articles about Tsaritsyn

During the civil war in Russia, fierce battles broke out for Tsaritsyn. Bolshevik control over the city did not allow the White armies in the south and east of the country to unite to organize a united front against Soviet power.

From July 1918 to January 3, 1920, Tsaritsyn was a front-line city, where supplies were provided centrally and not for all categories of the population. The situation of the overwhelming majority of the population of Tsaritsyn worsened. The main issue for residents was the daily struggle for survival. The work of city services was disrupted, living conditions did not satisfy the basic needs of the population (there were problems with heating, lack of water, and power outages).

A significant part of the working class was mobilized into the Red Army. However, the main enterprises related to providing the front with everything necessary continued to operate in the city. The authorities organized educational lectures, concerts, and performances. Propaganda work was actively carried out among ordinary residents.

In June 1919, the Caucasian Army P.N. Wrangel managed to take Tsaritsyn. The city establishes a governance structure typical of white-occupied areas of the country. In a stripped-down version, the leaders of the white movement tried to reproduce the system of state power of pre-revolutionary Russia. Lieutenant General Wrangel was the commander-in-chief of the Saratov and northern parts of the Astrakhan province. The Saratov governor, Colonel M.S., was subordinate to him. Lachinov (later Lieutenant General V.V. Ermolov). Prince L.V. was initially placed at the head of the Tsaritsyn district. Djurich, who headed the specially created Tsaritsyn district administration. In a short time, the Tsaritsyn city government was formed, headed by N.S. Rozanov and the Dubovskaya Posad Administration headed by S.I. Popov. In the summer of 1919, elections of volost elders were organized in the Tsaritsyn district. In Tsaritsyn itself there were a number of civil and military institutions.

The district and provincial authorities conducted active correspondence and coordinated their actions in detail, although they were located on neighboring streets of the city. The existing structure of local government was complex and bureaucratic, which did not facilitate the prompt resolution of pressing issues. Key positions in the local administration were occupied by the military.

The Tsaritsyn district administration consisted of three departments:

General Affairs (chief A.P. Khomatin);

Local government (head P.N. Persidsky);

On cases of military service (chief M.D. Golubin).

The management staff consisted of 18 employees and support staff. The total monthly cost of maintaining officials was determined to be 111,150 rubles. The head of the district was entitled to an apartment and a car, and all employees were given a cash increase due to the high cost. Members of the district administration, in addition to salaries, received some benefits, for example, the opportunity to exchange Soviet money for banknotes of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia.

Employees of the Tsaritsyn district zemstvo administration were appointed to positions on the recommendation of priests, heads of educational institutions, and former officials of the Russian Empire. Approval for the position was carried out by the Saratov governor.

Significant changes have occurred in the personnel composition of the county administration in a short period of time. Prince Djurich on July 18 asked the Saratov governor for leave, and on July 20 for expulsion from Tsaritsyn. On July 25, G.M. becomes acting head of the district. Cherkasov, in October this post was occupied by Colonel Lupandin.

To maintain order, the state guard of the Tsaritsyn district was created. The guards were entrusted with a wide range of duties: patrolling the streets, monitoring the quality of food in the city's markets, assisting with searches, ensuring theatrical gatherings, searching for deserters and abandoned property, etc. However, discipline in the guards left much to be desired - officers kept weapons in their apartments, lower ranks left their posts and were sometimes drunk in the barracks.

In the monograph of the Volgograd historian T.G. Ageeva points out the main issues that the city authorities had to solve during the civil war: sewerage maintenance; garbage removal and organization of sewage disposal service in conditions of requisition of horses for the needs of the army; pollution of the streets and squares of Tsaritsyn; depletion of the fire supply; tram stop; desolation of city parks.

In Tsaritsyn, a complex of complex problems persisted: disorder on the streets, poor quality of food in the city markets, loss of city and private property. Medical institutions and schools in Tsaritsyn district were left without maintenance.

An important area of ​​activity for local authorities was the search for funds to ensure the economic life of the region. The Department of Internal Affairs under the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia ordered that revenue be sought locally, taxes collected, and loans from the government relied on in a minimal amount and in the most extreme cases.

Nevertheless, the head of the Tsaritsyn district had to ask the Saratov governor to allocate 100 thousand rubles. for the maintenance of zemstvo medical institutions in the county. Later, Prince Djuric, sending the estimate of the district zemstvo council for approval, indicated that it had no funds at all, and asked for a loan in the amount of two months' maintenance (2,084,168 rubles 58 kopecks).

The head of the county carefully considered proposals from lower authorities to introduce taxes. Thus, the decision of the Tsaritsyn city government to collect fees from ships and timber rafts stopping at the shore of the Volga River was not approved so as not to impede the commercial and industrial development of Tsaritsyn.

Local authorities managed to resolve some complex issues of the socio-economic life of the region. In a short time, tram traffic was restored in the city, the work of railway and river transport was partially established, and the main government institutions were located.

In the Tsaritsyn district there were many wounded military personnel and civilians; cholera, typhoid and typhus were rampant among the population. There was a loss of livestock in the Erzovsky volost. The organization of measures to combat epidemics and epizootics also fell on the shoulders of the local leadership. However, in wartime conditions, the efforts of individual doctors and veterinarians to normalize the situation were clearly not enough. The connection between villages and hamlets with the authorities was weak; orders from Tsaritsyn rarely reached the volost and village boards.

The district leaders were also concerned about the state of firefighting in Tsaritsyn. The Tsaritsyn city fire brigade included 65 people, but its material base was largely lost.

The city lacked housing to accommodate troops and firewood for heating. Soldiers and officers sometimes arbitrarily occupied private houses and apartments of city residents. The head of the district had to conduct correspondence about the advisability of dismantling barracks for firewood, which were allocated for barracks. For the needs of city institutions, the zemstvo administration in August 1919 turned to the Tsaritsyn Timber Industry Union for permission to purchase firewood at one of the timber warehouses. But there was very little forest material in the city, and it was provided primarily for military purposes.

Archival documents show a hierarchy and a high degree of regulation of the activities of government bodies in Tsaritsyn. The head of the district even dealt with minor economic issues, to the point of instructing the Elshansky rural community to mow the grass beyond the Volga or trying to obtain liquid fuel from the Tsaritsyn commission for the sale of military production for the needs of the mills of the Dubovka settlement.

Pettiness and red tape reached the point of absurdity, in particular, when the Novonikolsk rural administration of the Otradninsky volost asked the head of the county to order a seal for the headman.

Residents of the city and refugees from other parts of the country were in dire straits. A large number of people cut off from their previous life sought material support from the authorities. Some of them tried to join the newly created governing bodies. In their petitions, the authors often indicated that they had no means of subsistence. There were many women among the petitioners.

The difficult financial situation of the population and its tireless struggle for basic survival have created a favorable environment for the rapid growth of crime. There was a real rampant crime in Tsaritsyn. Thefts were committed almost every day, and corpses with signs of violent death were often found. One of the most notorious crimes was the large-scale theft of ancient objects and coins from the local museum by soldiers of the Naval Battalion Eremin and Solovyov. Discipline in the Caucasian Army of Baron P.N. Wrangel was rapidly decomposing. Drunk officers and soldiers conducted night searches in the apartments of Tsaritsyn residents and went on carousings in the city’s entertainment establishments. A characteristic feature of the time was the tightly closed windows and doors of the houses of Tsaritsyn inhabitants.

