Belarusian operation 1944
	Belarus, Lithuania, eastern regions of Poland.
	Victory of the Red Army. Liberation of Belarus and Lithuania. Entry of Soviet troops into Poland.
Opponents
PKNO, 1st Army of the Polish Army	BCR, Belarusian Regional Defense
Poland, Home Army
Commanders
Ivan Bagramyan (1st Baltic Front)
Ivan Chernyakhovsky (3rd Belorussian Front)
Georgy Zakharov (2nd Belorussian Front)	Georg Reinhardt (3rd Panzer Army)
Konstantin Rokossovsky (1st Belorussian Front)	Kurt von Tippelskirch (4th Field Army)
Georgy Zhukov (coordinator of the 1st and 2nd Belarusian Fronts)
Alexander Vasilevsky (coordinator of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts)
Alexey Antonov (development of the operation plan)
	Walter Weiss (2nd Field Army)
Strengths of the parties
(at the start of the operation) 2.4 million people, 36 thousand guns and mortars, St. 5 thousand tanks, St. 5 thousand aircraft	(according to Soviet data) 1.2 million people, 9,500 guns and mortars, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,350 aircraft
178,507 killed/missing, 587,308 wounded, 2,957 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,447 guns and mortars, 822 combat aircraft	The exact losses are unknown. Soviet data: 381 thousand dead and missing, 150 thousand wounded, 158,480 prisoners David Glanz: lower estimate - 450 thousand total losses. Alexey Isaev: more than 500 thousand people Steven Zaloga: 300-350 thousand people, including 150 thousand prisoners (until the 10th of July)

Belarusian offensive operation, "Bagration"- a large-scale offensive operation of the Great Patriotic War, carried out from June 23 to August 29, 1944. It was named in honor of the Russian commander of the Patriotic War of 1812 P.I. Bagration. One of the largest military operations in the history of mankind.

Significance of the operation

During this extensive offensive, the territory of Belarus, eastern Poland and part of the Baltic states was liberated and the German Army Group Center was almost completely defeated. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, partly due to the fact that A. Hitler prohibited any retreat. Germany was no longer able to make up for these losses.

Prerequisites for the operation

By June 1944, the front line in the east approached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin, forming a huge protrusion - a wedge facing deep into the USSR, the so-called “Belarusian balcony”. If in Ukraine the Red Army managed to achieve a series of impressive successes (almost the entire territory of the republic was liberated, the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses in the chain of “cauldrons”), then when trying to break through in the direction of Minsk in 1943-1944, the successes, on the contrary, were quite modest.

At the same time, by the end of the spring of 1944, the offensive in the south slowed down, and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to change the direction of efforts. As K.K. Rokossovsky noted,

Strengths of the parties

Data on the strengths of the parties differ in different sources. According to the publication “Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War,” 1 million 200 thousand people took part in the operation on the Soviet side (excluding rear units). On the German side - as part of Army Group Center - 850-900 thousand people (including approximately 400 thousand in the rear units). In addition, at the second stage, the right wing of Army Group North and the left wing of Army Group Northern Ukraine took part in the battle.

The four fronts of the Red Army were opposed by four armies of the Wehrmacht:

• The 2nd Army of Army Group Center, which held the area of ​​Pinsk and Pripyat, advanced 300 km east of the front line;
• 9th Army of Army Group Center, which defended the area on both sides of the Berezina southeast of Bobruisk;
• The 4th Army and the 3rd Tank Army of Army Group Center, which occupied the area between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers, as well as a bridgehead from Bykhov to the area northeast of Orsha. In addition, units of the 3rd Tank Army occupied the Vitebsk area.

Composition of the parties

The section shows the distribution of forces of the German and Soviet troops as of June 22, 1944 (the corps of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army army are listed in the order of their deployment from north to south, reserves are indicated separately first).

Germany

Army Group Center (Field Marshal Ernst Busch, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Krebs)

• 6th Air Fleet (Colonel General von Greim)

* 3rd Panzer Army (Colonel General Reinhardt) consisting of:

• • 95th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Michaelis);
  • 201st Security Division (Lieutenant General Jacobi);
  • Kampfgruppe von Gottberg (SS Brigadeführer von Gottberg);

* 9th Army Corps (Artillery General Wuthmann);

• • 252nd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Meltzer);
  • Corps Group "D" (Lieutenant General Pamberg);
  • 245th Assault Gun Brigade (Hauptmann Knüpling);

* 53rd Army Corps (Infantry General Gollwitzer);

• • 246th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Müller-Büllow);
  • 206th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Heatter);
  • 4th Luftwaffe Air Field Division (Lieutenant General Pistorius);
  • 6th Luftwaffe Air Field Division (Lieutenant General Peschel);

* 6th Army Corps (Artillery General Pfeiffer);

• • 197th Infantry Division (Major General Hane);
  • 299th Infantry Division (Major General Junck);
  • 14th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Floerke);
  • 256th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Wüstenhagen);
  • 667 Assault Gun Brigade (Hauptmann Ullmann);
  • 281st Assault Gun Brigade (Hauptmann Fenkert);

* 4th Army (Infantry General Tippelskirch) consisting of:

• • tank-grenadier division "Feldherrnhalle" (Major General von Steinkeller);

* 27th Army Corps (Infantry General Voelkers);

• • 78th Assault Division (Lieutenant General Trout);
  • 25th Panzer-Grenadier Division (Lieutenant General Schürmann;
  • 260th Infantry Division (Major General Klammt);
  • 501st Heavy Tank Battalion (Major von Legat);

* 39th Panzer Corps (General of Artillery Martinek);

• • 110th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General von Kurowski);
  • 337th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Schünemann);
  • 12th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Bamler);
  • 31st Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Ochsner);
  • 185th Assault Gun Brigade (Major Glossner);

* 12th Army Corps (Lieutenant General Müller);

• • 18th Panzergrenadier Division (Lieutenant General Zutavern);
  • 267th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Drescher);
  • 57th Infantry Division (Major General Trowitz);

* 9th Army (Infantry General Jordan) consisting of:

• • 20th Panzer Division (Lieutenant General von Kessel);
  • 707th Infantry Division (Major General Hittner);

* 35th Army Corps (Lieutenant General von Lützow);

• • 134th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Philip);
  • 296th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Kulmer);
  • 6th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Heine);
  • 383rd Infantry Division (Major General Geer);
  • 45th Infantry Division (Major General Engel);

* 41st Army Corps (Lieutenant General Hoffmeister);

• • 36th Infantry Division (Major General Conradi);
  • 35th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Richert);
  • 129th Infantry Division (Major General von Larisch);

* 55th Army Corps (Infantry General Herrlein);

• • 292nd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Jon);
  • 102nd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General von Bercken);

* 2nd Army (Colonel General Weiss) consisting of:

• • 4th Cavalry Brigade (Major General Holste);

* 8th Army Corps (Infantry General Hon);

• • 211th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Eckard);
  • 5th Jaeger Division (Lieutenant General Thumm);

* 23rd Army Corps (General of Engineering Troops Tiemann);

• • 203rd Security Division (Lieutenant General Pilz);
  • 17th Panzer-Grenadier Brigade (Colonel Kerner);
  • 7th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General von Rappard);

* 20th Army Corps (Artillery General von Roman);

• • Corps Group "E" (Lieutenant General Feltsmann);
  • 3rd Cavalry Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Boeselager);

In addition, Hungarian units were subordinate to the 2nd Army: 5, 12 and 23 reserve and 1 cavalry division. The 2nd Army took part only in the second phase of the Belarusian operation.

* 1st Baltic Front (Army General Bagramyan) consisting of:

* 4th Shock Army (Lieutenant General Malyshev);

• • 83rd Rifle Corps (Major General Soldatov);
  • reinforcement parts;

* 6th Guards Army (Lieutenant General Chistyakov);

• • 2nd Guards Rifle Corps (hereinafter referred to as Guards Rifle Corps)(Lieutenant General Ksenofontov);
  • 22nd Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Ruchkin);
  • 23rd Guards Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Ermakov);
  • 103rd Rifle Corps (Major General Fedyunkin);
  • 8th Howitzer Artillery Division;
  • 21st Artillery Breakthrough Division;

* 43rd Army (Lieutenant General Beloborodov);

• • 1st Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Vasiliev);
  • 60th Rifle Corps (Major General Lyukhtikov);
  • 92nd Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Ibyansky);
  • 1st Tank Corps (Lieutenant General Butkov);

* 3rd Air Army (Lieutenant General Papivin);

* 3rd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Chernyakhovsky) consisting of:

• • 5th Artillery Corps;

* 11th Guards Army (Lieutenant General Galitsky);

• • 8th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Zavodovsky);
  • 16th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Vorobiev);
  • 36th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Shafranov);
  • 2nd Tank Corps (Major General Burdeyny);
  • 7th Guards division of guards mortars (rocket artillery);

* 5th Army (Lieutenant General Krylov);

• • 45th Rifle Corps (Major General Gorokhov);
  • 65th Rifle Corps (Major General Perekrestov);
  • 72nd Rifle Corps (Major General Kazartsev);
  • 3rd Guards breakthrough artillery division;

* 31st Army (Lieutenant General Glagolev);

• • 36th Rifle Corps (Major General Oleshev);
  • 71st Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Koshevoy);
  • 113th Rifle Corps (Major General Provalov);

* 39th Army (Lieutenant General Lyudnikov);

• • 5th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Bezugly);
  • 84th Rifle Corps (Major General Prokofiev);

* 5th Guards Tank Army (Marshal Rotmistrov);

• • 3rd Guards tank corps (Major General Bobchenko);
  • 29th Tank Corps (Major General Fominykh);

* Cavalry mechanized group (Lieutenant General Oslikovsky);

• • 3rd Guards cavalry corps (Lieutenant General Oslikovsky);
  • 3rd Guards mechanized corps (Lieutenant General Obukhov);

* 1st Air Army (Lieutenant General Gromov);

* 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Zakharov) consisting of:

* 33rd Army (Lieutenant General Kryuchenkin);

• • 70th, 157th, 344th rifle divisions;

* 49th Army (Lieutenant General Grishin);

• • 62nd Rifle Corps (Major General Naumov);
  • 69th Rifles Corps (Major General Multan);
  • 76th Rifle Corps (Major General Glukhov);
  • 81st Rifle Corps (Major General Panyukov);

* 50th Army (Lieutenant General Boldin);

• • 19th Rifle Corps (Major General Samarsky);
  • 38th Rifle Corps (Major General Tereshkov);
  • 121st Rifle Corps (Major General Smirnov);

* 4th Air Army (Colonel General Vershinin);

* 1st Belorussian Front (Army General Rokossovsky) consisting of:

• • 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General Kryukov);
  • 4th Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General Pliev);
  • 7th Guards Cavalry Corps (Major General Konstantinov);
  • Dnieper River Flotilla (1st Rank Captain Grigoriev;

* 3rd Army (Lieutenant General Gorbatov);

• • 35th Rifle Corps (Major General Zholudev);
  • 40th Rifle Corps (Major General Kuznetsov);
  • 41st Rifle Corps (Major General Urbanovich);
  • 80th Rifle Corps (Major General Ragulya);
  • 9th Tank Corps (Major General Bakharov);
  • 5th Guards Mortar Division;

* 28th Army (Lieutenant General Luchinsky);

• • 3rd Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Perkhorovich);
  • 20th Rifle Corps (Major General Shvarev);
  • 128th Rifle Corps (Major General Batitsky);
  • 46th Rifle Corps (Major General Erastov);
  • 5th Artillery Division Breakthrough;
  • 12th Artillery Breakthrough Division;

* 48th Army (Lieutenant General Romanenko);

• • 29th Rifle Corps (Major General Andreev);
  • 42nd Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Kolganov);
  • 53rd Rifle Corps (Major General Gartsev);
  • 22nd Artillery Breakthrough Division;

* 61st Army (Lieutenant General Belov);

• • 9th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Popov);
  • 89th Rifle Corps (Major General Yanovsky);

* 65th Army (Lieutenant General Batov);

• • 18th Rifle Corps (Major General Ivanov);
  • 105th Rifle Corps (Major General Alekseev);
  • 1st Guards Tank Corps (Major General Panov);
  • 1st Mechanized Corps (Lieutenant General Krivoshein);
  • 26th Artillery Division;

* 6th Air Army (Lieutenant General Polynin);

* 16th Air Army (Colonel General Rudenko);

In addition, the 1st Belorussian Front included the 8th Guards, 47th, 70th, 1st Polish and 2nd Tank Armies, which took part only in the second phase of the Belarusian operation.

Preparing the operation

Red Army

Initially, the Soviet command imagined Operation Bagration as a repetition of the Battle of Kursk, something like a new “Kutuzov” or “Rumyantsev”, with a huge consumption of ammunition with a subsequent relatively modest advance of 150-200 km. Since operations of this type - without a breakthrough into operational depth, with long, stubborn battles in the tactical defense zone of attrition - required large quantities of ammunition and relatively little fuel for mechanized units and modest capacity for restoring railways, the actual development of the operation turned out to be for the Soviet command of the unexpected.

The operational plan for the Belarusian operation began to be developed by the General Staff in April 1944. The general plan was to crush the flanks of the German Army Group Center, encircle its main forces east of Minsk and completely liberate Belarus. This was an extremely ambitious and large-scale plan; the instant destruction of an entire army group was planned very rarely during the war.

Significant personnel changes were made. General V.D. Sokolovsky failed to prove himself in the battles of the winter of 1943-1944 (Orsha offensive operation, Vitebsk offensive operation) and was removed from command of the Western Front. The front itself was divided in two: the 2nd Belorussian Front (to the south) was headed by G. F. Zakharov, who showed himself well in the battles in the Crimea, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, who had previously commanded the army in Ukraine, was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front (to the north).

Direct preparations for the operation began at the end of May. Specific plans were received by the fronts on May 31 in private directives from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

According to one version, according to the original plan, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to deliver one powerful blow from the south, in the Bobruisk direction, but K.K. Rokossovsky, having studied the area, stated at a meeting at Headquarters on May 22 that more than one should be delivered, but two main blows. He motivated his statement by the fact that in heavily swamped Polesie, with one breakthrough, the armies would bump into the back of each other’s heads, clog the roads in the near rear, and as a result, the front troops could only be used in parts. According to K.K. Rokossovsky, one blow should have been delivered from Rogachev to Osipovichi, another from Ozarichi to Slutsk, while encircling Bobruisk, which remained between these two groups. K.K. Rokossovsky's proposal caused heated debate at Headquarters; members of Headquarters insisted on delivering one strike from the Rogachev area, in order to avoid dispersal of forces. The dispute was interrupted by I.V. Stalin, who stated that the perseverance of the front commander spoke of the thoughtfulness of the operation. Thus, K.K. Rokossovsky was allowed to act in accordance with his own idea.

However, G.K. Zhukov argued that this version is not true:

A thorough reconnaissance of enemy forces and positions was organized. Information was collected in many directions. In particular, reconnaissance teams of the 1st Belorussian Front captured about 80 “tongues”. Aerial reconnaissance of the 1st Baltic Front spotted 1,100 different firing points, 300 artillery batteries, 6,000 dugouts, etc. Active acoustic and human intelligence reconnaissance was also carried out, studying enemy positions by artillery observers, etc. Through a combination of various reconnaissance methods and its intensity, the enemy grouping was revealed quite completely.

