in the ruling camp in its hatred of communism and the revolutionary movement in China.

The fourth group, Chiang Kai-shek's relatives, the bankers Sun Tzu-wen and Kung Hsiang-hsi, concentrated in their hands connections with various circles of the bourgeoisie and was directly in charge of projects for economic development and reforms. Chiang Kai-shek deftly balanced in the struggle to maintain his position between the various factions of the Kuomintang.

In 1932-1935 he. Chiang Kai-shek and groups associated with him carried out a number of measures in the field of administrative-political, military and ideological, aimed at strengthening the centralization of power. By the mid-1930s, 20 out of 22 provinces in China were headed by the military, and in most provinces of North, East and Central China, proteges and supporters of the Chiang Kai-shek group. In a number of important provinces, a new administrative division was introduced, the territories of the counties were subdivided into more fractional units - districts, the heads of which were appointed from the center. Within the provinces, special districts subordinate directly to the center were created. According to the decrees of 1932-1933, the chiefs of counties, special districts and regions had to undergo special training at various courses organized by the people of Chen Guo-fu and Chen Li-fu.

In the apparatus of the Kuomintang, supporters of Chiang Kai-shek went in 1932 ᴦ. to create your own organization with its own special

discipline - ʼʼFusinsheʼʼ (ʼʼRenaissance Societyʼʼ), better known as the ʼʼSociety of Blue Shirtsʼʼ. It was created as an organization of the fascist type, in the charter of which the subordination of the "leader" - Chiang Kai-shek was declared the highest principle. The Blueshirts, brought up in the spirit of militant nationalism, showed themselves in the pogroms of trade unions, progressive organizations, in the secret murders of democrats.

In February 1934 ᴦ. Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed the beginning of the ʼʼmovement for a new lifeʼʼ. He declared the main goals of the movement to be the revival and dissemination of the Confucian ideals ʼʼliʼʼ, ʼʼiʼʼ, ʼʼqianʼʼ and ʼʼchiʼʼ - ʼʼobservance of the ritualʼʼ, ʼʼjusticeʼʼ, ʼʼmodestyʼʼ and ʼʼshamenessʼʼ. The organizers of the ʼʼmovement for a new lifeʼʼ demagogically declared that ʼʼthe source of the revival of the state is not in the power of arms, but in the height of knowledge and virtue of the peopleʼʼ. The main virtue, with reference to Confucius, was declared to be the subordination of the younger to the elders, the inferior to the superior, the people to the authorities. In numerous speeches by Chiang Kai-shek, it was explained that the acceptance of the principles of movement means the rejection of any ʼʼactions contrary to the lawsʼʼ, ʼʼʼʼʼ, ʼʼʼʼʼ. The organizers of the ʼʼmovementʼʼ called for ʼʼpermeating the whole life of the people with the spirit and goals of productionʼʼ, ʼʼto achieve militarization of the life of the nationʼʼ.

Almost simultaneously with the beginning of the ʼʼmovement for a new lifeʼʼ to attract the landlord-Shenshi forces in May 1934 ᴦ. The cult of Confucius was officially restored.

The movement was introduced mainly by police-bureaucratic methods. The New Life Movement Promotion Society was organized in Nanking, and branches were set up in the provinces and counties. By 1936 ᴦ. there were about 1100 of them. At the beginning of 1935 ᴦ. labor detachments of the distribution service of the ʼʼmovement for a new lifeʼʼ began to be organized. Οʜᴎ included regular military units, local militia units, police officers, teachers, students, Kuomintang functionaries, and local administration officials. The total number of detachments, according to official data, by 1936 ᴦ. amounted to about 100 thousand people. Local police authorities issued fines and penalties for non-compliance with traffic requirements, with particular concern for the outward, ostentatious side. At the same time, the fundamental, socio-economic reasons were left aside, which closed the way for the people to a truly new life.

Despite the well-known successes in the cause of unification of the country in 1931 - 1935, the Nanjing regime was unable to establish effective and undivided control either in the country as a whole, or in the Kuomintang and its apparatus. The unification was most often either the result of military subordination, or the result of top combinations.

The economic situation of China and the economic policy of the Kuomintang in 1931-1935. In these years, to the former external and

internal factors that hindered the economic development of the country, new ones were added: the world economic crisis of 1929 - 1933. (especially affecting China in 1931 - 1933) and the aggression of Japanese imperialism.

In the most difficult situation was the village, agriculture. The weakening of the attention of the authorities in the conditions of incessant wars to irrigation construction, to maintaining at least the minimum order of dams and dams led to the fact that a severe flood on the Yangtze and Huaihe in the summer of 1931 ᴦ. turned into a national disaster. Even according to official reports, only in the provinces of the Yangtze basin, more than 55% of the total number of peasant households (about 40 million people) suffered from flooding. A sharp drop in export prices in 1931 - 1932. on the products of Chinese agriculture accelerated its degradation, led to a further intensification of the exploitation of the peasantry, an increase in rent and taxes. In many areas, peasants abandoned their farms in masses and rushed to the cities, replenishing the ranks of the unemployed and lumpen. The sowing and production of cereals and cotton has decreased, China's share in the export of these types of products has sharply decreased, and, on the contrary, the import of wheat, flour, rice and cotton from abroad has increased. The production of oilseeds and industrial crops was in a difficult state.
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The export of products and raw materials from China has increased, especially due to the increase in the export of rare metals.