The rise of Stalin. Defense of Tsaritsyn Goncharov Vladislav Lvovich

Chapter XIII. Fighting on the Tsaritsyn Front in November 1918

During the period of October 23–30, when the operation to pursue the White Cossacks to the Kalach-on-Don region, west of Krivomuzginskaya and to the Lyapichev station was successfully developing, the headquarters of the 10th Tsaritsyn Army began to receive alarming information from the Northern sector of the Tsaritsyn Front.

At this time, the commander of the 10th Army, Comrade. Voroshilov strained all his strength to prevent the enemy from disrupting the operation he had planned to capture the right bank of the Don and clear the Tsaritsyn-Povorinskaya railway from it.

Carefully analyzing the progress of the operation to pursue whites in the direction of the Karpovka and Gniloaksayskaya areas, comrade. By October 25, Voroshilov came to the conclusion that the moment had come when it was possible to begin an energetic cleansing of the Northern section of the Tsaritsyn Front with the goal of quickly mastering the Tsaritsyn, Sebryakovo, Povorino railway. It was clear to him that if the units of the 9th Army did not steadfastly hold their front, and the units of the 1st Kamyshin Division on the right flank did not develop active actions in the direction of the Filomovo, Kumylga, (excl.) Sebryakovo stations, i.e. if they do not strive to drive the enemy north of the Medveditsa River to the west to the Sebryakovo-Povorino railway and further to the southwest, beyond the Don River, then all the offensive battles of the 10th Army north of Tsaritsyn will take place in extremely difficult conditions.

The White Cossacks, operating in the Northern sector of the Tsaritsyn Front, received the strictest orders to firmly hold positions north of the line Vertyachiy, Kotluban, Varlamov, Prudki. General Tatarkin, whose division headquarters was located in the Loznoye farm, was ordered: the 5th and 6th cavalry regiments, 1, 4, 17, 41, 78 and 82nd infantry regiments to expand the breakthrough in the direction of Kotluban, Pichuga.

At the headquarters of generals Krasnov and Denisov, after the failure of their offensive west and south of Tsaritsyn, there was still hope for developing success in the north, in the direction of Gumrak and Tsaritsyn. This hope was reinforced by the fact that the White Cossacks continued until October 25 to beat units of Mironov’s division, which was part of the 9th Army and was located at the junction with the 10th Tsaritsyn Army. The White Cossacks were inspired by the successes in the Kamyshin-Krasnoyarsk (Krasny Yar) direction, and they continued their offensive operations, trying to take possession of the Kamyshin, Krasny Yar, Balashov railway. In addition, quite favorable information for the Whites also came from the front of Liski, Novokhopersk, where they also had success against the 8th Red Army of the Southern Front.

October 25, 1918 Comrade. Voroshilov issues order No. 19 to the troops of the 10th Army. Here we present it in full.

To quickly eliminate the breakthrough and oust enemy units in the northern and temporary 4th and 5th sectors of the army entrusted to me, I ORDER:

Northern section under the command of Comrade. Kolpakova:

Keeping close contact with the central sector, the left flank of your troops to knock the enemy from their positions and advance to the northwest and north, occupy the station and the village of Kachalinskaya, crossing the Don River from the village of Trekh-Ostrovenskaya - Zimovensky up to the mouth of the Ilovlya River, which flows into Don River The center and right flank of his troops, keeping close contact with the units of Comrade. Gavrilov (chief of Volskoy) to knock the enemy from their positions and, moving to the northwest and north, occupy the farms: Zotov, Sazanov 2nd, Fastov, Shirokov, Sobachy, Baibaev, Shishkin, Alaev, Zavarigin, Popov, Kolotsky, Art. Ilovlya and the villages of Ilovlinskaya, Pesochny, Peschansky and Avilov. After occupying the above-mentioned farms, gain a foothold in your positions and wait for further orders.

To the temporary 4th combat section under the command of the head of the Volsk division Gavrilov:

Keeping close contact on the right flank with Kosolapov’s units and on the left flank with comrade’s units. Kolpakov, knock the enemy out of their positions throughout the entire sector of their troops, moving to the north-west and north, expanding their combat area, occupy the villages of Sadkovsky, Sazanov 1st, Ermilov, Bolshaya Ivanovka and all the villages along the river. Ilovlya, from Avilov to Ekaterinovskaya inclusive. After completing the above operation and occupying all the farms, gain a foothold in the occupied positions along the river. Ilovlya, awaiting further orders.

To the temporary 5th section under the command of Kosolapov:

Maintaining close contact on the right flank of his troops with Mironov’s units and on the left flank with Gavrilov’s units, as they advance, advance with their units in the direction of Sebryakovo.

Commander of the 10th Army VOROSHILOV.

As we can see, this order is a detailing (mainly for the Northern section) of those directives that Comrade. Voroshilov gave the army troops on October 23 to pursue the White Cossacks across the Don River.

The main operational idea embedded in this order was to eliminate the White breakthrough north of Tsaritsyn, push them back across the Ilovlya River, and then firmly straddle the Tsaritsyn-Povorinskaya railway. We again emphasize the extremely instructive method of using the still little-known comrade. Voroshilov in combat terms of the Volsk division, which he places in the middle (with secured flanks) between the combat sectors of Kolpakov and Kosolapov.

The successful development of the persecution of whites in the Central and Southern sections made it possible to begin the speedy cleansing of the entire area between the Ilovlya and Volga rivers (1st stage), and then between Medveditsa and the Volga (2nd stage).

If Tsaritsyn had received the fire supplies he requested from the Center in a timely manner and if the regiments of the Volskaya Division had not rebelled, then the process of clearing the Northern sector from the enemy would certainly have been faster and more successful. Simultaneously with the operational work, further organizational improvement of the units of the 10th Tsaritsyn Army continued intensively. New cadres of command staff were being trained, and the selection of contingents from new additions began to take place even more carefully. By order of October 25, No. 18, the 1st Don Soviet Rifle Division (three brigades with an artillery brigade) was formed with the attached 1st Soviet Cavalry Brigade, Comrade. Budyonny. Political commissars were appointed to all military units; Those comrades who showed their skill and courage in the decisive battles of Tsaritsyn’s first and second encirclements were promoted to senior command positions.

By order No. 17 of October 23, as we have seen, combat areas with corresponding demarcation lines were established; in order to further consolidate this principle of command organization, it was necessary to clearly indicate that individual divisions, previously subordinate directly to the commander of the 10th Army, were now subordinate to the commanders of combat sectors, and the latter to the army command. This was done mainly in order to more quickly manage the huge front (up to 400 km) held by the 10th Army, and this front was extremely unstable, mobile and intermittent. In addition, it was necessary to give greater operational and tactical freedom in the choice of means and measures to the commanders of combat sectors, of which order No. 17 of October 23 established five. In other words, five command levels were established with five private commanders directly subordinate to Comrade. Voroshilov.