The headquarters tried to achieve maximum surprise. All orders to unit commanders were given personally by army commanders; telephone conversations concerning preparations for the offensive, even in encrypted form, were prohibited. The fronts preparing for the operation went into radio silence. Active excavation work was carried out at the forward positions to simulate preparations for defense. The minefields were not completely removed so as not to alarm the enemy; the sappers limited themselves to unscrewing the fuses from the mines. The concentration of troops and regroupings were carried out mainly at night. Specially designated General Staff officers on airplanes patrolled the area to monitor compliance with camouflage measures.

The troops conducted intensive training to practice the interaction of infantry with artillery and tanks, assault operations, crossing water obstacles, etc. Units were alternately withdrawn from the front line to the rear for these trainings. The training of tactical techniques was carried out in conditions as close as possible to combat conditions and with live shooting.

Before the operation, commanders at all levels down to the companies conducted reconnaissance, assigning tasks to their subordinates on the spot. Artillery spotters and air force officers were introduced into the tank units for better cooperation.

Thus, the preparations for Operation Bagration were carried out extremely carefully, while the enemy was left in the dark about the upcoming offensive.

Wehrmacht

If the command of the Red Army was well aware of the German grouping in the area of ​​​​the future offensive, then the command of Army Group Center and the General Staff of the Ground Forces of the Third Reich had a completely wrong idea about the forces and plans of the Soviet troops. Hitler and the High Command believed that a major offensive should still be expected in Ukraine. It was assumed that from the area south of Kovel the Red Army would strike towards the Baltic Sea, cutting off army groups “Center” and “North”. Significant forces were allocated to counter the phantom threat. Thus, in the Northern Ukraine Army Group there were seven tank, two tank-grenadier divisions, as well as four battalions of Tiger heavy tanks. Army Group Center had one tank, two tank-grenadier divisions and only one Tiger battalion. In April, the command of Army Group Center presented its leadership with a plan to reduce the front line and withdraw the army group to better positions beyond the Berezina. This plan was rejected. Army Group Center defended in its previous positions. Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk were declared “fortresses” and fortified with the expectation of all-round defense. Forced labor of the local population was widely used for construction work. In particular, in the zone of the 3rd Tank Army, 15-20 thousand residents were sent to such work.

Kurt Tippelskirch (then commander of the 4th Field Army) describes the mood in the German leadership as follows:

There was no data yet that would make it possible to predict the direction or directions of the Russian summer offensive that was undoubtedly being prepared. Since aviation and radio reconnaissance usually accurately noted large transfers of Russian forces, one could think that an offensive from them was not yet immediately threatened. Until now, only in one case were intensive railway transports lasting for several weeks behind enemy lines in the direction of the Lutsk, Kovel, Sarny region, which, however, were not followed by a concentration of newly arrived forces near the front. At times we had to rely only on guesswork. The General Staff of the Ground Forces considered the possibility of repeating the attack on Kovel, believing that the enemy would concentrate its main efforts north of the Carpathians on the front of the Northern Ukraine Army Group, with the goal of pushing the latter back to the Carpathians. Army groups "Center" and "North" were predicted to have a "quiet summer." In addition, Hitler was particularly concerned about the oil region of Ploesti. Regarding the fact that the enemy's first attack would follow north or south of the Carpathians - most likely to the north - the opinion was unanimous.

The positions of the troops defending in Army Group Center were seriously reinforced with field fortifications, equipped with numerous interchangeable positions for machine guns and mortars, bunkers and dugouts. Since the front in Belarus stood still for a long time, the Germans managed to create a developed defense system.

From the point of view of the General Staff of the Third Reich, preparations against Army Group Center were intended only to “mislead the German command regarding the direction of the main attack and to pull reserves from the area between the Carpathians and Kovel.” The situation in Belarus inspired so little fear in the Reich command that Field Marshal Busch went on vacation three days before the start of the operation.

Progress of hostilities

The preliminary stage of the operation symbolically began on the third anniversary of the German attack on the USSR - June 22, 1944. As in the Patriotic War of 1812, one of the most significant battle sites was the Berezina River. Soviet troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts (commanders - Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, Army General G. F. Zakharov, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky), with the support of partisans, broke through the defenses of the German Army Group Center in many areas (commander - Field Marshal E. Bush, later - V. Model), surrounded and eliminated large enemy groups in the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Vilnius , Brest and east of Minsk, liberated the territory of Belarus and its capital Minsk (July 3), a significant part of Lithuania and its capital Vilnius (July 13), the eastern regions of Poland and reached the borders of the Narev and Vistula rivers and the borders of East Prussia.

The operation was carried out in two stages. The first stage took place from June 23 to July 4 and included the following front-line offensive operations:

• Vitebsk-Orsha operation
• Mogilev operation
• Bobruisk operation
• Polotsk operation
• Minsk operation

• Vilnius operation
• Siauliai operation
• Bialystok operation
• Lublin-Brest operation
• Kaunas operation
• Osovets operation

Partisan actions

The offensive was preceded by an unprecedented scale partisan action. Numerous partisan formations operated in Belarus. According to the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, during the summer of 1944, 194,708 partisans joined forces with the Red Army. The Soviet command successfully linked the actions of partisan detachments with military operations. The goal of the partisans in Operation Bagration was, at first, to disable enemy communications, and later to prevent the withdrawal of defeated Wehrmacht units. Massive actions to defeat the German rear began on the night of June 19-20. Eike Middeldorf noted:

The partisans’ plans included carrying out 40 thousand different explosions, that is, only a quarter of what was planned was actually accomplished, but what was accomplished was enough to cause a short-term paralysis of the rear of Army Group Center. The head of rear communications of the army group, Colonel G. Teske, stated:

The main targets of the partisans' forces were railways and bridges. In addition to them, communication lines were disabled. All these actions greatly facilitated the offensive of the troops at the front.

Vitebsk-Orsha operation

If the “Belarusian balcony” as a whole jutted out to the east, then the area of ​​the city of Vitebsk was a “protrusion on a protrusion”, protruding even further from the northern part of the “balcony”. The city was declared a “fortress”; Orsha, located to the south, had a similar status. The 3rd Tank Army defended in this sector under the command of General G.H. Reinhardt (the name should not be deceived; there were no tank units in the 3rd Tank Army). The Vitebsk region itself was defended by its 53rd Army Corps under the command of General F. Gollwitzer ( English). Orsha was defended by the 17th Army Corps of the 4th Field Army.

The operation was carried out on two fronts. The 1st Baltic Front, under the command of Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, operated on the northern flank of the future operation. His task was to encircle Vitebsk from the west and develop an offensive further to the southwest towards Lepel. The 3rd Belorussian Front, under the command of Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, operated further south. The task of this front was, firstly, to create a southern “claw” of encirclement around Vitebsk, and secondly, to independently embrace and take Orsha. As a result, the front was supposed to reach the area of ​​​​the city of Borisov (south of Lepel, southwest of Vitebsk). For operations in depth, the 3rd Belorussian Front had a cavalry-mechanized group (mechanized corps, cavalry corps) of General N. S. Oslikovsky and the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. A. Rotmistrov.

To coordinate the efforts of the two fronts, a special operational group of the General Staff was created, headed by Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky.

The offensive began with reconnaissance in force early in the morning of June 22, 1944. During this reconnaissance, it was possible to break into the German defenses in many places and capture the first trenches. The next day the main blow was dealt. The main role was played by the 43rd Army, which covered Vitebsk from the west, and the 39th Army under the command of I.I. Lyudnikov, which surrounded the city from the south. The 39th Army had virtually no overall superiority in men in its zone, but the concentration of troops in the breakthrough area made it possible to create a significant local advantage. The front was quickly broken through both to the west and south of Vitebsk. The 6th Army Corps, defending south of Vitebsk, was cut into several parts and lost control. Within a few days, the corps commander and all division commanders were killed. The remaining parts of the corps, having lost control and communication with each other, made their way to the west in small groups. The Vitebsk-Orsha railway was cut. On June 24, the 1st Baltic Front reached the Western Dvina. The counterattack of Army Group North units from the western flank failed. In Beshenkovichi, “Corps Group D” was surrounded. N. S. Oslikovsky’s cavalry-mechanized group was introduced into the breakthrough south of Vitebsk, and began to quickly advance to the southwest.

Since the desire of the Soviet troops to encircle the 53rd Army Corps was undoubted, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army G.H. Reinhardt turned to his superiors for permission to withdraw F. Gollwitzer’s units. On the morning of June 24, Chief of the General Staff K. Zeiztler flew to Minsk. He familiarized himself with the situation, but did not give permission to leave, not having the authority to do so. A. Hitler initially prohibited the withdrawal of the corps. However, after Vitebsk was completely surrounded, on June 25 he approved a breakthrough, ordering, however, to leave one - the 206th Infantry Division in the city. Even before this, F. Gollwitzer withdrew the 4th Air Field Division somewhat to the west to prepare a breakthrough. This measure, however, came too late.

On June 25, in the Gnezdilovichi area (southwest of Vitebsk), the 43rd and 39th armies united. In the Vitebsk area (the western part of the city and the southwestern outskirts), F. Gollwitzer's 53rd Army Corps and some other units were surrounded. The “cauldron” included the 197th, 206th and 246th Infantry, as well as the 6th Air Field Division and part of the 4th Air Field Division. Another part of the 4th Air Field was surrounded to the west, near Ostrovno.

In the Orsha direction the offensive developed quite slowly. One of the reasons for the lack of spectacular success was the fact that the strongest of the German infantry divisions, the 78th Assault, was located near Orsha. It was much better equipped than the others and, in addition, had the support of almost fifty self-propelled guns. Also in this area were units of the 14th Motorized Division. However, on June 25, the 3rd Belorussian Front introduced the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of P. A. Rotmistrov into the breakthrough. She cut the railway leading from Orsha to the west near Tolochin, forcing the Germans to withdraw from the city or die in the “cauldron”. As a result, by the morning of June 27, Orsha was liberated. The 5th Guards Tank Army advanced southwest, towards Borisov.

On the morning of June 27, Vitebsk was completely cleared of the encircled German group, which the day before had been continuously subjected to air and artillery strikes. The Germans made active efforts to break out of the encirclement. During the day of June 26, 22 attempts were recorded to break through the ring from the inside. One of these attempts was successful, but the narrow corridor was sealed after a few hours. The group of about 5 thousand people who broke through was again surrounded around Lake Moszno. On the morning of June 27, Infantry General F. Gollwitzer and the remnants of his corps capitulated. F. Gollwitzer himself, the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel Schmidt, the commander of the 206th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Hitter (Buchner erroneously listed as killed), the commander of the 246th Infantry Division, Major General Müller-Bülow, and others were captured.

At the same time, small boilers near Ostrovno and Beshenkovichi were destroyed. The last large group of encirclement was led by the commander of the 4th Air Field Division, General R. Pistorius ( English). This group, trying to escape through the forests to the west or southwest, on June 27 came across the 33rd Anti-Aircraft Division marching in columns and was scattered. R. Pistorius died in battle.

The forces of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts began to develop success in the southwestern and western direction. By the end of June 28, they liberated Lepel and reached the Borisov area. The retreating German units were subjected to continuous and brutal air strikes. There was little opposition to the Luftwaffe. The Vitebsk-Lepel highway, according to I. Kh. Bagramyan, was literally littered with dead and broken equipment.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the 53rd Army Corps was almost completely destroyed. According to V. Haupt, two hundred people from the corps broke through to the German units, almost all of them were wounded. Units of the 6th Army Corps and Corps Group D were also defeated. Vitebsk and Orsha were liberated. The losses of the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet claims, exceeded 40 thousand dead and 17 thousand prisoners (the greatest results were shown by the 39th Army, which destroyed the main “cauldron”). The northern flank of Army Group Center was swept away, and thus the first step was taken towards the complete encirclement of the entire group.

Mogilev operation

As part of the battle in Belarus, the Mogilev direction was auxiliary. According to G.K. Zhukov, who coordinated the operation of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, the quick push of the German 4th Army from the “cauldron”, which was created by attacks through Vitebsk and Bobruisk to Minsk, was meaningless. However, to speed up the collapse of German forces and speed up the advance, an offensive was organized.

On June 23, after effective artillery preparation, the 2nd Belorussian Front began crossing the Pronya River, along which the German defensive line passed. Since the enemy was almost completely suppressed by artillery, sappers within a short time built 78 light bridges for infantry and four 60-ton bridges for heavy equipment. After a few hours of battle, according to the testimony of prisoners, the number of many German companies fell from 80 - 100 to 15 - 20 people. However, units of the 4th Army managed to retreat to the second line along the Basya River in an organized manner. By June 25, the 2nd Belorussian Front had captured very few prisoners and vehicles, that is, it had not yet reached the enemy’s rear communications. However, the Wehrmacht army gradually retreated to the west. Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper north and south of Mogilev; on June 27, the city was surrounded and the next day taken by storm. About two thousand prisoners were captured in the city, including the commander of the 12th Infantry Division R. Bamler and the commandant of Mogilev G. G. von Ermansdorff, who was later found guilty of committing numerous serious crimes and hanged.

Gradually, the retreat of the 4th Army lost its organization. The connection between the units and the command and with each other was broken, and the units were mixed up. Those departing were subjected to frequent air raids, which caused heavy losses. On June 27, the commander of the 4th Army, K. von Tippelskirch, gave an order by radio for a general retreat to Borisov and Berezina. However, many retreating groups did not even receive this order, and not all of those who received it were able to carry it out.

Until June 29, the 2nd Belorussian Front announced the destruction or capture of 33 thousand enemy soldiers. The trophies included, among other things, 20 tanks, presumably from the Feldhernhalle motorized division operating in the area.

Bobruisk operation

The Bobruisk operation was supposed to create the southern “claw” of a huge encirclement planned by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. This action was carried out entirely by the most powerful and numerous of the fronts participating in Operation Bagration - the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky. Initially, only the right flank of the front took part in the offensive. He was opposed by the 9th Field Army of General H. Jordan. As at Vitebsk, the task of crushing the flank of Army Group Center was solved by creating a local “cauldron” around Bobruisk. K. K. Rokossovsky’s plan as a whole represented the classic “cannes”: from the southeast to the northwest, gradually turning to the north, the 65th Army (reinforced by the 1st Don Tank Corps) advanced, from the east to the west the 3rd I am an army that includes the 9th Tank Corps. For a quick breakthrough to Slutsk, the 28th Army with the cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev was used. The front line in the area of ​​​​operation made a bend to the west at Zhlobin, and Bobruisk, among other cities, was declared a “fortress” by A. Hitler, so the enemy in some way himself contributed to the implementation of Soviet plans.

The offensive near Bobruisk began in the south on June 24, that is, somewhat later than in the north and center. Bad weather initially seriously limited aviation operations. In addition, the terrain conditions in the offensive zone were very difficult: they had to overcome an extremely large, half-kilometer wide, swampy swamp. However, this did not stop the Soviet troops; moreover, the appropriate direction was chosen deliberately. Since the German defense was quite dense in the well-passable Parichi area, the commander of the 65th Army, P.I. Batov, decided to advance somewhat to the southwest, through the swamp, which was relatively weakly guarded. The quagmire was crossed along the roads. P. I. Batov noted:

On the first day, the 65th Army broke through the defenses of the enemy, completely stunned by such a maneuver, to a depth of 10 km, and a tank corps was introduced into the breakthrough. Its left-flank neighbor, the 28th Army under the command of Lieutenant General A. A. Luchinsky, achieved similar success.