In accordance with Chap Kai-shek's course, foreign government loans and the capital of private British and American companies were widely attracted to implement China's economic development projects. In the ongoing work of reorganizing and expanding the army, German advisers* were used.

The rise in import duties, combined with the depreciation in these years of silver, the main coin circulating in China, led to the fact that it became more profitable for foreign firms to open their branches in China and produce goods locally using cheap labor. As a result, in 1930-1931 gᴦ. in China, the number of foreign enterprises has increased. From the end of 1931 ᴦ., in the situation of the aggravation of the world economic crisis, the national industry was swept by a wave of mass bankruptcies. Foreign (especially Japanese) capital began to oust Chinese entrepreneurs even in those industries where Chinese medium and small enterprises predominated. Japan's aggression hit the economy hard - the rejection of the economically developed Northeast and the attack

1 In the Far East policy of Germany until 1936 ᴦ. the main stake was placed on the support of Chiang Kai-shek. Later, turning to the direct development of plans for a war in Europe, to the design of ʼʼ Berlin - Rome - Tokyoʼʼ, the Nazi elite reoriented itself towards a bloc with monarcho-fascist Japan.

to Shanghai, which paralyzed the economic life of this largest industrial and port center of the country for half a year.

In 1933-1935 he. in the industry of China there is a revival associated with the end of the world economic crisis and which began in 1933 ᴦ. rise in price of silver in the USA and in the world market. To a certain extent, this was also facilitated by the economic policy of the Kuomintang, which during these years continues its policy of raising tariff rates (up to prohibitive tariffs) and makes some changes to the policy of attracting foreign capital. Thus, according to a law passed in 1932, the Nanjing government established preferential tariffs for the import of machinery to foreign firms that agreed to take full responsibility for developing projects for the construction of certain enterprises and providing them with machinery and equipment. At the same time, the government expressed a desire to have a 51% stake in such ʼʼjoint venturesʼʼ, half of which (25%) it provided to private Chinese capital. A large place in the activities of the Naykin government was occupied by the construction of roads and the military industry. At the same time, the funds were obtained by further strengthening the tax burden, the entire burden of which fell on the workers, by internal loans. i .

The policy of Nanking led to a new strengthening of the positions of the imperialist powers in China. Despite the economic crisis in 1933, the share of foreign enterprises in iron smelting was 82.5%, in electricity production - 62.6%, in cotton fabrics - 61.4%, in tobacco products - 56.9%, in coal mining - 38%, nine%. In 1935 ᴦ. firms of imperialist states owned 46% of all spindles and 52% of looms in the textile industry 2 . According to incomplete estimates, the total amount of foreign investment in China's industry alone from 3.2 billion dollars in 1931 ᴦ. increased by 1936 ᴦ. to 4.4 billion dollars. The influx of Japanese capital increased especially rapidly. In 1936 ᴦ. Japanese capital investment in industry amounted to $2 billion (of which $1.4 billion was in the Northeast captured by Japanese imperialism).

The revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people in 1931-1935. under the slogans of the Soviets and the national revolutionary war against the Japanese invaders. Immediately after the capture of Manchuria by the Japanese, the CPC called on the Chinese people to take up armed struggle against

1 For more on the economic policy of the Kuomintang, see A. V. Meliksetov. Some Features of China's Capitalist Development During the Years of Kuomintang Domination (1927-1949). - ʼʼBig capital and monopolies of Asian countriesʼʼ. M., 1970, p.
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47-73.

- See ʼʼHistory of China's Economic Development 1840-1948 ᴦ.ʼʼ. M., 1958, p.
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143.

‣‣‣" Cm. Wei Tzu-chu. Capital Investments of the Imperialists in China (1902-1945). M., 1956, p.
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5.

aggressor. At the beginning of 1932 ᴦ. On the recommendation of the Comintern, the CCP put forward the slogan of a national revolutionary war. April 5, 1932 ᴦ. the leadership of the Soviet regions declared war on Japan. The Communists took an active part in the partisan struggle against the invaders in Manchuria. Under the new conditions, the Chinese Communist Party considered the Red Army of China as the main fighting force of the people to fight against the aggressors.