We must not forget the main thing that in 1918 the Red Army built and improved its combat units in the fire and storm of severe hardships, battles, in conditions of a lack of fire supplies, valiantly repelling the onslaught of external and internal counter-revolution from all sides. Discipline in battle and outside of battle was not yet at its best everywhere, and therefore Comrade. Voroshilov very often addressed the troops with orders that required iron discipline and strict organization. On October 26, when the immediate danger to Tsaritsyn had already ceased and the defeated and demoralized enemy was retreating in the Central and Southern combat sectors, holding for now only to the north of Tsaritsyn, Comrade. Voroshilov issues the following, extremely instructive order No. 20 to the troops of the 10th Tsaritsyn Army:

“In the fire of battle, amid the anxieties and joys of life on the march, the army on the Tsaritsyn front tirelessly continued its internal construction. Large combat units were created, discipline was approved. And the Military Revolutionary Council of the 10th Army salutes both the comrades of the Red Army for their desire for revolutionary discipline, and the command staff for their efforts to create the military structure of the army and raise its fighting revolutionary spirit to the fear of the enemies of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. But at the same time, observing individual cases of evasion of discipline, hesitation in the execution of orders, and disobedience to higher command, the Military Revolutionary Council of the Army, on the basis of decrees of the highest Soviet power, by this order strictly prescribes the strictest observance of revolutionary discipline and the order of subordination. Section chiefs report directly to the army commander and the Military Revolutionary Council of the army, division commanders report to section chiefs, brigade commanders to division commanders, regiment commanders to brigade commanders, etc., up to and including platoon commanders, section commanders, and every Red Army soldier in the Soviet Army. Between all members of the command staff, as well as among fellow Red Army soldiers, there must be strict comradely discipline, built on mutual respect for each other.”

By order to the troops of October 30, Comrade. Voroshilov seconded the 38th Rogozhsko-Simonovsky Regiment to the 1st Communist Division. In its glorious ranks the 38th Regiment of Moscow proletarians fought with exceptional heroism and fortitude.

In the process of developing active operations north of Tsaritsyn, for the hundredth time he sent to the Center and the headquarters of the Southern Front a request to send not “telegrams of promises”, but cargoes with fire supplies to supply them to the heroic fighters who continued to fight, having a small supply of products from Tsaritsyn factories and trophies.

Comrade Voroshilov wrote:

“KOZLOV, COMFORT TO SYTIN,

MEKHANOSHIN, MEMBER OF THE MILITARY REVIEW COUNCIL,

COPY ARZAMAS. TO THE CHIEF COMMANDER

I report: by October 31 of this year, the army entrusted to me had grown to a strength of more than 70,000 people (infantry, cavalry, artillery). Everyone is trained. Until now, the 10th Army heroically repelled the enemy’s advance, fighting back more than once without ammunition, using only bayonets. Supplies to the army began to arrive in small quantities; Despite timely demands, their release is still delayed.

November 5 this year. The army went on the offensive in the Archadinsky and Kamyshinsky sectors and, upon receiving the released combat supplies in sufficient quantities, will go on the offensive along the entire front. The strength of the army is sent twice a month to the headquarters of the Southern Front. No. 165.

Commander-10 VOROSHILOV."

On October 31, at the headquarters of the 10th Army it became known that its right neighbor - the 9th Army of the Southern Front - was again defeated and, under pressure from the White Cossacks, was retreating east of the Kamyshin-Balashov railway. Mironov's division retreated with heavy losses to the Rudnya region, Kikvidze's division to Aleksandrovka, Matyshevo.

On October 30, the White Cossacks occupied Krasny Yar, interrupting Balashov’s communication with Kamyshin. In other words, a direct threat was created to the only route for supplying the 10th Army - the Kamyshin area and the railway running from it to Balashov - Tambov - Moscow.

November 1 Comrade Voroshilov gives two orders, No. 24 and No. 25, aimed at eliminating the successes of the White Cossacks in the Kamyshin direction and north of Tsaritsyn as expediently and quickly as possible. Order No. 25 Comrade. Voroshilov entrusts the command of the Central sections with a 140-km front from the Myshkova (Yuzhnaya) River, through Vertyachiy to the village. Ekaterinovsky (on the Ilovlya River) and indicates that in the Northern sector he will have an assistant, Comrade. Kolpakov. The southern section of Kharchenko remained unchanged, as stated in Order No. 17 of October 23.

The front from the Ekaterinovsky farm to Krasny Yar was awarded to the division commander of the Kamyshin division; All troops that were sent to the Kamyshin area were subordinate to him.

Thus, the command of the Central Section had: the Steel Division, the 2nd Consolidated Cossack, Kotlubano-Buzinovskaya, Kachalinskaya, Don-Stavropol, 1st Communist, Volskaya divisions and the Sorokin brigade.

The main operational idea included in order No. 24 was to, by regrouping units, allocate a strike group from the most combat-experienced 1st Communist Division to the Archada direction with the task of capturing the Archeda area and thereby going to the rear of the White Cossacks who had broken through in the direction to Krasny Yar.

To do this, the Steel Division, 1st Donetsk-Morozovskaya, 2nd Consolidated-Donskaya and Kachalinskaya divisions had to continue their advance to the Don at the mouth of the Myshkova (Southern) River, Kolotsky village. Four and a half divisions (Don-Stavropol, Communist, Volskaya and 1st Kamyshinskaya and one brigade) are advancing in the zone between the Medveditsa and Volga rivers. By this time (the first days of November 1918), the combat composition of the divisions was as follows:

The strike group, i.e., the 1st Communist Division, was to be assisted on the left flank by the Don-Stavropol division under the command of Kolpakov with an offensive along the Don River to the Dukhovskaya farm, and on the right flank by the Volskaya and Kamyshinskaya divisions, which were supposed to advance to the front Kamyshin, Gurov. In addition, a group of 1,500 fighters was supposed to strike to the rear from the Kamyshin area to destroy the enemy who had broken through to Krasny Yar.

Comrade Voroshilov believed that after the regrouping of the divisions, on the morning of November 3, it was possible to launch an offensive in the direction of Arched and Povorino.

The VI All-Russian Extraordinary Congress of Soviets met on November 6–9. During the congress, reports were received about the German revolution, which crossed out the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

Comrade Voroshilov informed Comrade. Stalin about the departure of delegates from the 10th Tsaritsyn Army to the VI Congress of Soviets:

FROM A DIRECT CONVERSATION OF COMRADE VOROSHILOV (TSARITSYN) WITH COMRADE STALIN (MOSCOW) IN EARLY NOVEMBER 1918

VOROSHILOV. Delegates leave for the convention tonight. The supply situation remains hopeless. Kamyshin is directly threatened by the enemy, information has been received about the occupation of Nizhny by cadets. Dobrynka, which is 25–30 versts above Kamyshin. We took measures to defend Kamyshin, but this whole sad, if not fabulous, more sad story happened with such dizzying speed, and right on the nose of the front commands, that we could not do anything else. The general situation remains sluggish, but we already have information that the enemy is accumulating forces at Lyapichev and other places. As for our parades and reviews, they made a certain impression on Trotsky, who was convinced that we did not have detachments, but that we really had an organized, serious revolutionary army. I, Voroshilov, now remain here almost alone. Working now, under the current conditions, is terribly difficult.

STALIN. I believe that you must gather all your active comrades from Astrakhan and Voronezh in order to organize the work of the front in an exemplary manner. Voroshilov, as a commander, is the owner of the front and he has the opportunity to arrange things as he sees fit. All your notes are kept in a briefcase...

VOROSHILOV. Tell me, what is the position of the North Caucasian troops?

STALIN. They also suffer without supplies, just like you. According to the information received, units of the Caucasian Army are occupied by the Caucasian Army and they are heading to Tikhoretskaya, which is also possibly occupied. A comrade passing through Moscow reported this to us.