The 3rd Army of A.V. Gorbatov, on the contrary, met stubborn resistance. H. Jordan used his main mobile reserve, the 20th Panzer Division, against it. This seriously slowed down progress. The 48th Army under the command of P. L. Romanenko, advancing to the left of the 28th Army, was also stuck due to extremely difficult terrain. In the afternoon, the weather improved, which made it possible to actively use aviation: 2,465 sorties were carried out by aircraft, but progress still remained insignificant.

The next day, I. A. Pliev’s cavalry-mechanized group was introduced into the breakthrough on the southern flank. The contrast between the rapid offensive of P. I. Batov and the slow gnawing of the defense by A. V. Gorbatov and P. L. Romanenko was noticeable not only to the Soviet, but also to the German command. H. Jordan redirected the 20th Panzer Division to the southern sector, which, however, having entered the battle “on wheels”, was unable to eliminate the breakthrough, lost half of its armored vehicles and was forced to retreat to the south.

As a result of the retreat of the 20th Panzer Division and the introduction of the 9th Panzer Corps into the battle, the northern “claw” was able to advance deeply. On June 27, roads leading from Bobruisk to the north and west were intercepted. The main forces of the German 9th Army found themselves surrounded with a diameter of approximately 25 km.

H. Jordan was removed from the command of the 9th Army, and General of the Tank Forces N. von Forman was appointed instead. However, personnel changes could no longer affect the position of the encircled German units. There were no forces capable of organizing a full-fledged unblocking strike from the outside. An attempt by the reserve 12th Panzer Division to cut through the “corridor” failed. Therefore, the encircled German units began to independently make vigorous efforts to break through. Located east of Bobruisk, the 35th Army Corps under the command of von Lützow began preparing to break through to the north to link up with the 4th Army. On the evening of June 27, the corps, having destroyed all weapons and property that could not be carried away, attempted a breakthrough. This attempt generally failed, although some groups managed to pass between Soviet units. On June 27, communication with the 35th Corps was interrupted. The last organized force in the encirclement was General Hoffmeister's 41st Panzer Corps. Groups and individual soldiers who had lost control gathered in Bobruisk, for which they were transported across the Berezina to the west bank - they were constantly bombed by aircraft. The city was in chaos. The commander of the 134th Infantry Division, General Philip, shot himself in despair.

On June 27, the assault on Bobruisk began. On the evening of the 28th, the remnants of the garrison made a final attempt to break out, leaving 3,500 wounded in the city. The attack was led by the surviving tanks of the 20th Panzer Division. They managed to break through the thin Soviet infantry screen north of the city, but the retreat continued under air strikes, which caused heavy casualties. By the morning of June 29, Bobruisk was cleared. About 14 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers and officers were able to reach the positions of the German troops - most of them were met by the 12th Panzer Division. 74 thousand soldiers and officers died or were captured. Among the prisoners was the commandant of Bobruisk, Major General Haman.

The Bobruisk operation ended successfully. The destruction of two corps, the 35th Army and 41st Tank, the capture of both their commanders and the liberation of Bobruisk took less than a week. As part of Operation Bagration, the defeat of the German 9th Army meant that both flanks of Army Group Center were left exposed, and the road to Minsk was open from the northeast and southeast.

Polotsk operation

After the destruction of the front of the 3rd Tank Army near Vitebsk, the 1st Baltic Front began to develop success in two directions: to the north-west, against the German group near Polotsk, and to the west, towards Glubokoye.

Polotsk caused concern among the Soviet command, since this next “fortress” now hung over the flank of the 1st Baltic Front. I. Kh. Bagramyan immediately began to eliminate this problem: there was no pause between the Vitebsk-Orsha and Polotsk operations. Unlike most of the battles of Operation Bagration, near Polotsk the main enemy of the Red Army was, in addition to the remnants of the 3rd Tank Army, Army Group North represented by the 16th Field Army under the command of General H. Hansen. On the enemy side, only two infantry divisions were used as reserves.

On June 29, an attack on Polotsk followed. The 6th Guards and 43rd Armies bypassed the city from the south (the 6th Guards Army also bypassed Polotsk from the west), the 4th Shock Army - from the north. The 1st Tank Corps captured the town of Ushachi south of Polotsk and advanced far to the west. The corps captured a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dvina with a surprise attack. The counterattack planned by the 16th Army simply did not take place.

The partisans provided significant assistance to the attackers, intercepting small groups of retreating troops, and sometimes even attacking large military columns.

However, the defeat of the Polotsk garrison in the cauldron did not take place. The commander of the city’s defense, Karl Hilpert, voluntarily left the “fortress” without waiting for the escape routes to be cut. Polotsk was liberated on July 4. Failure in this battle cost Georg Lindemann, commander of Army Group North, his job. It should be noted that despite the absence of "cauldrons", the number of prisoners was significant for an operation that lasted only six days. The 1st Baltic Front announced the capture of 7,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

Although the Polotsk operation was not crowned with a defeat similar to what happened near Vitebsk, it brought significant results. The enemy lost a stronghold and a railway junction, the flank threat to the 1st Baltic Front was eliminated, the positions of Army Group North were bypassed from the south and were under the threat of a flank attack.

After the capture of Polotsk, organizational changes took place for new tasks. The 4th Shock Army was transferred to the 2nd Baltic Front, on the other hand, the 1st Baltic Front received the 39th Army from Chernyakhovsky, as well as two armies from the reserve. The front line moved 60 km to the south. All these measures were related to the need to improve the controllability of the troops and strengthen them before the upcoming operations in the Baltic states.

Minsk operation

On June 28, Field Marshal E. Bush was relieved of command of Army Group Center; his place was taken by Field Marshal V. Model, who was a recognized specialist in defensive operations. Several fresh formations were sent to Belarus, in particular the 4th, 5th and 12th tank divisions.

Retreat of the 4th Army beyond the Berezina

After the collapse of the northern and southern flanks at Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the German 4th Army found itself sandwiched in a kind of rectangle. The eastern “wall” of this rectangle was formed by the Drut River, the western by the Berezina, and the northern and southern by Soviet troops. To the west was Minsk, which was the target of the main Soviet attacks. The flanks of the 4th Army were actually not covered. The environment looked imminent. Therefore, the army commander, General K. von Tippelskirch, ordered a general retreat through the Berezina to Minsk. The only way for this was the dirt road from Mogilev through Berezino. The troops and logistics agencies accumulated on the road tried to cross the only bridge to the western bank of the Berezina under constant destructive attacks from attack aircraft and bombers. The military police withdrew from regulating the crossing. In addition, the retreaters were subject to attacks by partisans. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the retreating forces were joined by numerous groups of soldiers from units defeated in other areas, even from near Vitebsk. For these reasons, the crossing of the Berezina was slow and accompanied by heavy casualties. It should be noted that the pressure from the 2nd Belorussian Front, located directly in front of the front of the 4th Army, was insignificant, since the plans of the Supreme High Command did not include expelling the enemy from the trap.

Battle south of Minsk

After the destruction of two corps of the 9th Army, K.K. Rokossovsky received new tasks. The 3rd Belorussian Front advanced in two directions, to the southwest, towards Minsk, and west, to Vileika. The 1st Belorussian Front received a symmetrical task. Having achieved impressive results in the Bobruisk operation, the 65th and 28th armies and the cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev turned strictly to the west, towards Slutsk and Nesvizh. The 3rd Army of A.V. Gorbatov advanced to the north-west, towards Minsk. The 48th Army of P. L. Romanenko became a bridge between these shock groups.

The front's offensive was led by mobile formations - tank, mechanized units and cavalry-mechanized groups. The horse-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev, quickly moving towards Slutsk, reached the city on the evening of June 29. Since the enemy in front of the 1st Belorussian Front was mostly defeated, resistance was weak. The exception was the city of Slutsk itself: it was defended by units of the 35th and 102nd divisions, which suffered serious losses. Soviet troops estimated the garrison of Slutsk to be approximately two regiments.

Faced with organized resistance in Slutsk, General I. A. Pliev organized an assault from three sides simultaneously. The flank coverage brought success: on June 30, by 11 a.m., Slutsk was cleared by a cavalry-mechanized group with the assistance of infantry that had bypassed the city.

The cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev captured Nesvizh by July 2, cutting off the Minsk group’s escape route to the southeast. The offensive developed quickly, with only small scattered groups of soldiers offering resistance. On July 2, the remnants of the German 12th Panzer Division were driven back from Pukhovichi. By July 2, the tank corps of K.K. Rokossovsky’s front approached Minsk.

Fight for Minsk

At this stage, German mobile reserves, withdrawn mainly from the troops operating in Ukraine, began to arrive at the front. The first, on June 26 - 28, to the northeast of Minsk, in the Borisov area, was the 5th Panzer Division under the command of General K. Dekker. It posed a serious threat, given that over the previous several months it had almost not participated in hostilities and was staffed almost to its normal strength (including in the spring, the anti-tank division was re-equipped with 21 Jagdpanzer IV/48 tank destroyers, and in June a fully staffed one arrived battalion of 76 “Panthers”), and upon arrival in the Borisov area it was reinforced by the 505th heavy battalion (45 Tiger tanks). The weak point of the Germans in this area was the infantry: these were either guard divisions or infantry divisions that had suffered significant losses.

On June 28, the 5th Guards Tank Army, the horse-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps set into motion with the goal of crossing the Berezina and advancing to Minsk. The 5th Panzer Army, marching in the middle of the battle formation, encountered the group of General D. von Saucken on the Berezina (the main forces of the 5th Panzer Division and the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion). D. von Saucken's group had the task of holding the Berezina line in order to cover the retreat of the 4th Army. On June 29 and 30, extremely tough fighting took place between this group and two corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 5th Guards Tank Army advanced with great difficulty and heavy losses, but during this time the cavalry-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the riflemen of the 11th Guards Army crossed the Berezina, breaking the weak resistance of the police units, and began to cover the German division from the north and south. The 5th Panzer Division, under pressure from all sides, was forced to retreat with heavy losses after short but fierce street fighting in Borisov itself. After the collapse of the defense at Borisov, N. S. Oslikovsky's cavalry-mechanized group was aimed at Molodechno (northwest of Minsk), and the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were aimed at Minsk. The right-flank 5th Combined Arms Army, at this time, was moving north strictly west, to Vileika, and the left-flank 31st Army followed the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Thus, there was a parallel pursuit: Soviet mobile formations overtook the retreating columns of the surrounded group. The last line on the way to Minsk was breached. The Wehrmacht suffered serious losses, and the proportion of prisoners was significant. The claims of the 3rd Belorussian Front included more than 22 thousand killed and more than 13 thousand captured German soldiers. Coupled with the large number of destroyed and captured vehicles (almost 5 thousand cars, according to the same report), we can conclude that the rear services of Army Group Center were subjected to heavy blows.

North-west of Minsk, the 5th Panzer Division gave another serious battle to the 5th Guards. tank army. On July 1-2, a difficult maneuver battle took place. German tank crews announced the destruction of 295 Soviet combat vehicles. Although such claims should be treated with caution, there is no doubt that the losses of the 5th Guards. tank army were heavy. However, in these battles, the 5th TD was reduced to 18 tanks, and all the “tigers” of the 505th heavy battalion were also lost. In fact, the division lost the opportunity to influence the operational situation, while the strike potential of the Soviet armored units was by no means exhausted.

July 3, 2nd Guards. The tank corps approached the outskirts of Minsk and, after making a roundabout maneuver, broke into the city from the north-west. At this moment, the advanced detachment of the Rokossovsky Front approached the city from the south, and the 5th Guards was advancing from the north. tank army, and from the east - the advanced detachments of the 31st combined arms army. Against such numerous and powerful formations in Minsk there were only about 1,800 regular troops. It should be noted that the Germans managed to evacuate more than 20 thousand wounded and rear personnel on July 1-2. However, there were still quite a few stragglers in the city (mostly unarmed). The defense of Minsk was very short: by 13:00 the capital of Belarus was liberated. This meant that the remnants of the 4th Army and the units that joined it, more than 100 thousand people, were doomed to captivity or extermination. Minsk fell into the hands of Soviet troops, severely destroyed during the battles in the summer of 1941; in addition, retreating Wehrmacht units caused additional destruction to the city. Marshal Vasilevsky stated: “On July 5 I visited Minsk. The impression I was left with was extremely difficult. The city was heavily destroyed by the Nazis. Of the large buildings, the enemy did not manage to blow up only the house of the Belarusian government, the new building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, the radio plant and the House of the Red Army. The power plant, railway station, most industrial enterprises and institutions were blown up."

Collapse of the 4th Army

The surrounded German group made desperate attempts to escape to the west. The Germans even attempted attacks with knives. Since the army's control fled to the west, the actual command of the remnants of the 4th Field Army was carried out by the commander of the 12th Army Corps, W. Müller, instead of K. von Tippelskirch.

The Minsk “cauldron” was shot right through by artillery fire and aircraft, ammunition was running out, supplies were completely absent, so a breakthrough attempt was made without delay. To do this, those surrounded were divided into two groups, one led by W. Müller himself, the other led by the commander of the 78th Assault Division, Lieutenant General G. Traut. On July 6, a detachment under the command of G. Traut, numbering 3 thousand people, attempted to break through at Smilovichi, but collided with units of the 49th Army and was killed after a four-hour battle. On the same day, G. Trout made a second attempt to get out of the trap, but before reaching the crossings across the Svisloch at Sinelo, his detachment was defeated, and G. Trout himself was captured.

On July 5, the last radiogram was sent from the “cauldron” to the army group command. It read:

There was no answer to this desperate call. The outer front of the encirclement quickly shifted to the west, and if at the moment the ring closed it was enough to travel 50 km to break through, soon the front passed already 150 km from the boiler. No one made their way to the surrounded people from the outside. The ring was shrinking, resistance was suppressed by massive shelling and bombing. On July 8, when the impossibility of a breakthrough became obvious, W. Muller decided to capitulate. Early in the morning, he drove out, guided by the sounds of artillery fire, towards the Soviet troops, and surrendered to units of the 121st Rifle Corps of the 50th Army. He immediately wrote the following order:

"July 8, 1944. To all soldiers of the 4th Army located in the area east of the Ptich River! Our situation after many days of heavy fighting became hopeless. We have fulfilled our duty. Our combat effectiveness has been practically reduced to nothing, and we cannot count on the resumption of supplies. According to the Wehrmacht High Command, Russian troops are already standing near Baranovichi. The path along the river is blocked, and we cannot break through the ring on our own. We have a huge number of wounded and soldiers who have lost their units. The Russian command promises: a) medical care for all wounded; b) keep orders and bladed weapons for officers, and orders for soldiers. We are required to: collect and hand over all available weapons and equipment in good condition. Let's put an end to the senseless bloodshed! I order: Stop resisting immediately; gather in groups of 100 people or more under the command of officers or senior non-commissioned officers; concentrate the wounded at collection points; act clearly, energetically, showing comradely mutual assistance. The more discipline we show when passing, the sooner we will be given allowance. This order must be disseminated orally and in writing by all means available. lieutenant general and commander XII Army Corps.