At the same time, in some program documents of the CCP in 1931 - 1932. and in the subsequent period - up to 1935 ᴦ. - contained a number of incorrect assessments and provisions. The national crisis that worsened during these years was regarded by the leadership of the CPC as the creation of a revolutionary crisis and a revolutionary situation in China. Such an assessment was also reflected in a number of documents of the Comintern, in particular, in the decisions of the XI (April 1931 ᴦ.), XII (September 1932 ᴦ.) and XIII (December 1933 ᴦ.) plenums of the Comintern Executive Committee. Based on this assessment, the CPC developed a course for the victory of the Soviet revolution in the entire country immediately at this stage of the revolution, starting with the establishment of Soviets in one or several provinces. After the beginning of the Japanese aggression, the leadership of the CPC put forward the demand for the "overthrow of the counter-revolutionary power of the Kuomintang, which is betraying and humiliating China", as the main slogan. Meanwhile, life showed that under the conditions of that time, the forces of the CPC and its Red Army alone were not enough to repulse the aggressors. The situation demanded the rallying of all sections of the Chinese people into a united front in the struggle against imperialism. With the correlation of class and political forces that existed in China in those years, the level of consciousness of the masses and the objective tasks, the course towards "complete Sovietization" of the country could not be implemented directly.

The position of the CPC in the early 1930s was determined not only by sectarian dogmatic assessments of the national bourgeoisie and intermediate forces. Up until the mid-1930s, most of the Kuomintang groupings took a sharply anti-communist position, waged an armed war against the CPC and the Soviet regions, showing no readiness to fight against the imperialist aggressors. During these years, the prerequisites for a united front were only taking shape: only by 1933 ᴦ. as a result of the enormous work in building the Red Army and the Soviet regions, they have grown into such strength, military-political bloc with which he could be of real interest.

After 1932 ᴦ. the number of red trade unions, party cells and communists in the cities is significantly reduced. In the cities and ʼʼʼʼʼ regions, the CCP during these years retained its positions mainly among the left-wing radical intelligentsia and students, exerting influence on these circles through the help and authority of L Xin has the League of Leftist Writers and the League of Leftist Journalists.

At the same time, the strengthening of the Soviet regions continued. November 7-24, 1931 ᴦ. near Ruijin (Jiangxi) the First All-China Congress of Representatives of the Soviet Regions of China was held. More than 600 delegates participated in the work of the congress, practically from all Soviet regions of China and the largest units of the Red Army. The congress adopted the draft constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the land law, the law on labor, on economic policy, the resolution on the Red Army, on the national question, the draft regulation on Soviet construction, approved the rules on benefits for the military personnel of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army and a number of other resolutions 4 .

The decisions and documents of the First Congress were largely programmatic in nature.
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The purpose of their publication was to show the working people of China the prospects for the Soviet revolution, to oppose the policy of the new government, which protects the interests of the working masses, to the Kuomintang's policy of social and national oppression.

In the draft constitution, political power in the territory of the Soviet regions was defined as the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. The right to elect to the Soviets and exercise political power was granted to workers, peasants, Red Army soldiers and other working people who had reached the age of 16, regardless of gender, religion and nationality; democratic freedoms were proclaimed, the right to education, freedom of religion, the right to self-determination of small nations, up to the separation and formation of independent states by them.

The 1st Congress approved the abolition of all old taxes and decided to introduce a single progressive tax. The families of Red Army soldiers, workers, urban and rural poor were completely exempted from the tax.

The Labor Law provided for an 8-hour working day for adult workers, 6-hour for teenagers (16-18 years old) and 4-hour for children (14-16 years old), paid weekly rest day and annual holidays, setting a minimum wage. A special section of the law determined the principles of activity and the rights of trade unions.

The land law determined the unified principles of agrarian policy in all Soviet regions: gratuitous confiscation of all land of landowners, militarists, world-eaters - tuhao, shenshi and monasteries. Former owners of the confiscated land were deprived of the right to receive any allotment. The lands of the kulaks were subject to confiscation and entered into redistribution. After the confiscation, the kulak could receive a labor allotment from the worst land. For farm laborers, coolies, working peasants, without distinction of sex, the right to an equal allotment was recognized. The law provides

1 See ʼʼSoviets in Chinaʼʼ. Collection of materials and documents. M., 1933, p.
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417-448.

trival also allotment of land according to the labor norm of the Red Army.

The Red Army was established as a volunteer army, the right to join which was granted only to workers, farm laborers, peasants (poor and middle peasants) and the urban poor. The resolution on the Red Army consolidated the system of political departments and political commissars.

The Congress elected the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the Presidium and the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee and formed the Provisional Central Government. Mao Tse-tung was elected chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the CSR and the Soviet government at the suggestion of the leadership of the CPC, and Zhang Guo-tao and Xiang Ying were elected his deputies.

The creation of stable Soviet regions made it possible to significantly change the social composition of the Red Army, to pour into its ranks a mass of representatives of the poorest sections of the peasantry, mainly young people aged 15 to 23 years. In the Central Soviet region, recruitment into the army was carried out practically on the principles of universal military service. Data on the composition of individual military formations indicate that rural paupers and people from the poorest strata of the working peasantry predominated among the rank and file soldiers and junior officers. There were practically no industrial workers on the territory of the Soviet regions. The other part of the replenishment was made up of former Kuomintang soldiers (defectors and prisoners). In the middle and lower command staff of the army in 1932-1934. a significant replenishment poured in from representatives of the social lower classes of the city and village; among the highest command and political staff, immigrants from the kulak-pomeranian strata, former officers of the Kuomintang troops, prevailed.