VOROSHILOV. The departing comrades will report everything in detail, and I, on my part, ask you to inform me more often about the state of affairs in the center. In addition, I ask you to send Parkhomenko here, who I really need.

STALIN. I’ll tell Parkhomenko this very minute. As for the policy change, wait until after the convention. Things in the Center will now go better than they have gone so far. I have no doubt about it. I'm leaving, shaking everyone's hands.

VOROSHILOV. Please tell me, what have you heard about the West?

STALIN. Nothing special yet.

VOROSHILOV. Well, good luck. Greetings from us to Comrade Ilyich, shake hands.

STALIN. Ilyich is with you in spirit, he fell in love with you, devils.

VOROSHILOV. This is our greatest reward for all the undeserved insults inflicted by other comrades. Be healthy.

STALIN. Shake your hand.

We interrupted the presentation of the operations of the 10th Army at the moment when it began to regroup its units to carry out the order of Comrade. Voroshilov for No. 24 dated November 1. The regrouping of units proceeded normally; Only from the area occupied by the regiments of the Volskaya division, by November 5, information began to arrive that in parts of the Volskaya division the mood was such that they were unlikely to fulfill the combat mission assigned to them by order No. 24. Three regiments of the Volskaya division concentrated in the Loznoye region, which the White Cossacks by November 3 they left, moving north to the line of the Ilovlya River. Comrade On November 6, Voroshilov sent order No. 28 to the head of the Volsk division Gavrilov and political commissar Belyaev:

“I order the Volsk division to immediately begin executing operational order No. 24; for failure to comply with the order, the entire command staff and commissars will be put on trial by the Military Revolutionary Tribunal, and provocateurs who incite soldiers to fail to comply will be shot without trial. Telegraph me about receipt of order No. 28. No. 132."

But this order had no effect on the Volsk division, which had completely disintegrated, and the command was unable to restore order and properly deal with the leaders of the rebellion.

“Our units went on the offensive at 8 o’clock in the morning, the troops are approaching the Beluzhinsky crossing, which will be occupied today. The enemy has not yet revealed himself. Successful progress is greatly hampered by the destruction of all railway bridges and damage to the track. Over a large area, the rails were bent and the sleepers were destroyed. I will inform you about further actions in a timely manner."

And at a time when stubborn battles were taking place along the railway leading to the Ilovlya station, when, under the personal leadership of Comrade Voroshilov, the valiant heroes, the Moscow workers of the 38th Rogozhsko-Simonovsky regiment went on the attack, destroying the class enemy, bleeding in the fiercest battles , when the brigade of Comrade Sorokin named after the Third International, with a deft maneuver, entered the rear of the Whites and with one blow destroyed 250 people in the area of ​​the Ilovlya station with 2 officers, at that moment the 1st Astrakhan, 1st and 2nd Balaklava rifle regiments, abandoning their positions, concentrated in the Loznoe area, deciding to go further to Dubovka. Units of the 2nd Ilovlinsky Regiment of the 1st Kamyshin Division, succumbing to the counter-revolutionary agitation of rebels from the Volskaya Division who had sneaked into the regiment, also abandoned their positions and retreated to the rear.

During this rebellion, the 1st and 2nd Balaklava and 2nd Ilovlinsky regiments abandoned their positions, the 7th company of the 1st Ilovlinsky regiment showed outstanding heroism: surrounded by the rebel regiments, it responded to their demand to surrender their weapons with rifle and machine-gun fire, broke through from the Zakharovka area to the Aleksandrovka area, disarmed one of the treacherous companies of the 2nd Ilovlinsky regiment and continued to fight hard with the White Cossacks. The leaders of this valiant deed, Solomentsov (regimental commissar) and Dorokhin (commander of the 7th company) received the gratitude of the commander of the 10th Army, Comrade. Voroshilov.

Seeing that the further spread of the rebellion could disrupt the offensive of our strike group, which was successfully developing towards the Ilovlya station, Comrade Voroshilov ordered the liquidation of the rebellion of the Volsk division units as soon as possible. For this purpose, he allocates a detachment under the command of the hero of the Tsaritsyn defense, Comrade. Mikhailovsky, who very quickly and successfully eliminated the mutiny of the regiments of the Volsk division.

Back on November 1, the commander of the Southern Front, Trotsky’s protégé, Sytin, issued a directive in which he decided to launch an energetic offensive with all armies. He wrote:

“I recognize the Povorino line of the Tsaritsyn railway as the main operational direction, and in this direction a crushing blow must be dealt to the enemy from both Povorino (the main strike group) and from Tsaritsyn.”

The operational plan of the front commander was to launch a “swift, energetic, concentric” strike by the 8th, 9th and 10th armies in the direction of Talovaya, Kalach; Povorino, Filonovo and the valleys of the Archeda and Medveditsa rivers. But nothing came of this offensive, which was supposed to begin on November 4. Moreover, this directive was taken with him to Krasnov by Colonel Nosovich, an active member of the White Guard “National Center” who defected to the White Cossacks. On this occasion, Comrade. Voroshilov wrote:

“MOSCOW, CEC, CHAIRMAN SVERDLOV

From Tsaritsyn, accepted 6/XI 1918.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Eighth Army informed us that the former headquarters of Sevkavokr Nosovich had gone over to the side of the Whites. Not only we, but the front commander Slaven repeatedly pointed out Nosovich’s obvious counter-revolutionism, but the usual inattention of our comrades gave him the opportunity this time to evade punishment and take command of the enemy forces. We believe that at the moment it is necessary to take a number of emergency measures in relation to Nosovich’s closest associates, who held prominent positions with him: General Snesarev, released from arrest and commander of the Western curtain, and especially Kovalevsky, chief of staff of the Southern Front, openly declaring (which can be confirmed by Stalin and Sergo Ordzhonikidze) that he is not fighting the Cossacks. It is absolutely necessary and urgent to clean up the Southern Front and replace all codes, since the fact of Nosovich’s unhindered passage not only through our line, but also through the enemy’s line clearly indicates Nosovich’s relations with the enemy while he was at front headquarters.

Commander X

K. VOROSHILOV.”

Krasnov and Denisov, having learned the operational plan of the commander of the Southern Front, Sytin, launched a concentrated 13,000-strong group into an energetic attack on the Liski, Talovaya front in the direction of Voronezh. This greatly alarmed Commander Sytin, and he abandoned his plan for a concentric offensive. On the evening of November 3, Sytin wrote to Comrade. Voroshilov that the White Cossacks were conducting an offensive in large forces in the area of ​​Bobrov, Nikolaevka, and Kupavka. They attacked the front of the 8th Army, whose position had become threatening, and therefore “the reserves intended for the general offensive had to be distributed to two armies to delay the enemy’s successes.” Sytin demanded that the 10th Army develop an offensive in the direction of the Sebryakovo station, where as many troops as possible could be concentrated. The success of the White Cossacks developed every day. The front of the 8th and 9th armies again suffered heavy losses (the Latvian regiments and the 11th division, which lost 37 guns, were almost out of action).

For this failure of the operation, Sytin was removed from command of the Southern Front.