The commanders of the Red Army were quite self-critical in assessing the actions to defeat the Minsk “cauldron”. The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, General G. F. Zakharov, expressed extreme dissatisfaction:

However, during July 8-9, the organized resistance of German troops was broken. The cleanup continued until July 12: partisans and regular units combed the forests, neutralizing small groups of encirclements. After this, the fighting east of Minsk finally stopped. More than 72 thousand German soldiers died, more than 35 thousand were captured.

Second stage of the operation

On the eve of the second stage of Operation Bagration, the Soviet side tried to exploit the success achieved as much as possible, and the German side tried to restore the front. At this stage, the attackers had to fight the arriving enemy reserves. Also at this time, new personnel changes took place in the leadership of the armed forces of the Third Reich. The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, K. Zeitzler, proposed to withdraw Army Group North to the south in order to build a new front with its help. This proposal was rejected by A. Hitler for political reasons (relations with Finland), as well as because of the objections of the naval command: leaving the Gulf of Finland worsened communications with Finland and Sweden. As a result, K. Zeitzler was forced to resign as chief of the general staff and was replaced by G.V. Guderian.

Field Marshal V. Model, for his part, tried to erect a defensive line running from Vilnius through Lida and Baranovichi and seal a 400 km wide hole in the front. To do this, he had the only army of the Center group that had not yet been attacked - the 2nd, as well as reinforcements and the remnants of defeated units. In total these were obviously insufficient forces. V. Model received significant help from other sectors of the front: by July 16, 46 divisions were transferred to Belarus. However, these formations were introduced into battle gradually, often “on wheels,” and could not quickly change the course of the battle.

Siauliai operation

After the liberation of Polotsk, the 1st Baltic Front of I. Kh. Bagramyan received the task of attacking in the direction to the northwest, to Dvinsk and to the west, to Kaunas and Sventsyany. The general plan was to break through to the Baltic and cut off Army Group North from the other Wehrmacht forces. To prevent front troops from being stretched across different operational lines, the 4th Shock Army was transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front. In exchange, the 39th Army was transferred from the 3rd Belorussian Front. Reserves were also transferred to the front: it included the 51st Army of Lieutenant General Ya. G. Kreizer and the 2nd Guards Army of Lieutenant General P. G. Chanchibadze. These changes caused a short pause, since on July 4 only two of the front armies had the enemy in front of them. The reserve armies were marching to the front, the 39th was also on the march after the defeat of the Vitebsk “cauldron”. Therefore, until July 15, the battle went on without the participation of the armies of Ya. G. Kreiser and P. G. Chanchibadze.

Expecting an attack on Dvinsk, the enemy transferred part of the forces of Army Group North to this area. The Soviet side estimated the enemy forces near Dvinsk at five fresh divisions, as well as a brigade of assault guns, security, sapper and penal units. Thus, the Soviet troops did not have superiority in forces over the enemy. In addition, interruptions in the supply of fuel forced Soviet aviation to greatly reduce activity. Because of this, the offensive that began on July 5 stalled by the 7th. Shifting the direction of the attack only helped to move forward a little, but did not create a breakthrough. On July 18, the operation in the Dvina direction was suspended. According to I. Kh. Bagramyan, he was ready for such a development of events:

The advance towards Sventsyany was much easier, since the enemy did not deploy such significant reserves in this direction, and the Soviet group, on the contrary, was more powerful than against Dvinsk. Advancing, the 1st Tank Corps cut the Vilnius-Dvinsk railway. By July 14, the left flank had advanced 140 km, leaving Vilnius to the south and moving to Kaunas.

The local failure did not affect the overall course of the operation. The 6th Guards Army went on the offensive again on July 23, and although its advance was slow and difficult, Dvinsk was cleared on July 27 in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front advancing to the right. After July 20, the introduction of fresh forces began to have an effect: the 51st Army reached the front line and immediately liberated Panevezys, after which it continued to move towards Siauliai. On July 26, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps was brought into battle in its zone, which reached Siauliai on the same day. The enemy's resistance was weak, mainly separate operational groups acted on the German side, so Šiauliai was taken already on July 27.

The enemy quite clearly understood the intention of the Supreme High Command to cut off the North group. J. Friesner, commander of the army group, drew A. Hitler's attention to this fact on July 15, arguing that if the army group did not reduce the front and withdraw, it would face isolation and, possibly, defeat. However, there was no time to withdraw the group from the emerging “bag”, and on July 23 G. Friesner was removed from his post and sent south to Romania.

The overall goal of the 1st Baltic Front was access to the sea, so the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, as a mobile group of the front, was turned almost at a right angle: from west to north. I. Kh. Bagramyan formalized this turn with the following order:

By July 30, it was possible to separate the two army groups from each other: the vanguards of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps cut the last railway between East Prussia and the Baltic states in the Tukums area. On July 31, after a rather tense assault, Jelgava fell. Thus, the front reached the Baltic Sea. In the words of A. Hitler, a “gap in the Wehrmacht” arose. At this stage, the main task of I. Kh. Bagramyan’s front was to maintain what had been achieved, since an operation to great depth would lead to a stretching of communications, and the enemy was actively trying to restore land communications between army groups.

The first of the German counterattacks was an attack near the city of Birzai. This town was located at the junction between the 51st Army, which had broken through to the sea, and the 43rd Army, which followed it on the right in a ledge. The idea of ​​the German command was to reach the rear of the 51st Army running towards the sea through the positions of the 43rd Army covering the flank. The enemy used a fairly large group from Army Group North. According to Soviet data, five infantry divisions (58th, 61st, 81st, 215th and 290th), the Nordland motorized division, the 393rd assault gun brigade and other units took part in the battle. On August 1, going on the offensive, this group managed to encircle the 357th Infantry Division of the 43rd Army. The division was quite small (4 thousand people) and was in a difficult situation. However, the local “cauldron” was not subjected to serious pressure, apparently due to the lack of enemy strength. The first attempts to relieve the encircled unit failed, but contact was maintained with the division and it had air supplies. The situation was turned around by the reserves brought in by I. Kh. Bagramyan. On the night of August 7, the 19th Tank Corps and the encircled division, which was fighting from inside the “cauldron,” united. Biržai was also detained. Of the 3,908 people who were surrounded, 3,230 people emerged in service and about 400 wounded. That is, the losses in people turned out to be moderate.

However, counterattacks by German troops continued. On August 16, attacks began in the Raseiniai area and west of Siauliai. The German 3rd Panzer Army tried to push the Red Army back from the Baltic Sea and restore contact with Army Group North. Units of the 2nd Guards Army were pushed back, as were units of the neighboring 51st Army. By August 18, the 7th, 5th, 14th tank divisions and the “Gross Germany” tank division (in the document erroneously called “SS division”) were established in front of the 2nd Guards Army. The situation near Siauliai was stabilized by the introduction of the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle. However, on August 20, an offensive began from the west and east towards Tukums. Tukums was lost, and for a short time the Germans restored land communications between Army Groups Center and North. The attacks of the German 3rd Panzer Army in the Siauliai area failed. At the end of August there was a break in the fighting. The 1st Baltic Front completed its part of Operation Bagration.

Vilnius operation

The destruction of the Wehrmacht's 4th Army east of Minsk opened up tempting prospects. On July 4, I. D. Chernyakhovsky received a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command with the task of attacking in the general direction of Vilnius, Kaunas and by July 12 liberating Vilnius and Lida, and subsequently seizing a bridgehead on the western bank of the Neman.

Without taking an operational pause, the 3rd Belorussian Front began the operation on July 5. The offensive was supported by the 5th Guards Tank Army. The enemy did not have sufficient forces for direct confrontation, however, Vilnius was declared by A. Hitler to be another “fortress”, and a fairly large garrison was concentrated in it, which was further reinforced during the operation and numbered about 15 thousand people. There are alternative points of view on the size of the garrison: 4 thousand people. The 5th Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps broke through the enemy defenses and advanced 20 km in the first 24 hours. For infantry this is a very high pace. The matter was made easier by the looseness of the German defense: the army was opposed on a wide front by battered infantry formations and construction and security units thrown to the front. The army captured Vilnius from the north.

Meanwhile, the 11th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army were advancing further south, in the Molodechno region. At the same time, the tank army gradually shifted to the north, surrounding Vilnius from the south. Molodechno itself was taken by cavalrymen of the 3rd Guards Corps on July 5. A warehouse with 500 tons of fuel was seized in the city. On July 6, the Germans attempted a private counterattack against the 5th Guards Tank Army. It involved the 212th Infantry and 391st Security Divisions, as well as Hoppe's improvised armored group of 22 self-propelled artillery units. The counterattack had, according to German claims, limited success, but it was not confirmed by the Soviet side; only the fact of a counterattack is noted. He had no influence on the advance towards Vilnius, but the 11th Guards Army had to slightly slow down the pace of movement towards Alytus, repelling this and subsequent attacks (later the 11th Guards Army received counterattacks from the 7th and the remnants of the 5th tank divisions, security and infantry units). On July 7 - 8, the city was surrounded by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army from the south and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps from the north. The garrison under the command of Major General R. Stagel took up a perimeter defense. The city was defended by the usual combined group for the battles of 1944 from various units, including the 761st Grenadier Brigade, artillery and anti-aircraft battalions and others.

On July 7, an uprising of the Polish nationalist organization Home Army broke out in Vilnius (Operation “Sharp Gate” as part of the “Storm” Action). Its detachments, led by local commander A. Krzhizhanovsky, numbered, according to various sources, from 4 to 10 thousand people, and they managed to take control of part of the city. The Polish rebels were not able to liberate Vilnius on their own, but they provided assistance to units of the Red Army.

By July 9, most of the key facilities in the city, including the railway station and airfield, were captured by units of the 5th Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army. However, the garrison stubbornly resisted.

I. L. Degen, a tanker who participated in the assault on Vilnius, left the following description of these battles:

The lieutenant colonel said that the enemy was holding the defense with only about a hundred infantry, a couple of German tanks and several guns - one or two, and that was it. (...) And we, three tanks, crawled along the city streets, not seeing each other. The two German guns promised by the lieutenant colonel apparently multiplied by non-sexual division, and they began firing at us from guns from all sides. They barely had time to destroy them. (...) The battle with the Germans in the city, in addition to Soviet units, was actively fought by Poles with red and white armbands (subordinate to the Polish government in London) and a large Jewish partisan detachment. They had red bands on their sleeves. A group of Poles approached the tank. I jumped down to them and asked: “Do you need help?” The commander, it seems, a colonel, almost with tears in his eyes, shook my hand and showed me where the Germans were shooting at them most intensively. It turns out that the day before they were left alone with the Germans without support. That’s why the lieutenant general turned out to be so kind to us... A lieutenant, whom I had already seen at the regimental headquarters, immediately came running and conveyed a request from the commander to support the battalion in the same direction that the Poles had just pointed out to me. Found it in the basement of the NP battalion commander. The battalion commander familiarized me with the situation and set the task. He had seventeen people left in the battalion... I grinned: well, if three tanks are considered a tank brigade, then why can’t 17 soldiers be a battalion... The battalion was assigned one 76-mm cannon. The crew had two armor-piercing shells left. This was all the ammunition. The gun was commanded by a young junior lieutenant. Naturally, the artillerymen could not support the battalion with fire. Their heads were filled with one thought: what would they do if German tanks came down the street?! Starting from July 9, my tank did not leave the battle for three days. We have completely lost orientation in space and time. No one brought shells to me, and I was forced to think a thousand times before allowing myself another shot from a tank gun. Mainly supported the infantry with fire from two machine guns and tracks. There was no communication with the brigade or even with Varivoda. Street fighting is a real nightmare, a horror that the human brain cannot fully comprehend. (...) On July 13, fighting stopped in the city. The Germans surrendered in groups. Do you remember how many Germans the lieutenant colonel warned me about? One hundred people. So, there were five thousand captured Germans alone. But there were no two tanks either.

On the night of July 12-13, the German 6th Panzer Division, with the support of part of the Grossdeutschland division, broke through a corridor to Vilnius. The operation was personally led by Colonel General G. H. Reinhardt, commander of the 3rd Tank Army. Three thousand German troops came out of the “fortress”. The rest, no matter how many there were, died or were captured on July 13th. The Soviet side announced the death of eight thousand German soldiers in Vilnius and the surrounding area and the capture of five thousand. By July 15, the 3rd Belorussian Front captured a bridgehead across the Neman. Units of the Home Army were interned by the Soviet authorities.

While the assault on Vilnius was underway, the southern wing of the front was calmly moving west. The 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps captured Lida, and by July 16 reached Grodno. The front crossed the Neman. The large water obstacle was passed at a fast pace with moderate losses.

Wehrmacht units tried to neutralize the bridgeheads across the Neman. For this purpose, the command of the German 3rd Panzer Army created an improvised battle group from units of the 6th Panzer Division and the Grossdeutschland Division. It included two tank battalions, a motorized infantry regiment and self-propelled artillery. The counterattack on July 16 was aimed at the flank of the 72nd Rifle Corps of the 5th Army. However, this counterattack was carried out in a hurry; there was no time to organize reconnaissance. In the depths of the Soviet defense near the town of Vroblevizh, the battle group came across the 16th Guards, which had taken up defensive positions. anti-tank destroyer brigade, and lost 63 tanks during a difficult battle. The counterattack fizzled out, the bridgeheads beyond the Neman were held by the Russians.

Kaunas operation

After the battle for Vilnius, the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky was aimed at Kaunas and Suwalki, the last major cities on the way to East Prussia. On July 28, front troops went on the offensive and advanced 5 to 17 km in the first two days. On July 30, the enemy’s defenses along the Neman were broken through; In the zone of the 33rd Army, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was introduced into the breakthrough. The entry of the mobile formation into operational space put the Kaunas garrison in danger of encirclement, so by August 1, Wehrmacht units left the city.

However, the gradual increase in German resistance led to a relatively slow advance with serious losses. The stretching of communications, the depletion of ammunition, and growing losses forced the Soviet troops to suspend the offensive. In addition, the enemy launched a series of counterattacks on the front of I. D. Chernyakhovsky. So, on August 9, the 1st Infantry Division, 5th Tank Division, and the “Gross Germany” Division counterattacked the 33rd Front Army marching in the center and somewhat pushed it back. In mid-August, a counterattack by infantry divisions in the Raseinaya area even led to tactical (regimental level) encirclements, which, however, were soon broken through. These chaotic counterattacks led to the drying up of the operation by the 20th of August. From August 29, at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the defensive, reaching Suwalki and not reaching several kilometers to the borders of East Prussia.

Access to the old German borders caused panic in East Prussia. Despite the assurances of Gauleiter E. Koch that the situation on the approaches to East Prussia had stabilized, the population began to leave the region.

For the 3rd Belorussian Front, the Kaunas operation ended the battles within the framework of Operation Bagration.