In 1931 - 1934. the number of organizations and party members in the Soviet regions grew rapidly. At the end of 1931 ᴦ. in the Central Soviet region, there were 15 thousand members of the party, by March 1932 ᴦ. - 22 thousand, by April 1932 ᴦ. - 31 thousand, in the summer of 1932 ᴦ. - 38 thousand, in October 1933 ᴦ. - 240 thousand. 1 Sharp jumps in the growth of the party are explained by campaigns to recruit new party members. The application of the method of individual reception recommended by the 6th CPC Congress in the conditions of the Soviet regions turned out to be very difficult because of the downtroddenness and passivity of the poorest strata of the countryside. Admission campaigns were usually held during periods of division of land and property of the village elite.

Grassroots organizations, especially in the villages, created or expanded in this way, often turned out to be fragile, suffered from fluidity of composition, and passivity. More durable and stable were the party cells and organizations in the Red

1 See ʼʼParty Organization in the Central Soviet Regionʼʼ. - ʼʼLenin weeklyʼʼ, 1933, No. 18, [b/paᴦ.] (in Chinese).

armies, in which in 1933 ᴦ. included over 50% of all fighters and commanders 1 .

The political power in the Soviet regions was represented by the military control regime. The system of elected bodies - the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies - with the further buildup of the masses, their acquisition of the experience of self-government, created the conditions for the transformation of these institutions into organs of self-government of the masses. During the short period of its existence, the Soviets have accumulated rich experience, contributed to the awakening to political life of social strata that had been vegetating in oppression and darkness for centuries. An important means of activating the masses, "driving belts" of the new government were various committees and commissions of councils - on accounting and control over the division of land, organizing assistance to the Red Army and the families of Red Army soldiers, developing a network of schools for children and adults, trade unions and organizations of the poor, women's and youth organizations. But in the specific situation of war, encirclement, in conditions of illiteracy, oppression and passivity of the masses, the basis of the political mechanism "was the army, paramilitary and paramilitary organizations such as the Red and Young Guards, as well as a network of security agencies.

The struggle of the Red Army against the 4th punitive campaign of the Kuomintang. Improving combat tactics. Late 1931 - early 1932 ᴦ. The leadership of the CCP and the Red Army put forward a plan to seize power in the provinces of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi, including the capture of their large urban centers. It was a plan to merge individual Soviet regions into a continuous Soviet territory. In the resolution of the CPC Central Committee of January 9, 1932 ᴦ. ʼʼAbout winning the victory of the Chinese revolution, initially in one or several provincesʼʼ it was said that ʼʼthe balance of class forces has already changed in favor of the workers and peasantsʼʼ, ʼʼthe development of the Red Army and partisan detachments created an environment of encirclement of such important medium and large cities as Nanchang, Jinan, Wuhanʼʼ ; it was argued that "in some cities the situation is already being created for holding general strikes". "The correct tactic in the past," the resolution said, "which was not to occupy the big cities, must now be changed." Practice has shown that such a statement of the problem was unrealistic. Soon, under the conditions of the 4th campaign launched by the Kuomintang, the CPC, with the support of the Comintern, practically abandoned the goal of winning victory in three provinces.

Central Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, established in 1931 ᴦ. in the Central Soviet region and headed from the end of 1931 ᴦ. Zhou

1 See ʼʼSome Data on the Social Composition of the Red Army in the Central Soviet Regionʼʼ. - Sat. ʼʼStruggle of the Red Armyʼʼ. Shanghai, 1933, [b/paᴦ.] (in Chinese).

En-lai, took a number of measures to strengthen the control of the CPC Central Committee over the Central Soviet Region and the Red Army. Personnel sent by the Central Committee were nominated for responsible Soviet and party work, as well as for political work in the army. These measures severely limited the power of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters in the regions and parts of southern Jiangxi and aroused their dissatisfaction with the policy of the Central Committee and the Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. This dissatisfaction was openly revealed in Mao Tse-tung's struggle against the directives of the Central Committee of the CCC on military questions during the enemy's 4th campaign.

The Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and most of the leaders of the Central Soviet Region considered it necessary to make the most of the absence of large enemy forces in Jiangxi to expand the territory and mass base, to quickly train command and political personnel familiar with both partisan tactics and combat tactics of modern armies. Mao Tse-tung advocated the tactics of retreat, opposed the expansion of the Red Army, proposed a plan for disaggregating its units and turning them into partisan detachments. This would mean an unjustified return to the initial stage of the Soviet movement, i.e., the self-liquidation of the main achievement of the CPC during the years of struggle under the slogan of the Soviets - large own armed forces, thanks to which the party became a significant factor in the political life of the country. To determine tactical

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE BEGINNING OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE FIGHT. THE DEFEAT OF THE SOVIET MOVEMENT (1931-1935) - the concept and types. Classification and features of the category "JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE BEGINNING OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE FIGHT. THE DEFEAT OF THE SOVIET MOVEMENT (1931-1935)" 2017, 2018.