By mid-November 1918, Comrade. It became clear to Voroshilov that the 10th Army (Tsaritsyn), as before, was left to its own devices; no help can be expected from the North Caucasus and the Southern Front. In the North Caucasus, the Sorokinism greatly complicated the situation. Denikin, with the help of the Entente powers, firmly took possession of the Kuban and Stavropol regions, and although under the leadership of Comrade. Ordzhonikidze, the 12th Red Army successfully suppressed the counter-revolutionary uprising of the Terek White Cossacks, but these private successes could not dramatically help the overall military-political situation in the North Caucasus, which was unfavorable for the Soviet government. The latter was cut off from the Center for a long time. On the Southern Front, the 8th and 9th armies could only conduct defensive operations, which they did throughout November 1918.

On November 15, the commander-in-chief wrote to Comrade. Voroshilov that in place of the Volsk division he was sending the Ural division at the disposal of the 10th Army in the Kamyshin area. The commander-in-chief wrote:

“According to the situation, your entire army should go on the offensive. The main task falls on your army, since it is the strongest. I ask you to use all your authority to lift the mood.”

The Commander-in-Chief, in telegram No. 341 addressed to the new commander Slaven, demanded that all armies go on the offensive as quickly as possible in order to capture the Borisoglebsk-Tsaritsyn railway. To this, the command responded to the commander-in-chief on November 16 about the reasons for the failures of the 8th and 9th armies and that in November this task was impossible for the front. Here the commanding officer emphasized that the poor state of combat supplies of the 10th Army was hampering Comrade. Voroshilov in the development of broad offensive operations.

But the military-political situation (the November revolution in Germany, Krasnov’s attempts to change his German orientation to the Anglo-French one) required the development of decisive operations against Krasnov for the final liquidation of the remnants of his units.

The entire second half of November passed again for Comrade. Voroshilov in intense activity. Operational combat work was continuously interspersed, as before, with large organizational work on the construction of the 10th Army.

By November 22, comrade. Voroshilov and artillery inspector comrade. Kulik carried out a thorough and extensive work on accounting and regrouping all the artillery available in the troops of the Tsaritsyn Front. Then an order was given for the 10th Army, which assigned to each division the appropriate number of batteries and calibers of guns, organizing them into artillery brigades and artillery divisions. Summarizing these data by division, we give the corresponding table showing the presence of artillery in the divisions, which received a light artillery brigade and a heavy artillery division (see table).

Availability of artillery in the divisions of the Tsaritsyn Front:

In addition, all active troops of the 10th Army were consolidated into divisions, the latter having 2-3 brigades, brigades - 2-3 regiments.

According to the order of comrade. Voroshilov for No. 55, the 10th Army in the second half of November 1918 formed:

1) Kamyshin rifle division;

2) Don-Stavropol Rifle Division;

3) Communist Rifle Division;

4) Donetsk-Morozov rifle division;

5) 1st Don Soviet Rifle Division;

6) Steel Rifle Division;

7) Budyonny’s cavalry brigade, after the entire cavalry of the Steel Division joined it, was deployed into the Consolidated Cavalry Division.

We must constantly remember that all this large organizational work on reorganizing the units took place in 1918, during stormy days of battle, under enemy fire, who did not weaken his activity on the Tsaritsyn front. And, of course, a whole series of these organizational measures by Comrade. Voroshilov inevitably aroused notes of discontent among individual commanders who did not yet fully understand the need to reorganize units and regroup combat assets; they wrote letters to the command of the 10th Army, expressing their grievances and dissatisfaction, to which the army command responded with great tact, bringing clarity to this matter. As an illustration, at the end of the book there is a letter from one of the combat commanders of the Tsaritsyn Front and the answer to him from the commander of the 10th Army.

In order to completely eliminate the remnants of Krasnov's troops, Comrade Voroshilov carried out three remarkable operations in the most important directions.

On the twentieth of November, comrade. Voroshilov went to the Southern combat sector of Comrade. Kharchenko. From Abganerov he wrote to Tsaritsyn:

“Inquire immediately about the Ural Division [i.e. that is, about the one that, as we saw above, was promised by the commander in chief. - Vl. M.], contact Kozlov [Headquarters of the Southern Front. - Vl. M.], point out the importance of the situation with the cessation of navigation [the cold weather set in, and the ships of the Volga flotilla began to winter. - Vl. M.]. In the southern section the situation is the same. Ours occupy st. Abganerovo, the village [Gniloye] Abganerovo and to the East to Elmat - Tundutovo, to the northwest to the village. Lus, which is east of Stepannikov. I leave for the location of the Steel Division on November 23, 1918.

VOROSHILOV."

Although Comrade Voroshilov was very skeptical about the possibility of the commander-in-chief quickly transferring the Ural division he had promised to the 10th Tsaritsyn Army, but he still asked to find out once again how things were going with this division. And, indeed, Comrade Voroshilov’s fears came true. Four days later he received the following urgent telegram from the commander-in-chief:

“Commander-10 Voroshilov. 27.XI.18 Serpukhov.

I ask you to urgently inform me if you have the opportunity to select from your army one completely reliable and combat-ready brigade, staffed by workers from the Donetsk basin, to transfer it to the Voronezh direction. No. 373."

Comrade Voroshilov asked for the Ural division promised to him mainly for the Kamyshin combat sector (where he appointed Antonyuk as commander of the Northern combat sector and division commander), since the disbandment of the Volskaya division and the activity of the White Cossacks on the Krasny Yar, Kamyshin front required strengthening of this direction. But after the above telegram No. 373 of the commander-in-chief, it became clear that the fight had to be waged, relying only on available forces.

November 23 in the Abganerovo area comrade. Voroshilov, having familiarized himself with the situation on the spot, with the position of his units and the enemy, authorized the plan for the proposed active operation, which was conceived by the commander of the Southern section Kharchenko together with the command of the Don Soviet division and the cavalry brigade comrade. Budyonny. Careful reconnaissance established that the white cavalry units of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, the 1st and 2nd Plastun Regiments, the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Infantry Regiments, as well as the 46th and 2nd 1st infantry regiments are grouped in the area of ​​​​Gniloaksayskaya and the Kucherovy farm. There was also an officer regiment with 4 guns and 8 machine guns. These White Cossack units (76th, 77th, 78th, 79th partisan infantry regiments) were part of General Popov’s group, while the rest were separated and grouped to the south, in the area of ​​Kotelnikovo, Zimovniki.

The commander of the Southern section decided to take the initiative into his own hands and defeat the Gniloaksay group of whites; to this he received consent from the commander of the 10th Army. The details of this remarkable, lightning-fast operation are little known and are only recorded in the order for the troops of the 10th Army, Comrade. Voroshilov. Basically, it was like this: Budyonny’s cavalry brigade (deployed from November 28 into a consolidated cavalry division), secretly and skillfully penetrated the rear of the White Cossacks, with the full assistance of the infantry units of the 1st Don Soviet Division, advancing south of the station. Abganerovo, with a successful maneuver, as Comrade Voroshilov writes in his order dated November 26, took

“...the enemy was encircled and completely defeated by his cavalry, the 46th and 2nd Volga Infantry Regiments in full force. Thanks to the outstanding composure and management of the commanders and the boundless courage of the Red Army heroes, who promptly and accurately carried out the combat order, almost the entire existing strength of the enemy regiments was destroyed, and the trophies left to us were enormous. Until now, several carriages of prisoners have been noted - soldiers, cadets, with 7 officers sent to Tsaritsyn, the rest of the prisoners are collected and counted; 2 guns, 11 machine guns, two thousand rifles, over 100 carts with cartridges and shells were taken, containing more than 300,000 rounds of ammunition and over 1,500 shells; the total number of prisoners exceeds 700, there are more than 300 enemy corpses on the battlefield; The pursuit of the enemy continues. Announcing this brilliant victory for the troops of the 10th Army, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Army is proud and happy to note this outstanding case of heroic courage both on the part of the command staff and on the part of the comrades of the Red Army. With such troops, the victorious banners of the great socialist world revolution will not know defeat. Honor and praise to the comrade heroes!