Bialystok and Osovets operations

After the creation of the Minsk “cauldron”, General G.F. Zakharov, like other front commanders, received the task of moving deep to the west. As part of the Bialystok operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front played a supporting role - it pursued the remnants of Army Group Center. Leaving Minsk behind, the front moved strictly west - to Novogrudok, and then to Grodno and Bialystok. The 49th and 50th armies at first could not take part in this movement, since they continued fighting with German units that were surrounded in the Minsk “cauldron”. Thus, only one remained for the offensive - the 3rd Army. She started moving on July 5th. At first, enemy resistance was very weak: in the first five days, the 3rd Army advanced 120-125 km. This tempo is very high for infantry and is more characteristic of a march than an attack. On July 8 Novogrudok fell, on July 9 the army reached the Neman.

However, gradually the enemy built a defense in front of the front troops. On July 10, in front of the front positions, reconnaissance identified the remnants of the 12th and 20th tank and parts of four infantry divisions, as well as six separate regiments. These forces could not stop the offensive, but influenced the operational situation and slowed down the tempo of the operation.

On July 10, the 50th Army entered the battle. The Neman was crossed. On July 15, front troops approached Grodno. On the same day, the troops repulsed a series of counterattacks, causing serious damage to the enemy. On July 16, Grodno was liberated in cooperation with the 3rd Belorussian Front.

The enemy reinforced units in the Grodno direction, but these reserves were not sufficient, and in addition, they themselves suffered heavy losses in battles. Although the pace of the front's offensive fell seriously, from July 17 to 27, troops broke through to the Augustow Canal, recaptured Bialystok on July 27, and reached the pre-war border of the USSR. The operation took place without noticeable enemy encirclement, which was due to the weakness of the mobile formations at the front: the 2nd Belorussian Front did not have a single tank, mechanized or cavalry corps, having only tank infantry support brigades. In general, the front completed all the tasks assigned to it.

Subsequently, the front developed an offensive against Osovets, and on August 14 occupied the city. The front also occupied a bridgehead beyond the Narev. However, the advance of the troops was quite slow: extended communications played a role, on the one hand, and frequent counterattacks by the strengthened enemy, on the other. On August 14, the Bialystok operation was terminated, and Operation Bagration also ended for the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Developing the success of the 1st Belorussian Front

After the liberation of Minsk, the front of K.K. Rokossovsky, like others, received a directive to pursue the remnants of Army Group Center. The first destination was Baranovichi, and in the future it was planned to develop an offensive towards Brest. The mobile group of the front - the 4th Guards Cavalry, 1st Mechanized and 9th Tank Corps - was aimed directly at Baranovichi.

Already on July 5, the Red Army forces encountered arriving enemy operational reserves. The 1st Mechanized Corps entered into battle with the 4th Tank Division, which had just arrived in Belarus, and was stopped. In addition, Hungarian units (1st Cavalry Division) and German infantry reserves (28th Light Division) appeared at the front. On July 5 and 6 there were intense battles, progress was insignificant, success was seen only in the 65th Army of P. I. Batov.

Gradually, the resistance near Baranovichi was broken. The attackers were supported by large air forces (about 500 bombers). The 1st Belorussian Front noticeably outnumbered the enemy, so resistance gradually weakened. On July 8, after a heavy street battle, Baranovichi was liberated.

Thanks to the success at Baranovichi, the actions of the 61st Army were facilitated. This army, under the command of General P. A. Belov, advanced in the direction of Pinsk through Luninets. The army operated in extremely difficult marshy terrain between the flanks of the 1st Belorussian Front. The fall of Baranovichi created a threat of envelopment of German troops in the Pinsk area and forced them to a hasty retreat. During the pursuit, the Dnieper River Flotilla provided significant assistance to the 61st Army. In particular, on the night of July 12, the vessels of the flotilla secretly ascended Pripyat and landed a rifle regiment on the outskirts of Pinsk. The Germans failed to destroy the landing force; on July 14, Pinsk was liberated.

On July 19, Kobrin, a city east of Brest, was half-encircled and the next day captured. The right wing of the front reached Brest from the east.

Combat operations also took place on the left wing of the front, separated from the right by the impenetrable swamps of Polesie. As early as July 2, the enemy began to withdraw troops from Kovel, an important transport hub. On July 5, the 47th Army went on the offensive and liberated the city on July 6. Front commander Konstantin Rokossovsky arrived here to directly lead the troops. On July 8, in order to seize a bridgehead on the Western Bug (the subsequent task is access to Lublin), the 11th Tank Corps was brought into battle. Due to disorganization, the corps was ambushed and irretrievably lost 75 tanks; corps commander Rudkin was removed from his post. Unsuccessful attacks continued here for several more days. As a result, near Kovel, the enemy retreated 12 to 20 kilometers in an organized manner and thwarted the Soviet offensive.

Lublin-Brest operation

Start of the offensive

On July 18, the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky went on the offensive in full force. The left wing of the front, which had until now remained largely passive, entered the operation. Since the Lviv-Sandomierz operation was already underway to the south, maneuvering with reserves was extremely difficult for the German side. The enemy of the 1st Belorussian Front was not only parts of Army Group Center, but also Army Group Northern Ukraine, commanded by V. Model. This field marshal thus combined the posts of commander of army groups “Center” and “Northern Ukraine”. In order to maintain communication between the army groups, he ordered the withdrawal of the 4th Tank Army beyond the Bug. The 8th Guards Army under the command of V.I. Chuikov and the 47th Army under the command of N. I. Gusev went to the river and immediately crossed it, entering the territory of Poland. K.K. Rokossovsky dates the crossing of the Bug to July 20, D. Glanz - to the 21st. Be that as it may, the Wehrmacht failed to create a line along the Bug. Moreover, the defense of the German 8th Army Corps collapsed so quickly that the help of the 2nd Tank Army was not needed; the tankers were forced to catch up with the infantrymen. The tank army of S.I. Bogdanov consisted of three corps and posed a serious threat. She quickly moved towards Lublin, that is, strictly to the west. The 11th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, with infantry support, turned to Brest, to the north.

Brest "cauldron". Storm of Lublin

At this time, Kobrin was liberated on the right wing of the front. Thus, a local “cauldron” began to form near Brest. On July 25, the encirclement ring around units of the 86th, 137th and 261st Infantry Divisions was closed. Three days later, on July 28, the remnants of the encircled group broke out of the “cauldron.” During the defeat of the Brest group, the Germans suffered serious casualties, which is noted by both warring parties (according to Soviet claims, 7 thousand corpses of German soldiers remained on the battlefield). Extremely few prisoners were taken - only 110 people.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Tank Army was advancing on Lublin. The need for its quick capture was due to political reasons. J.V. Stalin emphasized that the liberation of Lublin “... is urgently required by the political situation and the interests of independent democratic Poland.” The army received the order on July 21, and on the night of the 22nd began to carry it out. Tank units advanced from the battle formations of the 8th Guards Army. The 3rd Panzer Corps struck the junction between two German corps, and after a short battle, penetrated their defenses. In the afternoon the coverage of Lublin began. The Lublin-Puławy highway was blocked, and enemy rear establishments were intercepted on the road and evacuated along with the city administration. Part of the tank army forces did not have contact with the enemy that day due to interruptions in the fuel supply.

The success of the first day of the breakthrough to Lublin led to the Red Army overestimating its capabilities. The next morning, July 23, the city was stormed by tank corps. In the outskirts, the Soviet forces were successful, but the attack towards Loketka Square was parried. The attackers' problem was an acute shortage of motorized infantry. This problem was mitigated: the Home Army uprising broke out in the city. On this day, S.I. Bogdanov, who observed the assault, was wounded. General who replaced him. I. Radzievsky (previously the chief of staff of the army) energetically continued the assault. Early in the morning of July 24, part of the garrison left Lublin, but not everyone managed to retreat successfully. Before noon, units attacking it from different sides united in the center of the city, and by the morning of July 25, Lublin was cleared.

According to Soviet data, 2,228 German soldiers were captured, led by SS Gruppenführer H. Moser. The exact losses of the Red Army during the assault are unknown, but according to a certificate from Colonel I.N. Bazanov (chief of army staff after S.I. Bogdanov was wounded), from July 20 to August 8, the army lost 1,433 people killed and missing. Taking into account the losses in the battle of Radzimin, the irretrievable losses of the army during the attack on Lublin and the assault could reach six hundred people. The capture of the city occurred ahead of schedule: the directive for the assault on Lublin, signed by A. I. Antonov and I. V. Stalin, provided for the occupation of Lublin on July 27. After the capture of Lublin, the 2nd Panzer Army made a deep push north along the Vistula, with the ultimate goal of capturing Prague, the eastern suburb of Warsaw. The Majdanek extermination camp was liberated near Lublin.

Seizing bridgeheads

On July 27, the 69th Army reached the Vistula near Puława. On the 29th, it captured a bridgehead at Pulawa, south of Warsaw. The crossing went quite calmly. However, not all units enjoyed the same success.

On July 30, the 69th, 8th Guards, 1st Polish and 2nd Tank armies received orders from K.K. Rokossovsky to seize bridgeheads across the Vistula. The front commander, as well as the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, intended in this way to create a base for future operations.

1. The chief of the front engineering troops should pull up the main crossing facilities to the river. Vistula and ensure the crossing of: 60th Army, 1st Polish Army, 8th Guards Army. 2. Army commanders: a) draw up army plans for crossing the river. Vistula, linking them with operational tasks performed by the army and neighbors. These plans clearly reflect the issues of interaction between infantry and artillery and other means of reinforcement, focusing on the reliable provision of landing groups and units with the task of preventing their destruction on the western bank of the river; b) organize strict control over the implementation of the forcing plan, while avoiding drift and disorganization; c) bring to the attention of commanders of all levels that the soldiers and commanders who distinguished themselves during the crossing of the river. Vistula, will be presented with special awards with orders up to and including the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. TsAMO RF. F. 233. Op. 2307. D. 168. L. 105–106

On July 31, the Polish 1st Army unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Vistula. Pointing to the reasons for the failure, the head of the political department of the Polish army, Lieutenant Colonel Zambrowski, noted the inexperience of the soldiers, lack of ammunition and organizational failures.

On August 1, the 8th Guards Army began to cross the Vistula at Magnushev. Its bridgehead was supposed to arise between the Pulawy bridgehead of the 69th Army and Warsaw. The original plan envisaged crossing the Vistula on August 3-4, after strengthening the 8th Guards Army with artillery and crossing facilities. However, the commander of the army, V.I. Chuikov, convinced K.K. Rokossovsky to start on August 1, counting on the surprise of the attack.

During August 1 - 4, the army managed to conquer a vast area on the western bank of the river, 15 km along the front and 10 km in depth. The supply of the army in the bridgehead was ensured by several bridges built, including one with a carrying capacity of 60 tons. Taking into account the possibility of enemy attacks on a fairly long perimeter of the bridgehead, K.K. Rokossovsky on August 6 ordered the transfer of an “outsider” of the battles for the bridgehead, the 1st Army of the Polish Army, to Magnushev. Thus, the 1st Belorussian Front provided itself with two large springboards for future operations.

Tank battle near Radzimin

In the literature there is no single name for the battle that took place on the eastern bank of the Vistula in late July and early August. In addition to Radzimin, he is also tied to Warsaw, Okunev and Volomin.

The Lublin-Brest operation cast doubt on the reality of Model's plans to hold the front along the Vistula. The field marshal could fend off the threat with the help of reserves. On July 24, the 9th Army was recreated, and the forces arriving on the Vistula were subordinated to it. True, at first the composition of the army was extremely meager. At the end of July, the 2nd Tank Army began testing its strength. Radzievsky's army had the ultimate goal of capturing a bridgehead across the Narew (a tributary of the Vistula) north of Warsaw, in the Serock region. On the way, the army was supposed to capture Prague, a suburb of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the Vistula.

On the evening of July 26, the army's motorcycle vanguard encountered the German 73rd Infantry Division at Garwolin, a town on the eastern bank of the Vistula northeast of Magnuszew. This was the prelude to a complex maneuver battle. The 3rd and 8th Guards Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army were targeting Prague. The 16th Panzer Corps remained near Dęblin (between the Magnuszewski and Pulawy bridgeheads), waiting for the infantry to relieve it.

The 73rd Infantry Division was supported by separate elements of the "airborne" division "Hermann Göring" (a reconnaissance battalion and part of the division's artillery) and other scattered infantry units. All these troops were united under the leadership of the commander of the 73rd Infantry Division, Fritz Franek, into the "Franek" group. On July 27, the 3rd Tank Corps crushed the Hermann Goering reconnaissance battalion, 8th Guards. TK also achieved a breakthrough. Under threat of being overrun, the "Franek" group rolled back to the north. At this time, tank units began to arrive to help the beaten infantry division - the main forces of the Hermann Goering division, 4 and 19 tanks. divisions, SS divisions “Viking” and “Totenkopf” (in two corps: Dietrich von Saucken’s 39th Panzer Corps and Gille’s 4th SS Panzer Corps). In total, this group consisted of 51 thousand people with 600 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 2nd Tank Army of the Red Army had only 32 thousand soldiers and 425 tanks and self-propelled guns. (the Soviet tank corps roughly matched the size of the German division). In addition, the rapid advance of the 2nd TA led to a lag in the rear: fuel and ammunition were delivered intermittently.

However, until the main forces of the German tank formation arrived, the Wehrmacht infantry had to endure a heavy blow from the 2nd TA. On July 28 and 29, heavy fighting continued; Radzievsky’s corps (including the approaching 16th Panzer) tried to intercept the Warsaw-Siedlce highway, but were unable to break through the defenses of Hermann Goering. The attacks on the infantry of the "Franek" group were much more successful: in the Otwock area a weak point in its defense was found, the group began to be covered from the west, as a result of which the 73rd division began to retreat unorganized under attack. General Franek was captured no later than July 30 (Radzievsky’s report on his capture dates back to the 30th). Group "Franek" was broken into separate parts, suffered heavy losses and quickly rolled back to the north.

The 3rd Panzer Corps was aimed deep to the north-west with the aim of covering Prague, through Wołomin. It was a risky maneuver, and in the days that followed it almost led to disaster. The corps broke through the narrow gap between the German forces, in the face of the accumulation of enemy battle groups on the flanks. The 3rd Tank Corps was suddenly subjected to a flank attack at Radzimin. On August 1, Radzievsky orders the army to go on the defensive, but does not withdraw the 3rd Tank Corps from the breakthrough.

On August 1, Wehrmacht units cut off the 3rd Tank Tank, recapturing Radzimin and Volomin. The escape routes of the 3rd Tank Corps were intercepted in two places.

However, the collapse of the surrounded corps did not take place. August 2, 8th Guards. The tank corps, with an attack from the outside, broke through the narrow corridor towards the encircled. It was too early to rejoice at the salvation of those surrounded. Radzimin and Volomin were abandoned, and the 8th Guards. The tank and 3rd tank corps had to defend against enemy tank divisions attacking from several sides. On the night of August 4, at the location of the 8th Guards. So the last large groups of encirclement left. In the 3rd Tank Corps, two brigade commanders died in the cauldron. By August 4, Soviet infantry in the form of the 125th Rifle Corps and cavalry (2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) arrived at the battle site. Two fresh formations were enough to completely stop the enemy on August 4. It should be noted that the forces of the 47th and 2nd Tank Armies carried out a search for the soldiers of the encircled 3rd Tank Tank who remained behind the front line; the result of these activities was the rescue of several hundred encircled people. On the same day, the 19th Panzer Division and Hermann Goering, after unsuccessful attacks on Okunev, were withdrawn from Warsaw and began to be transferred to the Magnuszew bridgehead, with the goal of destroying it. The Germans' ineffective attacks on Okunev continued (with the forces of 4 TD) on August 5, after which the attackers' forces dried up.