The struggle of the Kuomintang (bourgeois party) with communist party China diverted the attention of Chinese diplomats and Chinese counterintelligence officers from the impending external danger. Rumors about the upcoming Japanese military operation in Manchuria began to spread in the Japanese government from the beginning of the summer of 1931. In September, the Kwantung Army began to make more frequent maneuvers and correspond by telegraph and couriers with the Japanese government. An alarming situation has developed along the entire SUMZhD (South Manchurian Railway).

On September 18, north of Mukden, an “explosion” thundered on one of the branches of the Southern Moscow Railway. The Japanese military command blamed all the blame for the "explosion" on ordinary Chinese infantrymen, whose corpses the next day the Japanese military dressed in sapper uniforms. The very fact of damage to the railway tracks aroused suspicions. No one, except for Japanese soldiers, examined the place of the "explosion".

At the time of the incident, the Japanese troops in Manchuria numbered 10,400 people; after the incident, a Japanese military brigade from Korea, numbering 3,500 people, arrived in Manchuria. The Japanese troops were distinguished by good officers and discipline. Despite the peaceful statements of the Japanese ambassador to the USSR K. Hirota, on September 18, 1931, Japanese troops attacked Manchuria (Northeast China) without declaring war.

The defeat by the Japanese troops of almost a hundred thousandth army of the Manchu ruler Zhang Xueliang and their rapid movement towards the Soviet border could not but cause a response in Moscow. Late in the evening of September 19, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.M. Karakhan summoned the Japanese ambassador to him, demanding information from him in connection with the events in Manchuria. By this time, Japanese troops had occupied Mukden, a major center of South Manchuria. The deputy commissar pointed out to the ambassador that Moscow attaches "the most serious importance" to the events in Manchuria. K. Hirota promised to request instructions from his government and inform L.M. Karakhan on events in Manchuria. Time passed, but there was no information from the Japanese side.

On October 28, 1931, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow made an official statement saying that it would be "undesirable" to send Soviet troops to the CER (Chinese Eastern Railway), as this would aggravate the situation on the railway, which would force Japan to take "necessary measures protection." The Japanese side accused the USSR of helping Chinese troops with supplies and weapons. L.M. Karakhan, in a statement made the next day, denied these allegations, stating that the USSR was pursuing a policy of non-intervention in China. The Deputy People's Commissar emphasized that the Soviet Union respects the international treaties concluded with the Chinese side.

But the Soviet Union often provided assistance to individual units of the Chinese army fighting against the Japanese invaders. Such steps by Moscow were explained by the possible prospect of the spread of hostilities to the Soviet Far East. Thus, the policy of non-intervention was violated, but not to the detriment of the interests of China and the USSR. The Japanese authorities more than once demanded that the Soviet government extradite Chinese soldiers. But Moscow, going into a diplomatic conflict with Tokyo, refused to comply with these demands. For example, the Chinese army, led by generals Su Bingwen, Li Te, and others, pressed by the Japanese, was given permission to cross the Soviet-Chinese border in the area of ​​​​st. Rebuff. More than 9,000 Chinese soldiers ended up on Soviet territory.

Chiang Kai-shek once admitted that there was a widespread belief in China that the Chinese could "oppose Japan only in alliance with Soviet Russia."

The Chinese government turned to the League of Nations for help, but to no avail. Japan did not directly annex Manchuria, but on March 1, 1932, it formed the puppet state of Manchukuo there. The Japanese government recognized the new "state" and assumed obligations to ensure its defense.

In Japan, some politicians believed that the Soviet Union was preparing to take the side of China as soon as it concentrated a strong military grouping in the Far East. In fact, this did not meet the national interests of the USSR. The Soviet government at first incorrectly (it is good for us, who live at the beginning of the 21st century to think about this), regarded the events in Manchuria as the result of a preliminary agreement between Japan and other powers. But it could very well be.

Literature

1. Foreign policy of the USSR. Volume III. 1925 - 1934 Collection of documents. M., 1945.
2. Galenovich Yu.M. Jiang Zhongzheng, or the unknown Chiang Kai-shek. M., 2002.
3. History of the Pacific War. Volume 1. M., 1957.
4. History of China. M., 1998.
5. Kapitsa M.S. Soviet-Chinese relations 1931 - 1945 M., 1954.
6. Crisis and war. International relations in the center and on the periphery of the world system in the 1930s and 1940s. M., 1998.
7. Mileksetov A.V. bureaucratic capital in China. M., 1972.
8. Silent wars. History of special services 1919 - 1945. Volume 2. Odessa, 2007.
9. Sokolov V.V. At the combat posts of the diplomatic front. Life and work of L.M. Karakhan. M., 1983.
10. Jacob Kovalio. Japan's Perception of Stalinist Foreign Policy in the Early 1930s. // Journal of Contemporary History. 1984. Vol 19, No. 2.

Each nation that took part in World War II has its own start date. The inhabitants of our country will remember June 22, 1941, the French - 1940, the Poles - September 1939. The Chinese do not have such a date. For the Celestial Empire, in fact, the entire beginning of the 20th century was a continuous string of wars that ended about sixty years ago with the founding of the PRC.