Upon submission of a more detailed report, the Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army will present the most courageous and distinguished people for a military award.

Commander of the 10th VOROSHILOV."

Simultaneously with the Gniloaksay operation, it unfolded under the direct personal leadership of Comrade. Voroshilov fought a fierce battle with superior forces of the White Cossacks south of Krivomuzginskaya, on the front of the Steel Division.

“TSARITSYN, MILITARY COUNCIL, TOV. SCHADENKO

Telegraph to Krivaya Muzga what has been done with the flotilla for withdrawal for the winter.

VOROSHILOV."

“Measures have been taken regarding the flotilla. Some urgent matters urgently require your presence in Tsaritsyn. No. 3236.

SCHADENKO.

"TSARITSYN, REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL, SCHADENKO

He led the battles all day. The enemy, with six regiments of cavalry, completely outflanked the division, which fought back all day. The enemy suffered heavy losses, ours stopped in the east in front of Varlamovka. I'm going to Tsaritsyn.

VOROSHILOV."

This operation proceeded in this way.

Arrival of comrade Voroshilov's deployment of the Steel Division's troops coincided with the energetic offensive of the White Cossacks on the front of this division. According to order No. 24 for the 10th Army, the Steel Division was supposed to leave the reserve and occupy the front from Marinovka through Krivomuzginskaya further south, approximately to the Stepannikov area. The troops of the Steel Division occupied the front indicated to it. Early in the morning of November 24 at the location of the 1st revolutionary infantry regiment (1018 bayonets, 27 machine guns), 1st and 2nd Don infantry regiments (1070 bayonets, 25 machine guns and 633 bayonets and 15 machine guns), 1st Tikhoretsky infantry regiment (852 bayonets and 16 machine guns) and a reserve infantry regiment (719 bayonets and 20 machine guns) were attacked by a mounted group of six White Cossack regiments consisting of 8,000 sabers. The enemy tried to attack the left flank and the center of the Steel Division through the Varlamov farm into the deep rear of the Reds and quickly capture the Karpovka area.

The Whites launched a cavalry attack on the front of Varlamov and Buzinovka, trying to capture the heights on the right bank of the Donskaya Tsaritsa River. The soldiers of the Steel Division were bypassed by a successful maneuver of the White Cossacks and fought surrounded. All day long comrade. Voroshilov, risking his life every moment, gave orders on the battlefield and directed the course of the battle between the red infantry and the white cavalry.

In the end, the White Cossacks, seeing the futility of all their attempts to squeeze the regiments of the Steel Division into the fire ring, began to dismount and, under the cover of armored cars, continued to advance in chains. One of the armored cars broke through from Varlamov, but under well-aimed artillery fire he had to retreat, and then at the end of the day of battle he was shot down and destroyed.

A detachment of 8,000 White Cossacks at the end of a continuous 16-hour battle became frenzied with rage; suffering huge losses and feeling powerless to tip the scales to his side, he began to quickly leave in separate groups to the west, abandoning his wounded and exterminating the wounded Red Army soldiers remaining on the battlefield.

Heroic day November 24 in the combat life of the Steel Division comrade. Voroshilov marked the order for the 10th Army:

“With a feeling of revolutionary gratitude, I note the selfless courage of the infantry regiments of the Steel Division, which throughout the whole day acted courageously and steadfastly, repelling the enemy, who surrounded the glorious revolutionary steel fighters with a ring. The enemy suffered heavy losses and retreated in disarray, leaving behind the parts of our positions that he had occupied. Having led and personally observed the battle on November 24 throughout the day, I note the personal courage and excellent management of artillery fire by artillery inspector comrade. Kulik, who single-handedly drove away an enemy armored car that had come to our rear with gunfire.

To my comrades: acting chief of the Steel Division Gorelenko, commander of the Tikhoretsky regiment Shelistov, I express special gratitude for their dedication and revolutionary courage - being both wounded, they did not leave their post and fought valiantly and led the battle until late at night.

For courage and high revolutionary valor, I thank comrades Parkhomenko, who was assigned to me on assignment, and the assistant chief of the combat area, Agatanovich, who worked tirelessly under a hail of bullets and shrapnel until the enemy was broken.

Once again I note the courage and high revolutionary tenacity of the infantry of the Steel Division; in all honesty I must say that the artillery could have acted much better, but taking into account the criminal attitude of the chief of artillery, Comrade. Ogienko, who was completely absent during the battle, this is the only way I explain the reason for the confusion and inappropriate behavior of some of the battery commanders, who prevented the comrade artillerymen from distinguishing themselves. To the artillery inspector comrade. I order Kulik to investigate the reason for the absence of Comrade. Ogienko and, having removed him from his duties, put him on trial by the Military Revolutionary Tribunal of the army.

Commander-10 VOROSHILOV."

On November 23-25, the troops of the Donetsk-Morozov, Don-Stavropol, Kachalin and Svodno-Don divisions continued to develop the offensive, carrying out order No. 24 comrade. Voroshilov on November 1, courageously pushing the White Cossacks back across the Don River.

By November 25, at the Kalach site, the mouth of the Ilovlya River, the White Cossacks were pushed back to the right bank of the Don. Units of the Communist Division were transferred to Log, the Archadin direction, where they successfully operated in the Tsaritsyn-Povorino railway line.

On November 23, a fierce battle broke out on the banks of the Ilovlya River. A group of White Cossacks under the leadership of General Tatarkin put up stubborn resistance and firmly held the northern bank of the Ilovlya River from the mouth to the village. Avilov. With a swift attack, the regiments of the Communist Division and the 38th Rogozhsko-Simonovsky Regiment defeated the group of the White Cossack General Tatarkin and completely destroyed the 78th, 98th, 82nd Don Regiments, throwing the remnants of this group to the Archeda station. By November 23–25, the battle line on the Tsaritsyn front ran from Lipki station further to Novogrigorievskaya and along the left bank of the Don River to the Cherkassky farm. This was a huge victory, considering the fact that the 10th Tsaritsyn Army still received very little of the weapons and fire supplies it needed, despite promises from the central supply authorities. This intolerable situation forced Comrade. Voroshilov at the end of November to contact the Center to comrades Lenin, Sverdlov, the commander-in-chief and commander of the Southern Front with the following telegram:

“... We have enough to fight back until Christmas. During this time, we will exhaust supplies, our replenishments will not cover current losses, we will bleed to death, we risk destroying the army, surrendering Tsaritsyn, if absolutely emergency measures are not taken by the Center. It becomes clear that the 9th and 10th armies with their available forces at full strength will not solve the totality of the task at hand. We absolutely need the immediate dispatch of one full division to the Kamyshinsky sector. Currently, we have attracted large enemy forces, we cannot make any transfer, the front is cracking. No. 1575."