German (and more broadly, Western) historiography evaluates the Battle of Radzimin as a serious success for the Wehrmacht by the standards of 1944. It is stated that the 3rd Tank Corps was destroyed or, at least, defeated. However, information about the actual losses of the 2nd Tank Army casts doubt on the validity of the last statement. From July 20 to August 8, the army lost 1,433 people killed, missing, and captured. Of this number, 799 people took part in the counterattack near Volomin. With the actual strength of the corps being 8-10 thousand soldiers, such losses do not allow us to talk about the death or defeat of the 3rd Tank Corps in the cauldron, even if it suffered all of them alone. It must be admitted that the directive to seize the bridgehead beyond the Narev was not implemented. However, the directive was issued at a time when there was no information about the presence of a large German group in the Warsaw area. The presence of a mass of tank divisions in the Warsaw area in itself made it unrealistic for the relatively small 2nd Tank Army to break into Prague, and even more so across the river. On the other hand, the counterattack of a strong group of Germans, despite their numerical superiority, brought modest results. The losses of the German side cannot be precisely clarified, since during the ten-day period of July 21-31, 9, the Wehrmacht army did not provide reports on the losses incurred. Over the next ten days, the army reported a loss of 2,155 dead and missing.

After the counterattack near Radzimin, the 3rd Tank Corps was withdrawn to Minsk-Mazowiecki for rest and replenishment, and the 16th and 8th Guards. tank corps were transferred to the Magnushevsky bridgehead. Their opponents there were the same divisions, “Hermann Goering” and the 19th Panzer, as at Radzimin.

Beginning of the Warsaw Uprising

With the approach of the 2nd Tank Army to Prague, the eastern district of Warsaw, the leaders of the underground Home Army decided on a large-scale uprising in the western part of the city. The Polish side proceeded from the doctrine of “two enemies” (Germany and the USSR). Accordingly, the goal of the uprising was twofold: to prevent the destruction of Warsaw by the Germans during the evacuation and at the same time to prohibit the establishment of a regime loyal to the USSR in Poland, as well as to demonstrate the sovereignty of Poland and the ability of the Home Army to act independently without the support of the Red Army. The weak point of the plan was the need to very accurately calculate the moment when the retreating German troops would no longer be able to resist, and the Red Army units would not yet enter the city. On July 31, when units of the 2nd Tank Army were a few kilometers from Warsaw, T. Bor-Komorowski convened a meeting of the commanders of the Home Army. It was decided to implement the “Storm” plan in Warsaw, and on August 1, a few hours after A. I. Radzievsky’s army went on the defensive, the uprising began.

At the end of the Battle of Radzimin, the 2nd Panzer Army was divided. The 3rd Tank Corps was withdrawn from the front line to the front rear for rest, the other two were sent to the Magnushevsky bridgehead. Only the 47th Army remained in the Warsaw area, operating on a wide front. Later it was joined by the 1st Army of the Polish Army. These forces initially did not provide assistance to the uprising. After this, the Polish Army made an unsuccessful attempt to cross the Vistula.

After the initial successes of the uprising, the Wehrmacht and SS began the gradual destruction of parts of the Home Army. The uprising was finally suppressed in early October.

The question of whether the Red Army could have provided assistance to the uprising, and whether Soviet leaders were willing to provide such assistance, is debatable. A number of historians argue that the stop near Warsaw is connected primarily with I.V. Stalin’s desire to give the Germans the opportunity to end the uprising. The Soviet position boiled down to the fact that assistance to the uprising was extremely difficult due to stretched communications and, as a result, supply interruptions, and increased enemy resistance. The point of view according to which the offensive near Warsaw stopped due to purely military reasons is shared by some Western historians. Thus, there is no consensus on this issue, but it can be stated that in fact the Home Army fought the Germans one on one in the rebellious Warsaw.

The fight for bridgeheads

The 8th Guards Army's main forces occupied the defense on the Magnushevsky bridgehead, and two more divisions were concentrated on the eastern bank in the Garwolin area due to K.K. Rokossovsky's fears about possible German counterattacks. However, the attacks of the German 19th Panzer Division and the Hermann Goering division, withdrawn from Radzimin, fell not on the rear of the bridgehead, but on its front, on its southern part. In addition to them, Soviet troops noted attacks by the 17th Infantry Division and the 45th Infantry Division, reformed after the death in the Minsk and Bobruisk “cauldrons”. To combat these forces, V.I. Chuikov had, in addition to infantry, a tank brigade and three regiments of self-propelled artillery. In addition, reinforcements gradually arrived at the bridgehead: on August 6, a Polish tank brigade and a regiment of IS-2 heavy tanks were thrown into battle. On the morning of August 8, it was possible to build bridges across the river, thanks to the anti-aircraft “umbrella” that the newly arrived three anti-aircraft divisions hung. Using the bridges, the 8th Guards Tank Corps, withdrawn from the 2nd Tank Army, crossed over to the bridgehead. This moment became a turning point in the struggle for the Magnushevsky bridgehead; in the following days, enemy activity dropped. The introduction of the “fresh” 25th Panzer Division did not help either. Then the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army arrived. By August 16, the enemy stopped attacks.

This battle was very difficult for the 8th Guards Army. From August 1 to August 26, its total losses amounted to more than 35 thousand people. However, the bridgehead was retained.

At the Pulawy bridgehead, on August 2, the 69th Army, with the support of the Polish Army, united two small bridgeheads near Pulawy into a single one, 24 km along the front and 8 km in depth. From August 5 to 14, the Germans tried to destroy the bridgehead, but failed. After this, the army of V. Ya. Kolpakchi finally consolidated the bridgeheads, by August 28 creating a bridgehead fortification of 30 by 10 km.

On August 29, the front went on the defensive, although the right wing of the front still continued private operations. From this date, Operation Bagration is considered completed.

Polish Committee of National Liberation

On July 21, 1944, after the Red Army crossed the Curzon Line and entered Polish territory, the provisional government of Poland, also known as the Polish Committee of National Liberation, was created. It was created with the active participation of the USSR and with complete disregard for the emigrant government of Poland in London, and therefore is considered by many historians as a puppet. The Polish Committee of National Liberation included representatives of the Polish Workers' Party, the Polish Socialist Party, the Stronnitstvo Ludowe and Stronnitstvo Demokratychne parties. On July 27, members of the Polish Committee of National Liberation arrived in Lublin (hence another name for this body - “Lublin Committee”). Initially, not recognized as the government of Poland by anyone except the USSR, it actually administered the liberated part of the country. Members of the émigré government were forced either to remain in exile or to join the Lublin Committee.

Results of the operation

The success of Operation Bagration significantly exceeded the expectations of the Soviet command. As a result of the two-month offensive, Belarus was completely cleared, part of the Baltic states was recaptured, and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. In general, on a front of 1100 km, advances to a depth of 600 km were achieved. In addition, the operation jeopardized Army Group North in the Baltic states; The carefully constructed line, the Panther line, was bypassed. Subsequently, this fact greatly facilitated the Baltic operation. Also, as a result of the capture of two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula south of Warsaw - Magnuszewski and Pulawski (as well as the bridgehead at Sandomierz, captured by the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation), the groundwork was created for the future Vistula-Oder operation. In January 1945, the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front began from the Magnuszewski and Pulawy bridgeheads, stopping only at the Oder.

From a military point of view, the battle in Belarus resulted in a massive defeat for the German armed forces. A common view is that the Battle of Belarus is the largest defeat of the German armed forces in World War II. Operation Bagration is a triumph of the Soviet theory of military art due to the well-coordinated offensive movement of all fronts and the operation carried out to disinform the enemy about the location of the general offensive that began in the summer of 1944. On the scale of the Soviet-German front, Operation Bagration became the largest in a long series of offensives. It absorbed German reserves, seriously limiting the enemy's ability to fend off both other offensives on the Eastern Front and the Allied advance in Western Europe. For example, the “Great Germany” division was transferred to Siauliai from the Dniester and, thus, was deprived of the opportunity to participate in repelling the Iasi-Kishinev operation. The Hermann Goering division was forced to abandon its position near Florence in Italy in mid-July, and was thrown into battle on the Vistula; Florence was liberated in mid-August, when Goering units unsuccessfully stormed the Magnuszew bridgehead.

Losses

USSR

The human losses of the Red Army are quite accurately known. They amounted to 178,507 dead, missing and captured, as well as 587,308 wounded and sick. These are high losses even by the standards of the Second World War, in absolute numbers significantly exceeding the casualties not only in successful, but even in many unsuccessful operations. So, for comparison, the Berlin operation cost the Red Army 81 thousand irrevocable losses, the defeat near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943 - just over 45 thousand irrevocably. Such losses are associated with the duration and scope of the operation, which was conducted on difficult terrain against a skilled and energetic enemy who occupied well-prepared defensive lines.

Germany

The issue of human losses of the Wehrmacht is debatable. The most common data among Western scientists is the following: 26,397 dead, 109,776 wounded, 262,929 missing and captured, and a total of 399,102 people. These figures are taken from ten-day casualty reports provided by the German armies. The extremely small number of killed is due to the fact that many of the dead were counted as missing in action; sometimes the entire division’s personnel were declared missing.

However, these figures have been criticized. In particular, the American historian of the Eastern Front D. Glantz drew attention to the fact that the difference between the numerical strength of Army Group Center before and after the operation was significantly larger. D. Glantz emphasized that the data from ten-day reports is minimum minimorum, that is, they represent a minimum assessment. Russian researcher A.V. Isaev, in a speech on the Echo of Moscow radio, estimated German losses at approximately 500 thousand people. S. Zaloga estimated German losses at 300-350 thousand people up to and including the surrender of the 4th Army.

It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that in all cases the losses of Army Group Center are calculated, without taking into account the victims of Army Groups North and Northern Ukraine.

According to official Soviet data published by the Sovinformburo, the losses of German troops from June 23 to July 23, 1944 were estimated at 381,000 killed, 158,480 prisoners, 2,735 tanks and self-propelled guns, 631 aircraft and 57,152 vehicles. It is likely that these data, as is usually the case with claims for enemy losses, are significantly overestimated. In any case, the issue of human losses of the Wehrmacht in “Bagration” has not yet been settled.

In order to demonstrate to other countries the significance of the success, 57,600 German prisoners of war captured near Minsk were marched through Moscow - for about three hours a column of prisoners of war walked along the streets of Moscow, and after the march the streets were washed and cleared.

The scale of the disaster that befell Army Group Center is clearly demonstrated by the loss of command personnel:

Clearly demonstrates the scale of the disaster
3rd Panzer Army
53 Army Corps	General of Infantry Gollwitzer	captured
206th Infantry Division	Lieutenant General Hitter ( English)	captured
4th airfield division	Lieutenant General Pistorius
6th airfield division	Lieutenant General Peschel ( English)
246th Infantry Division	Major General Müller-Bülow	captured
6th Army Corps	General of Artillery Pfeiffer ( English)
197th Infantry Division	Major General Hane ( English)	missing
256th Infantry Division	Major General Wüstenhagen
39th Tank Corps	General of Artillery Martinek
110th Infantry Division	Lieutenant General von Kurowski ( English)	captured
337th Infantry Division	Lieutenant General Schönemann ( English)
12th Infantry Division	Lieutenant General Bamler	captured
31st Infantry Division	Lieutenant General Ochsner ( English)	captured
12th Army Corps	Lieutenant General Müller	captured
18th motorized division	Lieutenant General Zutavern	committed suicide
267th Infantry Division	Lieutenant General Drescher ( English)
57th Infantry Division	Major General Trowitz ( English)	captured
27th Army Corps	General of Infantry Voelkers	captured
78th assault division	Lieutenant General Trout ( English)	captured
260th Infantry Division	Major General Klamt ( German)	captured
Army Corps of Engineers	Major General Schmidt	captured
35th Army Corps	Lieutenant General von Lützow ( English)	captured
134th Infantry Division	Lieutenant General Philip	committed suicide
6th Infantry Division	Major General Heine ( English)	captured
45th Infantry Division	Major General Engel	captured
41st Tank Corps	Lieutenant General Hoffmeister ( English)	captured
36th Infantry Division	Major General Conradi ( English)	captured
Commandant of Bobruisk	Major General Haman ( English)	captured
Reserve units
95th Infantry Division	Major General Michaelis	captured
707th Infantry Division	Major General Geer ( English)	captured
motorized division "Feldherrnhalle"	Major General von Steinkeller	captured

This list is based on Carell, is incomplete and does not cover losses incurred during the second phase of the operation. So, it lacks Lieutenant General F. Frank, commander of the 73rd Infantry Division, who was captured in late July near Warsaw, commandant of Mogilev, Major General Ermansdorf, and others. However, it demonstrates the scale of the shock experienced by the Wehrmacht and the losses of senior officers of Army Group Center.

It was finally broken, the Red Army began to recapture its land. The Second World War was relentlessly approaching its end. The liberation of Belarus was an important step on the path to victory.

Winter attempt

The first attempt to liberate Belarus was made in the winter of 1944. The offensive in the direction of Vitebsk began in early February, but it was not crowned with success: the advance was difficult, in a month and a half it was possible to go deeper only ten kilometers.

The Belorussian Front, operating in the Minsk-Bobruisk direction, was doing somewhat better, but also far from brilliant. Here the offensive began even earlier, in early January, and already on the 14th Mozyr and Kalinkovichi were taken. By the beginning of spring, Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper and recaptured 20-25 km of territory from the Nazis.

Such a leisurely advance of the Red Army could not be considered particularly successful, so in mid-spring the High Command decided to postpone the offensive. The troops were ordered to consolidate their positions and wait for better times.

In contrast to the Belarusian direction, the large-scale campaign of the winter-spring of 1944 was quite successful: the southern edge of the front crossed the border, battles were fought outside the USSR. Things were going well on the northern sector of the front: Soviet troops were able to force Finland out of the war. The liberation of Belarus and the Baltic republics and the complete reconquest of Ukraine were planned for the summer.

Disposition

The front line in the BSSR was an arc (protrusion, wedge) directed towards the Soviet Union with a length of 1100 km. In the north it was limited to Vitebsk, in the south - Pinsk. Inside this arc, called the “Belarusian salient” by the Soviet General Staff, German troops were stationed - the “Center” group, including the 3rd Tank, 2nd, 4th and 9th armies.

The German command attached great strategic importance to its positions in Belarus. They were ordered to be protected at all costs, so the liberation of Belarus was not at all an easy walk.

Moreover, in the spring of 1944, the Fuhrer did not at all consider the war lost, but consoled himself with hopes, believing that if time was delayed, the coalition would fall apart, and then the Soviet Union would surrender, exhausted by the long war.