In the second half of the 19th century, China experienced a period of anarchy and disintegration. Qing Dynasty Emperors descendant Manchurian horsemen, who arrived from the Amur north-eastern lands and captured Beijing in 1644, completely lost the militant determination of their ancestors, by no means gaining the love of their subjects. The huge empire, which at the end of the 18th century provided almost a quarter of world production, half a century later, suffering defeats from the army of Western states, made more and more territorial and economic concessions. Even the proclamation of the republic during the Xinhai Revolution, which took place under calls for the restoration of former power and independence in 1911, did not essentially change anything. The opposing generals divided the country into independent principalities, constantly fighting with each other. Control over the outskirts of the country was finally lost, foreign powers increased their influence, and the president of the new republic had even less power than the earlier emperor.

In 1925, Jiang Zhongzheng, known as Chiang Kai-shek, came to power in the nationalist Kuomintang Party, which controlled the southwestern lands of China. Having carried out a series of active reforms that strengthened the army, he undertook a campaign to the north. Already at the end of 1926, the entire south of China fell under his control, and the following spring, Nanjing (where the capital was moved) and Shanghai. These victories made the Kuomintang the main political force that gave hope for the unification of the country.

Seeing the strengthening of China, the Japanese decided to step up their forces on the mainland. And there were reasons for this. The top of the Land of the Rising Sun was very unhappy with the results of the First World War. Like the Italian elite, Japan, after the overall victory, saw itself left out. Issues unresolved after a military confrontation, as a rule, lead to a new struggle. The empire sought to expand the living space, the population grew and new arable land was required, a raw material base for the economy. All this was in Manchuria, where the influence of Japan was very strong. At the end of 1931, an explosion occurred on the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway. Under the guise of a desire to protect their citizens, Japanese troops flooded Manchuria. In an attempt to avoid open conflict, Chiang Kai-shek brought the attention of the League of Nations to reclaim China's legal rights and denounce the actions of the Japanese. A lengthy trial completely suited the conquerors. During this time, individual parts of the Kuomintang army were destroyed, the capture of Manchuria was completed. On March 1, 1932, the founding of a new state, Manchukuo, was announced.

Seeing the impotence of the League of Nations, the Japanese military turns its attention to China. Taking advantage of the anti-Japanese demonstrations in Shanghai, their aircraft bombed Chinese positions, and troops landed in the city. After two weeks of street fighting, the Japanese captured the northern part of Shanghai, but the diplomatic efforts of Chiang Kai-shek are bearing fruit - the envoys from the United States, England and France manage to stop the bloodshed and start negotiations. After some time, the League of Nations issues a verdict - the Japanese should get out of Shanghai.

However, this was only the beginning. At the end of 1932, Japanese troops added the province of Rehe to Manchukuo, coming close to Beijing. In Europe, meanwhile, there was an economic crisis, growing tension between countries. The West paid less and less attention to the protection of China's sovereignty, which suited Japan, opening up ample opportunities for further action.

Back in 1927, in the Land of the Rising Sun, Prime Minister Tanaka laid out a memorandum "Kodo" ("The Way of the Emperor") to the emperor. His main idea was that Japan could and should achieve world domination. To do this, she will need to capture Manchuria, China, destroy the USSR and the USA and form a "Prosperity Sphere of Great East Asia." Only at the end of 1936, the supporters of this doctrine finally won - Japan, Italy and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. The main opponent of the Japanese in the coming battle was the Soviet Union. Realizing that for this they needed a strong ground base, the Japanese staged provocation after provocation on the border with China in order to find a reason to attack. The last straw was the incident on July 7, 1937, near the Marco Polo Bridge, which lies southwest of Beijing. Conducting night exercises, the Japanese soldiers began firing at the Chinese fortifications. Return fire killed one person, which gave the aggressors the right to demand the withdrawal of Chiang Kai-shek's troops from the entire region. The Chinese did not answer them, and on July 20 the Japanese launched a large-scale offensive, capturing Tianjin and Beijing by the end of the month.

Shortly thereafter, the Japanese launched attacks on Shanghai and Nanjing, which were the economic and political capitals of the Republic of China. To win the support of the Western community, Chiang Kai-shek decided to show the whole world the ability of the Chinese to fight. All the best divisions under his personal leadership attacked the Japanese landing force that landed in Shanghai at the end of the summer of 1937. He appealed to the inhabitants of Nanjing not to leave the city. About a million people took part in the Shanghai massacre. Three months of continuous fighting brought countless casualties. The Chinese lost more than half of their personnel. And on December 13, Japanese soldiers, without meeting resistance, occupied Nanjing, in which only unarmed civilians remained. In the next six weeks, a massacre of unprecedented scale was going on in the city, a real nightmare that entered as the "Nanjing Massacre".

The invaders began by stabbing twenty thousand men of military age outside the city with bayonets so that they would never again be able to fight against them. Then the Japanese moved on to the extermination of the elderly, women and children. The killings took place with particular brutality. Samurai tore out the eyes and hearts of living people, cut off their heads, turned the insides out. Firearms were not used. People were stabbed with bayonets, buried alive, burned. Before the murder of adult women, girls, old women were raped. At the same time, sons were forced to rape mothers, and fathers - daughters. Residents of the city were used as "stuffed animals" for training with a bayonet, poisoned by dogs. Thousands of corpses floated down the Yangtze, preventing ships from landing on the banks of the river. The Japanese had to use the floating dead as pontoons to get on the ships.