With a completely insufficient supply of fire supplies, it often happened that cargo destined for Tsaritsyn or Kamyshin disappeared on the road and empty wagons arrived at the 10th Army, replaced along the way by clever businessmen in the rear of the Southern Front. For example, in a conversation over a direct wire, the head of the Kamyshinsky combat section complained to the chief of staff of the 10th Army that a cargo of 2000 rifles had disappeared on the road between Tambov and Balashov, and empty carriages had arrived in Kamyshin. Supply frauds of this kind further complicated the already difficult situation with weapons and fire supplies.

In the Kamyshinsky region, due to the constant instability of the left flank units of the 9th Army (Mironov's division), the situation was tense all the time. November 30 Comrade Voroshilov wrote to the commander of the Southern Front:

“KOZLOV, COMFRONT SLAVEN

The situation in the Northern section is improving; with the measures taken, the breakthrough will soon be eliminated. Take the most urgent measures against the outrages caused by Mironov, as a result of his unprovoked withdrawal from the Ilmen and Aidadurovo stations [Krasny Yar. - Vl. M.], our Northern sector cannot contact him and the enemy is given the opportunity to break through to the north. No. 3428.

Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army

VOROSHILOV."

Cold days have arrived; sporadic battles continued along the entire front in conditions of prolonged rain and snow; Comrade's orders Voroshilov are full of concern for the fighter. He strictly ordered to equip the trenches as best as possible, arrange flooring, and take care of delivering straw to the trenches in order to preserve the health of the soldiers. Comrade Voroshilov ordered to increase vigilance for the insidious enemy, especially at night, checking as often as possible (at least every half hour) guards, secrets, outposts, etc.

The Kamyshinsky region held out quite steadfastly, fighting 40–50 km to the west and 100 km to the north-west of the city of Kamyshin and repelling any attempts by the White Cossacks to cut the Kamyshin-Krasny Yar railway.

At the end of November, the White Cossacks broke through the front on the Ilovlya River, north of the Aleksandrovka farm, and began to spread again in the direction of Ust-Pagozhay, Loznoe. This was a demonstrative group consisting of two cavalry and one infantry regiments, since the main enemy forces were in the area of ​​Kotovo and Solomatino. The main operational idea of ​​the Whites was to straddle the Kamyshin-Balashov railway as soon as possible, strike at the junction between the 9th and 10th armies, separate them and fight each of these armies separately.

The enemy's transition to the southern bank of Ilovlya forces Comrade. Voroshilov to take urgent measures to localize this success of White. He orders the organization of the Dubovsky detachment and sends it under the command of Shamov to the north with the task together with the right flank of the troops of Comrade. Kolpakov to occupy the front on Ilovlya from Zakharovka to Uspenka. At the same time, in early December, units of the 9th Army, having launched a successful offensive (15th division - to Aleksikovo, 16th - to Yaryzhenskaya station, 23rd - to Filonovo station), captured the railway, but soon it was again lost and occupied a front 40–50 km south (Bulgurinsky) and southwest (Preobrazhenskaya) of the Krasny Yar - Balashov railway. Under these conditions, comrade. Voroshilov writes the following letter-telegram to the command of the Kamyshinsky district:

"KAMYSHIN, NACHUCHASTKA

From Tsaritsyn, adopted 3/XII - 1918

I order an energetic offensive in accordance with Order No. 36. All actions of the Ninth Army depend on your sector. The offensive must be carried out without regard for anything; put everything on the line and carry out order No. 36. Collect, pull together everything you can, and decide your and our fate. Tell Antonyuk, Mikhailovsky and everyone else, I also ask you, let them make every effort and show more energy.

I wish you success.

Commander X

VOROSHILOV."

Along the entire length of the Kamyshin Front, as well as to the south of its left flank (Solomatino), stubborn battles ensued, which ended successfully in the first half of December; the White Cossacks were thrown back west of the line Burluk, Kotovo, Solomatino; further the front went along the Ilovlya River from Zakharovka to Lipki.

At the end of November 1918, the hetman regime in Ukraine collapsed. November 30 Comrade Voroshilov gave orders to the 10th Army, informing the soldiers about the overthrow of Skoropadsky’s power in Ukraine and the election of the Soviet government consisting of Artyom, Voroshilov and others:

“The Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army calls on you, one and all, to remain steadfastly and fearlessly at your posts. The day is approaching when our victorious banners with joyful music will march across the fields of the Don, Kuban, and Ukraine, accompanied by fraternal cries of greetings that will greet all workers...

Long live Ukraine! Long live the red Ukrainian soldiers of the 10th Army and all their comrades in the upcoming victorious battles for the liberation of Ukraine!”

In December 1918, fighting on the Tsaritsyn Front took place only in certain operational directions.

The 10th Army bled heavily in October-November. Almost continuous fighting, as well as illness, put many fighters out of action. Losses numbered in the thousands. In December, the strength of the Tsaritsyn army dropped from 70,000 soldiers to 40,000. This circumstance forced Comrade. Voroshilov to appeal to the Center with a request to replenish this severe loss of people. The large front and the lack of reserves urgently required new reinforcements: the Kamyshin Division required 8,900 people, the Communist Division - 7,800 people, the Steel Division - 7,500 people, the Donetsk-Morozov Division - 9,600, the 1st Don Soviet Division - 8,700 and the Don-Stavropol Division - 7,600 Human.

Comrade Voroshilov asked to send reinforcements, uniformed and armed. Unfortunately, this request was fulfilled by no more than 10%. In December, thanks to the well-organized work of the Tsaritsyn factories, thanks to trophies and the ability to save supplies, to which Comrade Voroshilov constantly paid the most serious attention of his troops, fire supplies, although small, were still calculated at 25 million cartridges and 50,000 shells.

Krasnov's change of orientation from German to Allied failed; The Entente powers helped Denikin in every possible way. Krasnov completely lost his political and military authority on the Don; Soon he was dismissed by the Circle of the “All-Great Don Army”.

In December 1918, on the Tsaritsyn front, the weather worsened every day: impassable mud during the cold rains, strong, bone-piercing winds were supplemented by heavy snowfall.

The enormous material and human losses of the Don Cossack Army required new forces and reinforcements. The broad, maneuverable nature of the hostilities of the six-month period (from July 1918) gave way to calm on the Tsaritsyn front. After Ataman Krasnov was dismissed, General Denikin prepared his protege, General Sidorin, to replace him. But this happened already in 1919.

author Morozov Miroslav Eduardovich

Chapter 2. AIR COMBAT IN NOVEMBER. REFLECTION OF THE FIRST STORM OF SEVASTOPOL The battles near Sevastopol between November 1 and 21 entered Russian historiography as a reflection of the first assault on the city. German historians do not consider this an assault, preferring to call it “an attempt to take

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Chapter III. TURNING TURN IN THE WAR: Confrontation between the national policies of the USSR and Germany in the occupied territory of the Soviet Union in November 1942–1943

We continue to publish materials from the archive of completed certificates. We present to your attention a certificate prepared for the thematic request “Civil War in Tsaritsyn District” by bibliographer M. N. Urusova.

During the Civil War, Tsaritsyn, as a railway transport hub and a city with a developed river shipping company, was a strategically important site. Both whites and reds fought for its possession. In the history of the Civil War, the fighting between warring factions is written as the “defense of Tsaritsyn.”