After conducting a series of reconnaissance operations and analyzing the situation, the Wehrmacht decided that troubles should rather be expected from Ukraine and Romania: by using the already conquered territory, the Red Army could deal a crushing blow and even recapture the strategically important Ploesti fields from Germany.

Guided by these considerations, the Nazis pulled their main forces to the south, believing that the liberation of Belarus was unlikely to begin so soon: neither the state of the enemy forces nor local conditions were in the least conducive to an offensive.

Military stratagem

The USSR carefully supported these false beliefs in the enemy. False defensive lines were built in the central sector, the 3rd Ukrainian Front intensively imitated the movement of a dozen rifle divisions, creating the illusion that the tank formations stationed in Ukraine remained in place, while in fact they were hastily transferred to the central part of the offensive line . Numerous deceptive manipulations were carried out, designed to falsely inform the enemy, and in the meantime, Operation Bagration was being prepared in the strictest secrecy: the liberation of Belarus was just around the corner.

On May 20, the General Staff completed planning for the campaign. As a result, the Soviet command expected to achieve the following goals:

• push the enemy away from Moscow;
• to wedge between groups of Nazi armies and deprive them of communication with each other;
• provide a springboard for subsequent attacks on the enemy.

To achieve success, the Belarusian offensive operation was carefully planned, since a lot depended on its outcome: victory opened the way to Warsaw, and therefore to Berlin. A serious struggle lay ahead, because to achieve the goals it was necessary:

• overcome a powerful system of enemy fortifications
• cross large rivers;
• occupy strategically important positions;
• liberate Minsk from the Nazis as soon as possible.

Approved plan

On May 22 and 23, the plan was discussed with the participation of the commanders of the fronts taking part in the operation, and on May 30 it was finally approved. According to him, it was assumed:

• “pierce” the German defense in six places, taking advantage of the surprise of the attack and the power of the strike;
• destroy the groups near Vitebsk and Bobruisk, which served as a kind of “wings” of the Belarusian protrusion;
• after the breakthrough, move forward along a converging trajectory in order to encircle as many enemy forces as possible.

The successful implementation of the plan actually put an end to the Wehrmacht forces in this area and made possible the complete liberation of Belarus: 1944 was supposed to put an end to the suffering of the population, who had drank the horrors of war to the fullest.

Main participants of the events

The largest offensive operation involved the forces of the Dnieper military flotilla and four fronts: the 1st Baltic and three Belarusian.

It is difficult to overestimate the enormous role that partisan detachments played in the operation: without their developed movement, the liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders would certainly have taken much more time and effort. During the so-called partisan attack, they managed to blow up almost 150 thousand rails. This, of course, made life very difficult for the invaders, but trains were also derailed, ferries were destroyed, communications were damaged, and many other daring acts of sabotage were committed. in Belarus was the most powerful on the territory of the USSR.

When Operation Bagration was being developed, the mission of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Rokossovsky was considered especially difficult. In the area of ​​the Bobruisk direction, nature itself did not seem to be conducive to success - on this issue the high command of both sides was completely unanimous. Indeed, advancing with tanks through impassable swamps is, to put it mildly, a difficult task. But the marshal insisted: the Germans do not expect an attack from this side, since they know about the existence of the swamps no worse than we do. That is why the blow must be struck from here.

Balance of power

The fronts participating in the campaign were significantly strengthened. The railway worked not out of fear, but out of conscience: during the preparation, a countless amount of equipment and people were transported - and all this while maintaining the strictest secrecy.

Since the Germans decided to concentrate forces on the southern sector, the German Army Group Center opposing the Red Army had several times fewer people. Against 36.4 thousand Soviet guns and mortars - 9.5 thousand, against 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns - 900 tanks and against 5.3 thousand combat aircraft - 1350 aircraft.

The start time of the operation was kept in the strictest confidence. Until the very last moment, the Germans did not have the slightest idea about the impending campaign. One can imagine the commotion when Operation Bagration finally began in the early morning of June 23.

Surprise for the Fuhrer

The advance of the fronts and armies was not uniform. For example, the striking force of the 1st Baltic Army (4th Army) turned out to be unable to crush the enemy with one frantic onslaught. During the day of the operation, she was able to cover only 5 km. But fortune smiled on the Sixth Guards and Forty-third armies: they “pierced” the enemy’s defenses and bypassed Vitebsk from the north-west. The Germans hastily retreated, leaving about 15 km. The tanks of the 1st Corps immediately poured into the gap that had formed.

The 3rd Belorussian Front, with the forces of the 39th and 5th armies, bypassed Vitebsk from the south, practically did not notice the Luchesa River and continued the offensive. The cauldron was closing: on the very first day of the operation, the Germans had only one chance to avoid encirclement: a twenty-kilometer wide “corridor” that did not last long, the trap slammed shut in the village of Ostrovno.

In the Orsha direction, the Soviet soldiers initially faced failure: the German defense in this sector was very powerful, the enemy defended himself desperately, angrily and competently. Attempts to liberate Orsha were made back in January and failed. In winter, the battle was lost, but the war was not lost: Operation Bagration left no room for failure.

The 11th and 31st armies spent the entire day trying to break through to the second line of German defense. Meanwhile, the 5th Tank Army was waiting in the wings: in the event of a successful breakthrough in the Orsha direction, the path to Minsk would be open.

The 2nd Belorussian Front smoothly and successfully advanced towards Mogilev. By the end of the first day of fighting in the campaign, a good bridgehead was captured on the banks of the Dnieper.

On June 24, the operation to liberate Belarus began for the 1st Belorussian Front, which began its own combat mission: to move in the Bobruisk direction. Here the hopes for a surprise attack were fully justified: of course, the Germans did not expect trouble from this side. Their line of defense was scattered and few in number.

In the Parichi area, the strike group alone broke through 20 km - the tanks of the First Guards Corps immediately crawled into the gap formed. The Germans retreated to Bobruisk. Pursuing them, the vanguard was already on the outskirts of the city on June 25.

In the Rogachev area, things were not so rosy at first: the enemy resisted fiercely, but when the direction of the attack was diverted to the north, things got better. On the third day after the start of the Soviet operation, the Germans realized that it was time to escape, but they were too late: Soviet tanks were already deep behind enemy lines. On June 27, the trap slammed shut. It included more than six enemy divisions, which were completely destroyed two days later.

Success

The advance was rapid. On June 26, the Red Army liberated Vitebsk; on the 27th, after fierce fighting, the Nazis finally left Orshansk; on the 28th, Soviet tanks were already in Borisov, which was completely cleared on July 1.

Near Minsk, Vitebsk and Bobruisk, 30 enemy divisions were killed. 12 days after the start of the operation, Soviet troops advanced 225-280 km, overcoming half of Belarus in one burst.

The Wehrmacht was completely unprepared for such a development of events, and the command of Army Group Center itself was grossly and systematically mistaken. Time was counted in hours, and sometimes in minutes. At first, it was still possible to avoid encirclement by retreating to the river in time. Berezina and creating a new line of defense here. It is unlikely that in this case the liberation of Belarus would have been accomplished in two months. But Field Marshal Bush did not give the order on time. Either his faith in the infallibility of Hitler’s military calculations was so strong, or the commander underestimated the strength of the enemy, but he fanatically followed Hitler’s order to “defend the Belarusian salient at any cost” and ruined his troops. 40 thousand soldiers and officers, as well as 11 German generals who held high positions, were captured. The result, frankly speaking, is shameful.

Shocked by the enemy’s successes, the Germans began feverishly to correct the situation: Bush was removed from his post, and additional troops began to be sent to Belarus. Seeing the trends, the Soviet command demanded to speed up the offensive and occupy Minsk no later than July 8. The plan was exceeded: on the 3rd, the capital of the republic was liberated, and large German forces (105 thousand soldiers and officers) east of the city were surrounded. The last country that many of them saw in their lives was Belarus. The year 1944 was gathering its bloody harvest: 70 thousand people were killed and about 35 thousand had to walk through the streets of the jubilant Soviet capital. The enemy's front was gaping with holes, and there was nothing to bridge the huge 400-kilometer gap that had formed. The Germans fled.

Two stage operation

Operation Bagration consisted of two stages. The first began on June 23. At this time, it was necessary to break through the enemy’s strategic front and destroy the flanking forces of the Belarusian salient. The attacks of the fronts were supposed to gradually converge and concentrate at one point on the map. After success was achieved, the tasks changed: it was urgently necessary to pursue the enemy and expand the breakthrough line. On July 4, the USSR General Staff changed the original plan, thereby completing the first stage of the campaign.

Instead of converging trajectories, diverging ones were ahead: the 1st Baltic Front moved in the direction of Siauliai, the 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to liberate Vilnius and Lida, the 2nd Belorussian Front was to move to Novogrudok, Grodno and Bialystok. Rokossovsky went in the direction of Baranovichi and Brest, and having occupied the latter, he went to Lublin.

The second stage of Operation Bagration began on July 5. Soviet troops continued their rapid advance. By mid-summer, the vanguards of the fronts began to cross the Neman. Large bridgeheads were captured on the Vistula and the river. Narev. On July 16, the Red Army occupied Grodno, and on July 28, Brest.

Strategic importance

In terms of its scope, Bagration is one of the largest strategic offensive campaigns. In just 68 days, Belarus was liberated. 1944, indeed, marked the end of the occupation of the republic. The Baltic territories were partially reconquered, Soviet troops crossed the border and partially occupied Poland.

The defeat of the powerful Army Group Center was a great military and strategic success. 3 brigades and 17 divisions of the enemy were completely destroyed. 50 divisions lost more than half of their strength. USSR troops reached East Prussia - an extremely important German outpost.

During the operation, German losses amounted to about half a million people (killed, wounded and prisoners). The USSR also suffered serious losses in the amount of 765,815 people (178,507 killed, 587,308 injured). Soviet soldiers showed miracles of heroism in order for the liberation of Belarus to take place. The year of the operation, however, like the entire period of the Patriotic War, was a time of true national feat. There are many memorials and monuments installed on the territory of the republic. At the 21st kilometer of the Moscow Highway, a monument was erected, crowning the embankment, representing four bayonets, symbolizing the four fronts that carried out the campaign.

The significance of this local victory was so great that the Soviet government was going to establish a medal for the liberation of Belarus, but this never happened. Some sketches of the award are kept in the Minsk Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War.

A). Military and political situation on the eve of Operation Bagration

The fundamental turning point in the war that began at Stalingrad was finally consolidated in the summer of 1943 during the Battle of Kursk, when the Germans lost their last hope of turning the tide of events in their favor. The counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Kursk developed into a general strategic offensive from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea. The Dnieper was crossed, and important bridgeheads were captured on its right bank. The enemy group was defeated in the Smolensk-Bryansk region, and the liberation of Belarusian land began.

On September 22, the first regional center of Belarus Komarin was liberated, on September 26 - Khotimsk, on September 28 - Klimovichi, Kostyukovichi and Mstislavl, on September 30 - the ancient Belarusian city of Krichev.

At the beginning of October, the troops of the Kalinin Front (renamed the 1st Baltic Front on October 20) launched an offensive in the Vitebsk direction. The troops of the Western Front reached the approaches to Mogilev, Orsha, and Vitebsk.

The 1st Polish Infantry Division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszka under the command of Colonel Z. Berling, formed on the territory of the USSR, also took part in the battles for the liberation of Belarus. She received her first baptism of fire on October 12, 1943, near the town of Lenino near Gorki. This day became the birthday of the Polish Army.

“Retreating, the Nazis clung to every line, tried to delay the advance of Soviet troops to the west. Believing that the loss of Belarus would open the Armed Forces of the USSR a direct path to the Baltic states, Poland, East Prussia, the enemy kept large forces here and diligently strengthened defensive lines. In early October the Belarusian direction covered up to 70 Nazi divisions"*.

b). Start of hostilities

In mid-October 1943, the troops of the Central (from October 20, Belorussian) Front began to move forward in the Gomel-Bobruisk direction.

On November 26, troops of the Belarusian front liberated the first regional center of Belarus - the city of Gomel. In January-February 1944 there were fierce battles on the outskirts of Vitebsk, but it was not yet possible to capture the city.

In the winter of 1943-44, Soviet troops continued offensive operations to liberate the eastern regions of Belarus. On the central section of the Soviet-German front, the main events unfolded in the Vitebsk and Bobruisk directions. In December 1943, an offensive operation was carried out by the troops of the right wing of the 1st Baltic Front with the aim of eliminating the Gorodotsky ledge, which was defended by the troops of the 3rd Tank Army of Army Group Center.

From January 8 to March 8, 1944, troops of the Belorussian Front carried out the Kolinkovichi-Mozyr operation. Partisans of the Gomel, Polesie, and Minsk associations took part in its preparation and implementation. With their help, on January 14, the regional center of Mozyr and the Kalinkovichi railway junction were liberated. In the Ozarychi region, Red Army troops liberated prisoners of 3 concentration camps, where more than 33 thousand Soviet citizens suffered and died.

* Archive of the Brest Fortress.

Polesie partisans helped the troops of the Belorussian Front in defeating the Mozyr enemy group. The 37 Yelskaya brigade, together with a military unit, drove the enemy out of Yelsk on November 27, 1943; the 27th Norovlya brigade, together with the 415th Rifle Division, liberated Narovlya on the night of November 30, 1943. Polesie partisans took part in the liberation of Vasilevich, Lelchitsy, Kalinkovichy and other settlements. Vitebsk and Mogilev partisans directly interacted with military units. Guerrilla formations in other regions expanded their combat activities widely. On the night of November 1, 1943, the partisan brigades, the 1st Anti-Fascist Brigade and the People's Avengers named after. V.T. Voronyansky was defeated by the fascist garrisons in Vileika and at Kurenets station. At the end of 1943, favorable conditions were created for the establishment of direct contacts between the partisans and the soldiers of the Red Army through the “Rudobel Gate”, formed in the front line. In December 1943, the Minsk underground regional party committee, at the request of the military council of the 65th Army, sent more than 10 thousand partisans and volunteers from among local residents through the “gate” to replenish military units. The population and partisans of the Minsk and Polesie regions sent convoys with food and fodder through the “gate” for the Red Army. At the same time, the Military Council of the 65th Army provided assistance to the partisans with weapons, ammunition, and mine-explosive means.

The underground members of Vitebsk, operating under the leadership of the underground city party committee, systematically carried out sabotage. They regularly transmitted information about the location of enemy military units and military installations to the headquarters of the 4th Shock Army and the Broadband Broadcasting Division. Thanks to this data, Soviet aviation was able to deliver powerful attacks on the deployment of the Spanish fascist “Blue Division”, on the secret pontoon crossing across the Western Dvina, built in the fall of 1943, on airfields and military warehouses.

In total, in the fall of 1943 - winter of 1943-1944. Red Army units liberated, in whole or in part, about 40 districts of the Gomel, Polesie, Mogilev and Vitebsk regions.

The offensive of the Soviet troops also developed successfully on other fronts. By mid-May 1944, the enemy was defeated near Leningrad and Novgorod, in Right Bank Ukraine and in Crimea.

The General Commissioner of Belarus, Lieutenant General Gottberg, in November 1943 began creating so-called defense villages, in which families of police officers and evacuated residents of the eastern regions of the USSR, including Cossacks who collaborated with the Germans, settled.