At the end of 1937, a Japanese newspaper enthusiastically reported on a dispute between two officers who decided to find out which of them would be the first to slaughter more than a hundred people with a sword in the allotted time. A certain Mukai won, killing 106 Chinese against 105.

In 2007, documents came to light from an international charity operating in Nanjing at the time. According to them, as well as records confiscated from the Japanese, it can be concluded that over 200,000 civilians were killed by soldiers in twenty-eight massacres. About 150,000 more were killed individually. The maximum number of all victims reaches 500,000 people.

Many historians agree that the Japanese killed more civilians than the Germans. A person who was captured by the Nazis died with a 4% probability (excluding the inhabitants of our country), among the Japanese this value reached 30%. Chinese prisoners of war did not have a single chance to survive at all, since in 1937 Emperor Hirohito abolished international law in relation to them. After Japan surrendered, only fifty-six prisoners of war from China saw freedom! Rumor has it that on a number of occasions the Japanese soldiers, who were poorly supplied with provisions, ate the prisoners.

The Europeans who remained in Nanjing, mostly missionaries and businessmen, tried to save the local population. They organized an international committee headed by Jon Rabe. The committee fenced off the area, dubbed the "Nanjing Security Zone". Here, they managed to save about 200,000 Chinese citizens. Rabe, a former member of the NSDAP, managed to achieve the immunity status of the “Safety Zone” from the interim government.

With the seal of the International Committee, Rabe failed to impress the Japanese military who captured the city, but they were afraid of the swastika. Rabe wrote: “I had no weapons, except for a party badge and a bandage on my arm. Japanese soldiers constantly invaded my house, but when they saw the swastika, they immediately went away.”

The Japanese authorities still do not want to officially recognize the very fact of the massacre, finding the data on the victims too high. They never apologized for the war crimes committed in China. According to their data, "only" 20,000 people died in Nanjing in the winter of 1937-1938. They deny calling the incident a "massacre", saying that it is Chinese propaganda aimed at humiliating and insulting Japan. Their school history books simply say that "many people died" in Nanjing. Photos of massacres in the city, which are indisputable evidence of the nightmares of those days, according to the Japanese authorities, are fakes. And this is despite the fact that most of the photographs were found in the archives of Japanese soldiers, taken by them as memorable souvenirs.

In 1985, a memorial to those killed in the Nanjing Massacre was built in Nanjing. In 1995 it was expanded. The memorial is located in the place of mass grave of people. The mass grave is covered with pebbles. A huge number of small stones symbolizes the countless number of dead. Expressive statues are also placed on the territory of the museum. And here you can also see documents, photographs and stories of survivors about the atrocities committed by the Japanese. One hall shows hidden behind glass, a terrible section of a mass grave.

Chinese women forced into prostitution or raped have petitioned the Tokyo authorities for compensation. The Japanese court replied that the corresponding verdict could not be issued due to the limitation period for the commission of crimes.

Chinese-American journalist Iris Chan has published three books about the extermination of the Chinese in Nanjing. The first work was ten weeks among America's bestsellers. Influenced by the book, the US Congress held a series of special hearings, adopting in 1997 a resolution demanding a formal apology from the Japanese government for war crimes committed. Of course, Chan's book was banned from publication in Japan. In the course of subsequent work, Iris lost sleep, began to experience bouts of depression. The fourth book, about the Japanese takeover of the Philippines and the death march in Bataan, robbed her of her last spiritual strength. Having experienced a nervous breakdown in 2004, Chan landed in a psychiatric clinic, where she was diagnosed with manic-depressive psychosis. The talented journalist constantly took risperidone. On November 9, 2004, she was found shooting herself with a revolver in her car.

In the spring of 1938, the Japanese finally suffered their first defeat at Tai'erzhuang. They failed to take the city and lost over 20,000 men. Stepping back, they turned their attention to Wuhan, where Chiang Kai-shek's government was located. The Japanese generals believed that the capture of the city would lead to the surrender of the Kuomintang. However, after the fall of Wuhan on October 27, 1938, the capital was moved to Chongqing, and the stubborn Kaishi still refused to surrender. To break the will of the fighting Chinese, the Japanese began bombarding civilian targets in all unoccupied major cities. Millions of people were killed, injured or left homeless.

In 1939, both in Asia and in Europe, a premonition of a world war arose. Realizing this, Chiang Kai-shek decided to buy time in order to hold out until the hour when Japan clashes with the United States, which looked very likely. Future events showed that such a strategy was correct, but in those days the situation looked like a stalemate. Major Kuomintang offensives in Guangxi and Changsha ended without success. It was clear that there would be only one outcome: either Japan would intervene in the war in the Pacific, or the Kuomintang would lose control of the remnants of China.