1. Abrosimov, M. Pages of the past [Text]: from the history of the Astrakhan Provincial Extraordinary Commission / M. Abrosimov, V. Zhilinsky. - Volgograd: Nizh.-Volzh. book publishing house, 1988. - 128 p.

2. Ageeva, T. G. Grenadier units of the Caucasian Army P.N. Wrangel in the battles for the city of Tsaritsyn [Text] / T. G. Ageeva // Local history issues[Text]. Vol. 11. Materials of the XVIII and XIX local history. readings / Committee on Culture of the Volga Administration. region, Volgogr. region local historian museum, Volgogr. region society of local historians. - Volgograd: Publishing house Volgogr. state Univ., 2008. - pp. 219-221.

3. Current problems of history Tsaritsyn at the beginning of the 20th century and period civil Ouch wars s in the light of modern vision(1900-1920) [Text]: scientific materials. conference, 14 Oct. 1998 / Volgogr. memor.-ist. museum; [ed. count : B. G. Usik, T. A. Bogatova, V. A. Polyakova]. - Volgograd: Publisher, 2001. - 134 p.

4. BolsheviksTsaritsyn and in years civil Ouch wars s(1918-1920) [Text]: collection of documents and materials. - Volgograd: Nizh.-Volzh. book publishing house, 1986. - 240 p.

5. The rise of Stalin. Defense Tsaritsyn[Text] / ed.-comp. V. L. Goncharov. - Moscow: Veche, 2010. - 507 p. : ill. - (Military secrets of the 20th century).

6. Glushchenko, D. V. Bykadorov Evsey Fedorovich in CivilOuch warsit's on the Don[Text] / D. V. Glushchenko // Kazarla. - 2012. - No. 1. - P. 44-47: photo.

7. Civil and I wars a 1917-1920 gg. in Tsaritsyn and the Volga region[Text] // Astrakhan Cossacks of the Tsaritsyn village / K. M. Perfilyeva. - Volgograd: Stanitsa-2, 2011. - Book. 3. - P. 180-184: ill.

8. Gross, K. A. Civiland Iwars and the Cossacks of the village of Mikhailovskaya [Text] / K. A. Gross; hands works by M.E. Kunitsyn // Cossack circle: . - 2014. - March 7. - P. 6: photo.

9. Denikin, A. I. Essays on the Russian Troubles [Text] / A. I. Denikin // Questions of history. - 1994. - No. 7. - pp. 97–119; No. 9. - P. 88–111; No. 12. - pp. 114–136.

10. Igumentsev, S. Through time and storms [Text] / S. Igumentsev // Cossack circle: . - 2014. - April 30. - P. 3: photo.

11. Kireev, V. I. Malodelskaya village in Civil wow wars at [Text] / V.I. Kireev // Kazarla: Donskaya Kazarla (special issue). - 2012. - No. 6. - P. 30-37: photo.

12. Kostornichenko, V. N. Archival documents about Stalin’s activities in Tsaritsyn [Text]: (on the issue of adopting the decree on the nationalization of the Russian oil industry in 1918) / V. N. Kostornichenko // Questions of local history. - Volgograd: Publishing house Volgogr. state University, 2000. - Issue. 6: materials of local history readings dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Regional Society of Local History. - P. 50-55.

13. Mantsurov, Yu. A. The process of formation of the Tsaritsyn province in 1918-1920 [Text] / Yu. A. Mantsurov; ed. M. M. Zagorulko // Strezhen: scientific. yearbook. - Volgograd: Publisher, 2009. - Issue. 7. - P. 89-92.

14. Melnikova, V.V. Newspaper “Soldier of the Revolution” about the defense of Red Tsaritsyn [Text] / V.V. Melnikova // Historical and local history notes / Volgogr. region local historian museum, State archive Volgogr. region - Volgograd: Nizh.-Volzh. book publishing house, 1989. - Issue. 6: Dedicated to the 400th anniversary of the hero city. - P. 133-140: ill. - Bibliography at the end of Art.

15. Mordvintsev, I. At Golgotha ​​of the Revolution [Text]: to the 90th anniversary of the end Civil Ouch wars s / I. Mordvintsev // Fatherland. - 2010. - No. 3. - P. 176-187: photo.

16. Mordvintsev, I. The deadly truth of the army commander [Text]: on the 90th anniversary of the end Civil Ouch wars s / I. Mordvintsev // Fatherland. - 2010. - No. 4. - P. 129-141: ill.

17. Nalivaiko, G. G. Tsaritsyn. A look into the depths of centuries [Text]: historical essays / G. G. Nalivaiko. - Volgograd: Publisher, 2013. - 286 p. - Bibliography: p. 281-285 (60 titles).

18. Our region is in years of Soviet power(1917-1991) [Text] // My land: Tsaritsyn longevity, Stalingrad strength, Volgograd youth: essays on the history of socio-economics. development of the region (1589-2009) / G. V. Orlov. - Volgograd: Panorama, 2009. - P. 71-232.

19. Registered in Volgograd forever[Text]: collection of essays / [ed.-comp. L. M. Popova; artist V. A. Gusev]. - Volgograd: Nizh.-Volzh. book publishing house, 1975. - 175 p. : ill.

20. Puchenkov, A. The relationship between the generals of the Volunteer Army and the Great Don Army during the period Civil Ouch wars y [Text] / A. Puchenkov // Russian history. - 2013. - No. 5. - P. 27-42.

21. Tatarintseva, A. O. Declaration of the soul [Text]: (aspects of religious policy in the Tsaritsyn province in the 20s of the twentieth century) / A. O. Tatarintseva; hands works by I. A. Blinov // Cossack Circle: . - 2014. - May 16. - P. 6.

22. Tushkanov, I. V. Tsaritsyn in May 1918 [Text]: (according to the memoirs of V.N. Kokovtsov) / I.V. Tushkanov // Questions of local history / Volgogr. region local historian museum, Volgogr. region society of local historians. - Volgograd: VolSU Publishing House, 2010. - Issue. 12: Materials of local history readings XX. - P. 100-103. -

23. Foliev, A. Stalin in Tsaritsyn [Text] / A. Foliev, A. Folieva // Fatherland: Literary and artistic illustrated magazine. - 2004. - No. 4. - pp. 233-234.

24. Khmelevsky, K. A. Sons of the Don steppes [Text]: about F. G. Podtelkov, M. V. Krivoshlykov / K. A. Khmelevsky. - Moscow: Politizdat, 1985. - 127 p. - (Heroes of the Soviet Motherland).

25. Chernyshov, A. P. The third meeting of V.I. Lenin with representatives of Tsaritsyn [Text] / A.P. Chernyshov // Historical and local history notes / Volgogr. region local historian museum, State archive Volgogr. region - Volgograd: Nizh.-Volzh. book publishing house, 1989. - Issue. 6: Dedicated to the 400th anniversary of the hero city. - pp. 29-34.

26. Shield and sword revolution. 1917-1920 [Text] // Flipping through the documents of the Cheka. Tsaritsyn - Stalingrad. 1917-1945: Sat. doc. and materials. - Volgograd: Nizh.-Volzh. book publishing house, 1987. - P. 33-101: ill.

27. Yudin, V. N. Companions [Text]: internationalist defense heroes Tsaritsyn a: publicist. narration / V. N. Yudin. - Volgograd: Nizh. - Volzh. book publishing house, 1977. - 144 p.

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