As the West German historian Hesse testifies, in Belarus: “... everywhere there was no necessary basis for the implementation of this plan.”*

Until mid-April, it was possible to create 36 infantry and 6 sapper battalions (Belarusian Regional Defense, BKA), but they did not live up to the hopes of the occupiers.

Basically, they were staffed by attracting collaborators (people who collaborated with the Germans in the occupied territories) and the forcibly mobilized local population.

In 1943, the transition to the side of the partisans expanded among military personnel from various military auxiliary units and police organized by the occupiers.

__________________________________________________________________

• * "History of Belarus" 2 volumes. p.305
• V). Creation of the Belarusian Central Council

“In December 1943, when Gomel had already been liberated, the formation of an auxiliary body, a central institution of the Belarusian administration in the occupied territory of Belarus - the Belarusian Central Council (BCS) was unexpectedly announced in Minsk. By creating this appearance of a Belarusian national government, the invaders pursued certain goals. And first of all, they saw in it a means to mobilize the forces of the Belarusian people to fight against Bolshevism, to more fully use the economy of Belarus in their interests. The Belarusian collaborators, for their part, hoped to use the opportunity provided to realize their long-standing dream - the creation of Belarusian statehood under a German protectorate." .

The BCS consisted of 14 people, including Ostrovsky (president), Shkelyonok (1st vice-president), Sobolevsky (2nd vice-president). 13 departments were created: financial, cultural, agriculture and forestry, professional affairs, military and others. The occupiers transferred previously created organizations to the subordination of the BCS: Belarusian Self-Help, Belarusian Scientific Partnership, Union of Belarusian Youth and others.

Meanwhile, the Nazis were in no hurry to share power. Formally, they transferred only management of education, culture, social care and military issues to the BCS. But at the local level, the corresponding departments subsequently remained under the control of German district commissioners. BCS developed vigorous activity. Deputies or departments of the BCS were created in the districts. They helped the Nazis in every possible way to fight against the partisans and carry out supplies for the army.

G). Liberation of the eastern regions of the republic

“By the summer of 1944, the Red Army liberated almost 3/4 of the occupied territory. Its victories on the Soviet-German front and the strengthening of the national liberation movement in Western Europe forced the ruling circles of the USA and England to rush to open a second front. However, even after the landing of the British - American troops in northern France in June 1944, the Soviet-German front remained decisive. The Red Army firmly held the strategic initiative in its hands."

In the summer of 1944, Soviet troops carried out the Belarusian offensive operation, which went down in history under the name “Bagration”. The front line at the beginning ran east from Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin, west of Mozyr, along Pripyat to Kovel, forming the so-called Belarusian ledge.

__________________________________________________________________

* "History of Belarus" vol. 2 part 306

In 1944, the Red Army carried out a series of offensive operations, as a result of which the state border of the USSR was restored all the way from the Barents to the Black Sea. The Nazis were expelled from Romania and Bulgaria, from most areas of Poland and Hungary. The Red Army entered the territory of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Among these operations was the defeat of Nazi troops on the territory of Belarus, which went down in history under the code name “Bagration”. This is one of the largest offensive operations of the Red Army against Army Group Center during the Great Patriotic War.

The armies of four fronts took part in Operation Bagration: 1st Belorussian (commander K.K. Rokossovsky), 2nd Belorussian (commander G.F. Zakharov), 3rd Belorussian (commander I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 1st Baltic (commander I. Kh. Bagramyan), forces of the Dnieper military flotilla. The length of the combat front reached 1100 km, the depth of troop movement was 560-600 km. The total number of troops at the start of the operation was 2.4 million.

Operation Bagration began on the morning of June 23, 1944. After artillery and air preparation in the Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev directions, the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts went on the offensive. On the second day, enemy positions were attacked by troops of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Bobruisk direction. The actions of the fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Belarusian partisans dealt strong blows to the occupiers’ communications and communication lines. On the night of June 20, 1944, the third stage of the “rail war” began. During that night, the partisans blew up more than 40 thousand rails.

By the end of June 1944, Soviet troops surrounded and destroyed the Vitebsk and Bobruisk enemy groups. In the Orsha area, a group covering the Minsk direction was eliminated. The enemy's defenses in the territory between the Western Dvina and Pripyat were breached. The 1st Polish Division named after T. Kosciuszko received its first baptism of fire near the village of Lenino, Mogilev region. French pilots of the Normandy-Neman aviation regiment took part in the battles for the liberation of Belarus.

On July 1, 1944, Borisov was liberated, and on July 3, 1944, Minsk was liberated. In the area of ​​Minsk, Vitebsk and Bobruisk, 30 Nazi divisions were surrounded and destroyed.

Soviet troops continued their advance to the west. On July 16, they liberated Grodno, and on July 28, 1944, Brest. The occupiers were completely expelled from Belarusian soil. In honor of the Red Army, the liberator of Belarus from the Nazi invaders, the Mound of Glory was built at the 21st kilometer of the Moscow Highway. The four bayonets of this monument symbolize the four Soviet fronts, whose soldiers took part in the liberation of the republic.

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In the summer of 1944, the Soviet army set about the final liberation of Belarus from the Germans. The main content of the plan for Operation Bagration was an organized offensive on several fronts, which was supposed to throw the Wehrmacht forces outside the republic. Success allowed the USSR to begin the liberation of Poland and East Prussia.

The day before

The Bagration strategic plan was developed in accordance with the situation that developed in Belarus at the beginning of 1944. The Red Army has already liberated part of the Vitebsk, Gomel, Mogilev and Polesie regions of the republic. However, its main territory was still occupied by German units. A protrusion formed at the front, which in the Wehrmacht was called the “Belarusian balcony.” The headquarters of the Third Reich did everything possible to hold this important strategic area for as long as possible.

For defense, a new network of lines about 250 kilometers long was created. They consisted of trenches, wire fences, and anti-tank ditches were promptly dug in some areas. The German command even managed to increase its own contingent in Belarus, despite the scarcity of human resources. According to Soviet intelligence data, there were just over a million Wehrmacht troops in the region. What could Operation Bagration oppose to this? The plan was based on an attack by more than one and a half million Red Army soldiers.

Plan approval

Preparations for the operation to defeat the Germans in Belarus began at the direction of Stalin in April 1944. At the same time, the General Staff began to concentrate troops and materiel on the corresponding sector of the front. The original Bagration plan was proposed by General Alexei Antonov. At the end of May he prepared a draft of the operation.

At the same time, key commanders on the western front were summoned to Moscow. These were Konstantin Rokossovsky, Ivan Chernyakhovsky and Ivan Bagramyan. They reported on the current situation in their sectors of the front. Georgy Zhukov and (representatives of the High Command Headquarters) also took part in the discussion. The plan was clarified and finalized. After this, on May 30 it was approved

“Bagration” (the plan was named after the general of the year) was based on the following plan. The enemy's defenses had to be simultaneously broken through on six sectors of the front. After this, it was planned to encircle German formations on the flanks (in the area of ​​​​Bobruisk and Vitebsk), and attack in the direction of Brest, Minsk and Kaunas. After the complete defeat of the army group, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to go to Warsaw, the 1st Baltic Front to Konigsberg, and the 3rd Belorussian Front to Allenstein.

Guerrilla actions

What ensured the success of Operation Bagration? The plan was based not only on the execution of orders from Headquarters by the army, but also on its active interaction with the partisans. To ensure communication between them, special operational groups were created. On June 8, the partisans operating underground received orders to prepare for the destruction of the railways located in the occupied territory.

On the night of June 20, more than 40 thousand rails were blown up. In addition, the partisans derailed the Wehrmacht echelons. Group "Center", finding itself under a coordinated attack by the Soviet army, was unable to bring reserves to the front line in time due to the paralysis of its own communications.

Vitebsk-Orsha operation

On June 22, the active phase of Operation Bagration began. The plan included this date for a reason. The general offensive resumed exactly on the third anniversary. The 1st Baltic Front and the 3rd Belorussian Front were used to carry out the Vitebsk-Orsha operation. During it, the defenses on the right flank of the Center group were collapsed. The Red Army liberated several regional centers of the Vitebsk region, including Orsha. The Germans were retreating everywhere.

On June 27, Vitebsk was cleared of the enemy. The day before, the German group operating in the city area was subjected to numerous intense artillery and air strikes. A significant part of the German military personnel was surrounded. Attempts by some divisions to break out of encirclement ended in failure.

On June 28, Lepel was released. As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the Red Army managed to almost completely destroy the enemy's 53rd Army Corps. The Wehrmacht lost 40 thousand people killed and 17 thousand captured.

Liberation of Mogilev

The Bagration military plan adopted by the Headquarters stated that the Mogilev operation was to be a decisive blow to the Wehrmacht positions. There were slightly fewer German forces in this direction than in other sectors of the front. Nevertheless, the Soviet offensive here was very important, as it cut off the enemy’s path to retreat.

In the Mogilev direction, German troops had a well-prepared defense system. Every small settlement located near the main roads was turned into a stronghold. The eastern approaches to Mogilev were covered by several defensive lines. Hitler, in his public speeches, stated that this city must be held at all costs. It was now possible to leave him only with the personal consent of the Fuhrer.

On June 23, after artillery strikes, the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front began to cross the defensive line built by the Germans along its banks. Dozens of bridges were built across the river. The enemy almost did not resist, as he was paralyzed by artillery. Soon the upper section of the Dnieper in the Mogilev region was crossed. The city was taken on June 28 after a rapid advance. In total, more than 30 thousand German soldiers were captured during the operation. The Wehrmacht forces initially retreated in an organized manner, but after the capture of Mogilev this retreat turned into a stampede.

Bobruisk operation

The Bobruisk operation was carried out in the southern direction. It was supposed to lead to the encirclement of German units, for which Headquarters was preparing a large-scale cauldron. The plan for Operation Bagration stated that this task was to be carried out by the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by Rokossovsky.

The offensive near Bobruisk began on June 24, that is, a little later than on other sectors of the front. There were many swamps in this region. The Germans did not expect the Red Army soldiers to overcome this swamp at all. However, the complex maneuver was still carried out. As a result, the 65th Army made a quick and stunning strike against an enemy that was not expecting trouble. On June 27, Soviet troops established control over the roads to Bobruisk. The assault on the city began. Bobruisk was cleared of Wehrmacht forces by the evening of the 29th. During the operation, the 35th Army and 41st Tank Corps were destroyed. After the successes of the Soviet army on the flanks, the road to Minsk opened for it.

Polotsk strike

After success in Vitebsk, the 1st Baltic Front, under the command of Ivan Bagramyan, began the next stage of the offensive against German positions. Now the Soviet army had to liberate Polotsk. This is what they decided at Headquarters when coordinating Operation Bagration. The capture plan had to be carried out as quickly as possible, since a strong Army Group North was located in this area.

The attack on Polotsk was carried out on June 29 by the forces of several strategic Soviet formations. The Red Army was helped by partisans who unexpectedly attacked small scattering German detachments from the rear. Attacks from both sides brought even greater confusion and chaos into the enemy’s ranks. The Polotsk garrison decided to retreat before the cauldron closed.

On July 4, the Soviet army liberated Polotsk, which was also strategically important because it was a railway junction. This defeat of the Wehrmacht led to personnel purges. The commander of Army Group North, Georg Lindemann, lost his position. The German leadership, however, could do nothing more. Even earlier, on June 28, the same thing happened to Field Marshal Ernst Busch, commander of Army Group Center.

Liberation of Minsk

The successes of the Soviet army allowed Headquarters to quickly set new tasks for Operation Bagration. The plan was to create a boiler near Minsk. It was formed after the Germans lost control of Bobruisk and Vitebsk. The German 4th Army stood east of Minsk and was cut off from the rest of the world, firstly, by Soviet troops advancing from the north and south, and secondly, by natural obstacles in the form of rivers. To the west the river flowed. Berezina.

When General Kurt von Tippelskirch ordered an organized retreat, his army had to cross the river using a single bridge and a dirt road. The Germans and their allies were attacked by partisans. In addition, the crossing area was shelled by bombers. The Red Army crossed the Berezina on June 30. Minsk was liberated on July 3, 1944. In the capital of Belarus, 105 thousand Wehrmacht troops were surrounded. More than 70 were killed, and another 35 were captured.

March to the Baltics

Meanwhile, the forces of the 1st Baltic Front continued to advance to the northwest. The soldiers under the command of Bagramyan were supposed to break through to the Baltic and cut off Army Group North from the rest of the German armed forces. The Bagration plan, in short, assumed that for the operation to be successful, significant reinforcement was needed on this section of the front. Therefore, the 39th and 51st armies were transferred to the 1st Baltic Front.

When the reserves finally fully reached the forward positions, the Germans managed to pull together significant forces to Daugavpils. Now the Soviet army did not have such a pronounced numerical advantage as at the initial stage of Operation Bagration. The plan for a lightning war by that time was almost completed. The soldiers had one last push left to finally liberate Soviet territory from the occupiers. Despite local slippage in the offensive, Daugavpils and Siauliai were liberated on July 27. On the 30th, the military cut the last railway leading from the Baltic states to East Prussia. The next day, Jelgava was recaptured from the enemy, thanks to which the Soviet army finally reached the sea coast.

Vilnius operation

After Chernyakhovsky liberated Minsk and defeated the 4th Wehrmacht Army, Headquarters sent him a new directive. Now the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front had to liberate Vilnius and cross the Neman River. The execution of the order began on July 5, that is, a day after the end of the battle in Minsk.

In Vilnius there was a fortified garrison consisting of 15 thousand soldiers. In order to retain the capital of Lithuania, Hitler began to resort to the usual propaganda moves, calling the city “the last fortress.” Meanwhile, the 5th Army broke through 20 kilometers on the first day of its offensive. The German defense was slack and loose due to the fact that all the divisions operating in the Baltic States were badly battered in previous battles. However, on July 5, the Nazis still tried to carry out a counterattack. This attempt ended in nothing. The Soviet army was already approaching the city.

On the 9th, it captured strategically important points - the station and the airfield. The infantry and tank crews began the decisive assault. The capital of Lithuania was liberated on July 13. It is noteworthy that the soldiers of the 3rd Belorussian Front were assisted by Polish soldiers of the Home Army. Shortly before the fall of the city, she raised an uprising in it.

End of operation

At the final stage of the operation, the Soviet army completed the liberation of the western Belarusian regions located near the border with Poland. On July 27, Bialystok was recaptured. Thus, the soldiers finally reached the pre-war state borders. On August 14, the army liberated Osovets and took a bridgehead on the Narew River.

On July 26, Soviet units found themselves in the suburbs of Brest. Two days later there were no German occupiers left in the city. In August, the offensive began in eastern Poland. The Germans knocked it over near Warsaw. On August 29, a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was published, according to which units of the Red Army were to go on the defensive. The offensive was stopped. The operation is completed.

After the Bagration plan was completed, the Second World War entered its final stage. The Soviet army completely liberated Belarus and could now launch a newly organized offensive in Poland. Germany was approaching final defeat. This is how the great war ended in Belarus. The Bagration plan was implemented as quickly as possible. Gradually, Belarus came to its senses, returning to peaceful life. This country suffered from the German occupation perhaps more than all other Soviet republics.

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