Back in 1937, an agitation campaign began to create good feelings for Japan among the Chinese population. The goal was to strike at the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. At the very beginning, the inhabitants of some places really met the Japanese as brothers. But the attitude towards them very quickly changed directly to the opposite, since Japanese propaganda, like German propaganda, convinced its soldiers too much of their divine origin, which gives superiority over other peoples. The Japanese did not hide their arrogant attitude, looking at foreigners as second-class people, like cattle. This, as well as heavy labor service, quickly turned the inhabitants of the occupied territories against the "liberators". Soon the Japanese were barely in control of the occupied land. There were not enough garrisons, only cities, key centers and important communications could be controlled. The partisans were in full swing in the countryside.

In the spring of 1940 in Nanjing, Wang Jingwei, a former prominent figure in the Kuomintang, removed from his post by Chiang Kai-shek, organized the "Central National Government of the Republic of China" under the slogan: "Peace, anti-communism, nation building." However, his government failed to win much prestige from the Chinese. He was deposed on August 10, 1945.

The invaders responded to the actions of the partisan detachments by sweeping the territories. In the summer of 1940, General Yasuji Okamura, who led the North Chinese Army, came up with a truly terrible strategy called "Sanko sakusen". In translation, it meant "Three all": burn everything, kill everything, rob everything. Five provinces - Shandong, Shanxi, Hebei, Chahar and Shaanxi were divided into sections: "peaceful", "semi-peaceful" and "non-peaceful". Okamura's troops burned entire villages, confiscated grain and drove peasants to work digging trenches and building miles of roads, walls, and towers. The main goal was to eliminate enemies pretending to be locals, as well as all the men from fifteen to sixty who were behaving suspiciously. Even Japanese researchers believe that about ten million Chinese were enslaved in this way by their army. In 1996, the scholar Mitsuoshi Himeta made a statement that the Sanko sakusen policy led to the death of two and a half million people.

The Japanese also did not hesitate to use chemical and biological weapons. Fleas spreading the bubonic plague were thrown onto the cities. This caused a number of outbreaks of the epidemic. Special units of the Japanese army (the most famous of them - Division 731) spent their time putting terrible experiments on prisoners of war and civilians. Exploring people, the unfortunate were subjected to frostbite, sequential amputation of limbs, infection with plague and smallpox. Similarly, Unit 731 killed over three thousand people. The brutality of the Japanese varied in different places. At the front or during operations "Sanko sakusen" soldiers, as a rule, destroyed everything alive on the way. At the same time, foreigners in Shanghai lived freely. Camps for American, Dutch and British citizens organized after 1941 also had a relatively "soft" regime.

By the middle of 1940, it became quite clear that the undeclared war in China would drag on for a long time. Meanwhile, the Fuhrer in Europe was subordinating one country after another, and the Japanese elite were drawn to join the redivision of the world. The only difficulty they had was the direction of the strike - south or north? From 1938 to 1939, the battles along the Khalkhin Gol River and Khasan Lake showed the Japanese that there would be no easy victory over the Soviet Union. On April 13, 1941, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed. And even without paying attention to the insistent demands of the German command after June 22, its conditions were never violated. By this time, the Japanese army firmly decided to fight the United States, freeing the Asian colonies of European states. An important reason was the ban on the sale of fuel and steel to the Japanese, proposed by the United States to its allies. For a country that does not have its own resources, this was a very tangible blow.

On December 7-8, 1941, Japanese aircraft bombed Pearl Harbor, the base of the American Navy on the island of Oahu. The very next day, Japanese planes attacked British Hong Kong. On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek declared war on Italy and Germany. After four years of struggle, the Chinese have a chance to win.

China's assistance to European allies came in very handy. They fettered the maximum number of Japanese armed forces, and also helped on neighboring fronts. After the Kuomintang sent two divisions to help the British in Burma, President Roosevelt directly announced that after the end of the war, the situation in the world should be controlled by four countries - the USA, the USSR, Great Britain and China. In practice, of course, the Americans ignored their eastern ally, and their leadership tried to command Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters. Nevertheless, the mere fact that, after a hundred years of national humiliation, China was named one of the four major powers of the planet was very significant.

The Chinese did their job. In the summer of 1943, they held Chongqing and launched a counteroffensive. But, of course, the allies brought them the final victory. On August 6 and 9, 1945, nuclear bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In April, the Soviet Union broke the neutrality pact with Japan and entered Manchuria in August. Nuclear bombings and the record-breaking advance of the Soviet troops made it clear to Emperor Hirohito that it was useless to continue to resist. On August 15, he announced the surrender on the radio. I must say that few people expected such a development of events. The Americans generally assumed that hostilities would last until 1947.

On September 2, on board the USS Missouri, representatives of Japan and the allied countries signed an act of unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces. World War II is over.

After the surrender of Japan, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which met in Tokyo, sentenced 920 people to execution, 475 people to life imprisonment, and about 3,000 Japanese received various prison terms. Emperor Hirohito, who personally signed most of the criminal orders, was removed from the accused at the request of the commander of the occupying forces, General MacArthur. Also, many criminals, especially senior officers, did not appear before the tribunal due to suicide after the emperor ordered to lay down their arms.

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